war prevention works

50 stories of people resolving conflict

by Dylan Mathews
Oxford Research Group is a small independent team of researchers and support staff concentrating on nuclear weapons decision-making and the prevention of war. We aim to assist in the building of a more secure world without nuclear weapons and to promote non-violent solutions to conflict.

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- Promoting accountability and transparency.
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The five chapter titles refer to the stage of the conflict at the time of involvement by the organisation profiled. Within each chapter the stories are presented alphabetically by organisation name.

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Acknowledgments
In a world of 10,000 ethnies spilling across the borders of the 189 states of the United Nations system, violence seems to be everywhere, at least from the perspective of contemporary reporting in the mass media. Arms, whether in the hands of government forces or opposition groups, seem to do little for human security. And yet the world goes on, because peacemakers are also at work in the midst of violence. Their activity goes largely unreported, but they represent the path to a more peaceful future, where might does not make right.

The editors of this book have brought together a wonderful collection of stories about how local communities participate in transforming conflicts that have been destroying the lifeways of their society. Offering concrete evidence of what is possible, these stories need to be read and pondered by politicians, civic activists and policy makers.

Each story is unique, yet common threads appear in the pattern of the activities described. They include the following: the creation of special listening spaces, whether by national leaders or by local activists, women’s groups, faith groups or elders, spaces where stories of suffering are shared with the feared or hated ‘other’; the rediscovery of traditional patterns of restitution and reconciliation, with women’s groups and elders often playing key roles; helpful training in the skills of dialogue by friendly outsiders, and accompanying mobilization of the community’s learning and service resources; networking among an ever-widening circle of affected communities, and careful involvement of locals with regional and national leaders and elites.

Whether efforts begin at governmental levels or at the grassroots, the stories make clear that locals and national governments (where such exist) need each other. While many of the conflicts are still simmering, in each case a creative process has been delineated involving a continual relationship-building that holds promise for an end to violence and the achieving of new levels of peaceableness.

The stories are highly condensed, skilfully summarizing complex unfoldings of many interrelated events. Read them as stories! More complete documentation of each story will be found in the footnotes, as will references to scholarly analyses of the conflict-resolving processes at work. But even without looking up a single footnote, the cumulative effect of reading through these stories will be to give the reader a powerful sense of significant peacemaking processes at work in even the most violent conflict situations. The message is one of hope, and of empowerment for peacemakers everywhere.

Offering concrete evidence of what is possible, these stories need to be read and pondered by politicians, civic activists and policy makers.

Elise Boulding

Professor Emerita of Sociology, Dartmouth College, USA
Foreword

With increasing globalisation the interests of profit now tend to determine which group or nation should be supported and how, which should be helped in its struggle with a neighbour and why; whom to arm and with what weapons. Looking around this planet today we see hatred responding to hatred, violence to violence, inhumanity to inhumanity. These terrible knee jerks could kick the world to pieces.

What’s to be done? Thankfully many people have begun to wake up. Even some governments have established effective agencies for working on situations of conflict and the situations that could lead to violence. This essential book gives powerful examples of what the awakened have achieved, the many millions of individuals and the 240 non-governmental organisations listed at the end of the book.

It is important to recognise, as this great diversity of effort demonstrates, that there are no set answers to the problems that beset us. The historical setting, the culture, the character of the people involved, the nature of the issues concerned, demand wise and experienced, rather than text book, treatment.

The work of all these organisations and individuals is done by women and men who see what needs to be done and are doing it, often at great personal cost and in conditions of discomfort and danger. And they are educating, as this book will educate, those who haven’t fully realised what is happening.

At present the culture of achievement, profit, power and fame has seeped into the collective mind. We accept it as easily as we accept, and ignore, inequalities of wealth or position. But in so doing we have smudged, defaced and turned away from our wonderful and universal inheritance: the qualities of wisdom, courage and the capacity for love. How do the shams of celebrity compare with these?

The people whose work is described in the following pages, and those who will be interested in reading about them, have different values and are of a different mind. Their culture is the culture of peace, one we celebrate in a quite different way: with love and service and, if necessary, sacrifice.

I am profoundly encouraged by the effectiveness of the varied approaches and methods described here. They are human approaches applied by human beings to human problems. These are infinitely diverse, as are we, but like the streams that form a river, they also flow together in loving concern and intelligent respect for each other.

Professor Emeritus of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK
Here are 50 short accounts from all over the world of what ordinary people are doing to stop war and killing, armed only with integrity, stamina and courage. These stories show how powerful non-violence can be. They give an indication of what works, who does it, where, and how much it costs.

Contained in these pages are stories of how ordinary people do extraordinary things. They need to be known about. The people and organisations doing this work at the coalface typically operate discreetly or without fanfare, and are usually too busy to write about what they do.

Experience in what makes for effective non-violent intervention in conflict is growing exponentially. In 1980 there were only a handful of analyses of conflict interventions; two decades later there is an extensive body of knowledge. In addition to inter-governmental agencies working to prevent and mitigate conflict, there are now several hundred non-governmental organisations (NGOs) competent in the field. The application of theory and development of best practice are producing effective tools and techniques for conflict transformation.

These include: early warning; protection of human rights; promotion of democracy; support to indigenous dispute resolution; stakeholder dialogue; election monitoring; community mediation; bridge-building; confidence-building and security measures; civilian peace monitoring; violence containment; economic and technical assistance; arms embargoes; economic sanctions; peace-keeping; reconciliation measures; restorative justice and humanitarian diplomacy.

Nor can we be sure that the interventions described here will necessarily lead to a long-term durably peaceful outcome. Also, of course, there are many other examples where people tried to avert war, and failed.

What we do know is that a steep learning curve is taking place in terms of what can be done, how much it costs, and what constitutes best practice. These tools must now be made available far more widely, to communities across the globe struggling to create sustainable peace in areas of conflict. These tools need to be more readily available than weapons.

At this point a connection may be made between the work described in this book, and the work carried out by the Oxford Research Group with nuclear weapons decision-makers. Over many years O.R.G. has brought those who design, build, and commission or strategise with weapons to meet their counterparts from other countries, and their informed critics.

The objective is for the obstacles to disarmament to be overcome, and for those in positions of power over weapons of mass destruction to hear the point of view of those who envisage other ways of addressing threats and offer very different perspectives on how to build national and global security. In enabling this dialogue, O.R.G. uses many of the methods described in these stories: active listening, trust-building, brainstorming, mediation, role-play and so on.

But the emphasis is different. In these stories, the purpose of the intervention is usually immediate - it is to prevent or stop people getting killed, tortured, injured, or driven from their homes. Our purpose is to enable those with some power over hugely destructive weapons - people who incidentally often feel quite powerless - to gain a wider view of how their decisions affect the global picture, rather than the supposed national interest. The purpose, timescale and scope may be different, but the approaches used have striking similarities.
Well over 100 million people died in war in the twentieth century. At the beginning of the century, 80% of those deaths were military personnel; at the end of the century that figure reversed, and 80% of those who die now in armed conflict are civilians. Whereas previously most conflicts were between nations, now the vast majority are within nations. Twenty of the 34 poorest countries in the world are either involved in violent conflict or emerging from it. Conflict massively reduces the willingness of domestic and foreign investors to invest in a country, thus increasing poverty.

Governments are still subsidising arms exports. A US State Department paper comments ‘in some countries it is easier and cheaper to buy an AK 47 than to…provide a decent meal’ – rather disingenuous given that the US is the largest arms exporter in the world. Governments also commit vast sums of money to military interventions in conflict situations, which rarely solve the problem.

Meanwhile funding for non-violent conflict prevention and resolution work is grossly under funded. One example: the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe is the main intergovernmental conflict prevention organisation.

Britain spends twenty times its OSCE contribution on continued military operations to ‘contain’ Saddam Hussein. NATO’s core budget for administration only is 47 times that of the whole OSCE budget, while its member countries spend approximately $430 billion on defence, 215,000 times the OSCE budget. The result of such policies is that in conflict areas around the world, warlords have instant access to weapons and attention is concentrated on the violent, while potential bridge-builders and peacemakers have few tools and fewer resources.

This is beginning to change. Some national governments are beginning to realise that war prevention works, and to provide some funds for it. The UK government recently allocated £110 million p.a. to conflict resolution efforts co-ordinated between three government departments. This is a step in the right direction.

The reason for the delay in understanding is the relative obscurity of much of this work, so that many policy level officials are simply unaware that concrete preventive strategies have been practised effectively in a number of places. This is what our report shows: that there is a multitude of effective ways to prevent and resolve conflicts, without the use of violence. There are two implications. One: non-governmental organisations can be efficient and cost effective in preventing and resolving conflict, and this work could be contracted out to them at a fraction of the cost of military intervention. The stories in this book demonstrate time and again the extraordinary cost-effectiveness of non-military conflict transformation.

Two: since conflict inhibits foreign and domestic direct investment, it is in the interests of business and international corporations to support the non-violent resolution of conflict. Indeed in some of these stories industrialists have themselves played a pivotal role. Inspired by this, Oxford Research Group is establishing a fund to put those working at the frontline in touch with one another, and to channel resources and money directly to help them resolve conflict and assist in post-conflict reconciliation. It is hoped that the fund will grow, in partnership with other likeminded organisations and with international corporations, to multiply the application of effective techniques, and to increase the level of support available to those working silently with so few resources.

For each one of these stories, there are hundreds more out there, and thousands more people ready to commit their energy and talents to the prevention of bloodshed. Just imagine what could be done if the tools developed by the people in this book were made available worldwide…

The UK government recently allocated £110 million p.a. to conflict resolution efforts co-ordinated between three ministries. This is a step in the right direction.

Director, Oxford Research Group
Background
The conflict over Nigeria’s vast oil wealth, which accounts for over 90% of the country’s export earnings, has been raging for over forty years. Under the military dictatorships of Babangida, Abubakar and Abacha, community-led protests over the destruction of their environment and livelihoods caused by oil drilling were often brutally put down by the military and the dreaded mobile police forces (MOPOL). In addition, very little of the wealth generated by the drilling has ever filtered down to the communities, creating massive resentment and anger.

Communities have also been pitted against each other over the small amount of compensation that is entitled to them and oil companies have been complicit in some of the region’s most notorious incidences of violence. Even the transition to democratic rule has offered little comfort for the region, with extrajudicial killings by security forces and inter-communal conflicts over land and compensation rights still commonplace.

In 1998 a company contracted by the US multinational, Chevron, arrived in the Ngor Okpala/Uratta region of Imo state to conduct seismic tests to ascertain whether there were any oil fields in the area. Fearing that the arrival of the oil companies into the area would lead to the destruction of their environment and the exploitation of their communities, a number of youth groups emerged to demand the cessation of tests until adequate arrangements were made to protect their interests.

Packaging a series of demands, which included compensation for any damage done to the environment, these groups warned the company that they were willing to resort to violence if their needs were not met. In the past, throughout the region, such threats had resulted in tragedy. In November 1999 in the village of Odi in the Niger Delta a group of youths went on a rampage, killing 12 policemen in response to what they say was the failure of the government to fulfil its promise of relief for the region. As a result of the murders, the army was sent in and the town was completely destroyed, resulting in dozens and possibly hundreds of deaths.

Involvement
Responding to the escalating tensions in the area, the Committee for the Protection of People’s Dignity (COPPED) in association with its partner in the region, the Eastern Youths Democratic Forum, arranged to meet the groups of youths in Ngor Okpala and Uratta.

COPPED was set up in 1995 by a group of student leaders from the University of Lagos in response to Sani Abacha’s clampdown on the rise of student activism. COPPED’s aim was to re-invigorate the youth of Nigeria who through years of intimidation and violence at the hands of the junta were becoming increasingly disenchanted and marginalized. Since 1995 its range of activities has been broad, from campaigns against university campus gangs and AIDS awareness outreach programmes to conflict prevention and human rights advocacy.

The first hurdle that COPPED faced was whether or not it would be welcome in the area. Fortunately, COPPED’s student background and large youth membership worked in its favour. The University of Lagos Student Union had been a key pro-democracy force during Abacha’s rule, earning it the respect of young people throughout the country. This reputation gave COPPED essential leverage when meeting the youths face to face for the first time.

COPPED’s next task was to dispel the potentially explosive rumours, accusations and misconceptions that popularly circulate when oil is discovered in an area. This ‘truth telling’ they see as the first step to clearing a path for the non-violent resolution of the conflict. Importantly, this includes the historical background to oil exploration in Nigeria and how it has been used by successive dictatorships to divide communities.
A second element of their talks with the youths revolved around the lessons that could be learnt from other communities that had been through similar experiences. With an extremely poor communications infrastructure and a history of animosity between certain ethnic groups, communities in the region have had little chance of learning from each other’s experience with oil finds. This has led to many similar crises appearing throughout the region, some in very close proximity to one another. COPPED believe that by increasing people’s spatial and historical awareness, similar disputes stand a better chance of being resolved peacefully.

Lastly, COPPED began to teach the youths some basic negotiating skills. The confrontational approach that had been adopted by the youths was explained by COPPED to be counterproductive and would not help them towards their stated goals. Thus COPPED impressed upon the group the need to retract their demands and allow the oil company to ‘anchor’ its complete their seismic tests, so that they (and the community) could ascertain what, if any, oil existed beneath their soil.

With a long history of collusion between multinational oil companies, the state and the security forces, COPPED emphasised the importance of not scaring the company off. Such a move would have limited the opportunity for a transparent and open consultation process and may have unwittingly pushed the oil company towards more clandestine and provocative methods.

The final stage of the process was to invite members of the youth groups to participate in the democracy and human rights courses, which COPPED have run in various conflict prone areas throughout the region. With the curriculum built around the core concepts of ‘democracy and good governance’ ‘justice and the rule of law’ ‘conflict prevention and resolution’ and ‘gender issues’ the idea was to institutionalise non-violent approaches to conflict and thereby reduce the probability of such conflagrations occurring in the first place.

Outcome

After hearing the case put forward by COPPED the youth groups decided to retract their threat of violence. However, this may well be a temporary peace. ‘We need support to hold and consolidate peace’ says Peter Claver Oparah, Secretary General of COPPED. ‘Our task is Herculean and we are only just able to keep the peace in this area. If the oil exploration and drilling continues without proper consultation with the local communities these youth groups will certainly resort to violence.’

While the overwhelming majority of protests by communities in the Niger Delta and beyond have been peaceful, many of which have been met with massive violence, the worrying trend is the tendency of communities to ‘fight back’ when provoked or threatened.

The case of Odi, and many others, shows how the commercial exploitation of the region, without adequate recompense for the affected communities and coupled with severe environmental degradation may lead to a growing number of groups who, seeing no alternative, will resort to violence to achieve justice.

Peter Claver Oparah says that ‘youths remain the engine room of a vibrant population as well as the conscience of every nation. Where there is no way, it is up to the youths to chart a new pathway through which the people can walk into freedom.’ This is what COPPED set out to achieve back in 1995: to galvanise the youth of Nigeria to chart a better course for their future. While democratic rule has returned to Nigeria much work remains to be done. With adequate support COPPED may well become a potent force for change in Nigeria.

For More information:

See www.essentialaction.org/era/eraCall.html for an excellent resource on the environmental problems in Nigeria. See also www.copped.org for more information about COPPED.

Deaths:
Unknown

Cost of Involvement:
$100,000
Annual budget of COPPED.

Internally displaced:
Unknown

Refugees:
Unknown

‘We need support to hold and consolidate peace’

Peter Claver Oparah, Secretary General of COPPED

War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict
Background
During his years in power, Slobodan Milosevic oversaw the gradual disintegration of the political, economic and social infrastructure of Serbia, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, warfare on a scale not seen in Europe since WWII and increasingly suffocating international isolation and sanctions. The NATO bombing of Serbia between March and June 1999 in response to the Serb violence in Kosovo only deepened the crisis. While the figures speak for themselves - such as damage to Serbia's infrastructure estimated at over $4bn - the psychological costs were similarly high.

One source describes the prevailing mood amongst the Serbian population as being one of deep uncertainty, victimisation and isolation.¹ It is no wonder, then, that the International Crisis Group called Milosevic ‘the single greatest cause of instability and conflict in South-eastern Europe’.² The removal of Milosevic, however, seemed a monumental task.

With increasing control of all forms of media within Serbia, he used the NATO bombings to strengthen his hand by arguing that the West was intent on destroying the Serb people. His indictment for war crimes made many pro-democracy leaders increasingly nervous, seeing that if Milosevic had no-where to run he would most likely fight harder than ever to maintain his power and authority within Serbia. Elections, therefore, would be a sham and in all probability would end in violence and further repression. Meanwhile the opposition forces were viewed as weak, fragmented and indecisive, lacking the credibility to mount a serious threat to the regime.³ This view was particularly prevalent among western governments who largely ignored them.

Involvement
In July 1999, just after the devastating NATO bombing campaign, the East West Institute and the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised a conference in Bratislava, Slovakia, entitled ‘The Future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the context of post war reconstruction’.

The conference brought together representatives of pro-democracy forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) including the major opposition parties, trade unions, NGOs and independent media along with key figures from the international community (EU, Council of Europe, OSCE etc). This was the first time that anti Milosevic groups from all sectors of Serbian society had been brought together. The US-based East West Institute, founded in 1981 as a think tank on traditional security issues had, since the collapse of Communism, focused on research, networking and low-key conferences to help support the development of democracy and free enterprise in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. Its early work - acting as a bridge between East and West, building confidence in order to reduce the risk of armed conflict, had been praised by key Cold War politicians over the years and was widely respected. At the Bratislava meeting, Serbian pro-democracy participants voiced their concerns that the economic and political situation in the FRY would deteriorate even further and that Milosevic would tighten his grip on power.

Worryingly, some participants predicted an impending civil war or a ‘fascist coup’ by forces close to the Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj. Amid continuing international isolation and a crippling embargo the participants felt that Serbia desperately needed to re-engage with the rest of the international community so that it could begin to work towards an open society.⁴

When discussing the obstacles that lay in their path towards the goal of a free and democratic society, it was felt that the removal from office of Serbia's current leadership was not enough: pro-democracy forces were too fragmented to mount a credible alternative to the current system. As a result, two important initiatives were launched. The first was the creation of a ‘Community for Change’ - a consortium of pro-democracy forces which would engage the Serbian population and the international community in a common vision for the country. The second key outcome was the setting up of a Task Force to assist in the formation of the Community for Change and to develop a comprehensive action plan for the future of the FRY.
EWI, which was serving as the Secretariat for the Task Force, immediately set to work, organising a series of meetings between September 1999 and February 2000 which brought the Community for Change into close contact with international actors such as the Council of Europe. Here they were able to discuss some of the most vital issues that faced the country. At the same time, the Task Force organised meetings in Belgrade which soon became an important forum for the representatives of the opposition parties to meet each other and with NGOs, trade unions and the media.

This gradual process of coalition building played a significant role in the decision by all the main opposition groups to call for early general elections, which was the result of an intense discussion at the Task Force Belgrade meetings.

When, on July 6th, Milosevic changed the constitution so that the President of the FRY would be elected by a popular vote and early presidential elections would be held, the pro-democracy forces were given an opportunity to prove to themselves and to their many sceptics (both inside and outside the country) that they were able to unite and win at the polls. This was a decisive moment. Up until this point many experts especially in the west, argued that the opposition, united or not, would not win the elections. The International Crisis Group recommended that the international community not support these flawed elections lest they hand Milosevic a sham victory, further commenting that ‘serious doubts remain about the capacity of the opposition to mount a credible campaign...nor is there a consensus behind any one figure as an agent of change and an alternative to Milosevic.’

A Bratislava II conference scheduled for July 7th - the day after the constitutional changes - was devoted entirely to the task of working towards a common vision for the elections. The meeting covered every major issue from nominating a presidential candidate and preparing the election campaign to strengthening horizontal networking.

Soon after, nearly all of the opposition parties grouped together to form the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), nominating Vojislav Kostunica as their presidential candidate. A massive ‘Go to vote’ campaign was launched and preparations were made to field trained observers in each of the 160 municipalities in Serbia. As the Serbian newspaper Danas noted ‘The analysts of the Left probably could not have predicted such a degree of unity even in their worst nightmares.’

After a comprehensive and exhaustive campaign mounted by the united opposition, the election results yielded a clear victory for Kostunica’s DOS coalition. When Milosevic attempted to have the results annulled, a wave of non-violent protests spread throughout the country and he was forced to concede defeat. The DOS went on to win the Serbian elections in December and many members of the Bratislava Process Task Force became members of parliament, some even joining the Cabinet.

It is difficult to know to what extent the Bratislava Process contributed to the successful overthrow of the Milosevic regime. However, members of the Task Force, some of whom are now members of the government, privately attest to the importance of the initiative, pointing out that it did provide the first real opportunity for the pro-democracy forces to meet and coalesce around a common strategy.
1967 - 1972
Moral Re-Armament
India

Background
Following India’s independence in 1947, the North East of the country was plagued by a series of secessionist uprisings. In 1956 the struggle for an independent ‘Nagaland’ by indigenous peoples turned violent, and even the promise of full statehood within India did little to quell the uprising. In 1965 another armed movement was launched, this time in the Mizo Hills area.

Against the backdrop of increasing tension and escalating violence throughout the entire region, a new conflict began to emerge, this time in the hill area of Assam and headed by the All-Party Hill Leaders Conference (APHLC). The roots of this conflict began in 1960 when Assamese became the state’s official language. This angered the indigenous peoples in the hill area, who had been largely left alone under British rule and were accorded special status under Nehru in order to preserve their way of life. Now, through the APHLC, the hill people of Assam were clamouring for their own state.

The media of the time predicted a catastrophe on two fronts: one, that the struggle for an independent state carved from a part of Assam would become violent; second, that the threatened break-up of their state and the inflammatory language from some of the hill leaders would provoke clashes between the people living in the plains of Assam and those in the hills. Given the instability that characterised the region during this time, both scenarios were likely.

Involvement
In October 1967 the beleaguered General Secretary of the APHLC, Stanley Nichols-Roy, attended a dinner in New Delhi organised by members of Moral Re-Armament (MRA). Extremist factions within Nicholas-Roy’s party were becoming more aggressive in their agitation for statehood and increasingly hostile towards him, accusing him of weakness and of being ‘too soft’ on the issue. In the eyes of many commentators, there was a real risk that the APHLC would be hijacked by these extremists who would lead the party down the path towards violence.

However, around the dinner table that night, listening to his MRA hosts, Nichols-Roy began to hear how non-violence can work, how it has been used elsewhere to resolve conflicts and how MRA were willing to help him, if he would let them. He was intrigued. MRA had already gained a reputation around the world for its pioneering work in industrial and interclass relations and so when they invited Nichols-Roy and other key officials to the opening of their centre in Panchgani, in nearby Maharashtra state, he readily accepted.

MRA was launched in the UK in the 1920s by an American Lutheran pastor called Frank Buchman in response to what he saw as a need for a ‘moral and spiritual awakening’. The core MRA philosophy is that social change can only be achieved through personal transformation. MRA encourages the individual to search, through ‘times of silence’ which connect the individual to God, for spiritual growth and a clear sense of direction.

At the MRA centre Nichols-Roy and his delegation met political figures from all over the world, including French Socialist MP Irene Laure, who had tirelessly worked to build bridges of reconciliation between Germany and France following the war. Her story, of how she had cast aside her hatred of the Germans and now embraced them in order to build a new future, profoundly inspired Nichols-Roy. The personal care given to the APHLC leaders at this formative and tense time was critical. The visit became the first of many, and while the details of the talks that were conducted during this time are unavailable, they clearly had a deep impact on the leadership of the APHLC.
Said Nichols-Roy: ‘My visit to Panchgani convinced me that MRA is the ideology to bring sanity and peace to India’s troubled North-East, and to help it play its rightful part in Asia and the world.’

Others noticed the change in Nichols-Roy too. B.P. Chaliha, Chief Minister for Assam since 1956, said: ‘You know, that man Nichols-Roy is different. He used to be hard. He used to be stubborn. I am so impressed with his change that I am now prepared to work unitedly with him’.

With this Nichols-Roy, B.P. Chaliha and the policy makers in New Delhi began working together to resolve the issue of statehood for the hill people, and with it the threat of violence began to diminish.

What then followed was a remarkable ‘outreach’ programme in Assam which saw thousands of people from all walks of life watching a range MRA produced morality films and plays based on true stories drawn from around the world. This initiative was not in fact intended to ‘prepare’ the population for the inevitable secession; rather it was part of MRA’s ongoing mission to promote tolerance, peace and interclass relations.

For instance, the MRA film ‘Voice of the Hurricane’ called for humanity and racial understanding in British East Africa, telling the story of a group of white liberals attempting to bridge the divide between black revolutionaries and right-wing white colonists.

Nichols-Roy and B.P. Chaliha were so impressed with these films when they first saw them that not only did they request that every legislator in Assam watch them, but Nichols-Roy personally accompanied MRA, sometimes even acting as projectionist, as they travelled the region.

For the everyday man and woman, most of whom would never have seen a Western film or musical, these stories of personal transformation may well have made a significant contribution to the process of tolerance building and understanding amongst the people of the area. After seeing the MRA films one Assamese soldier said: ‘We are pointing our guns at someone we claim to be our countryman. You can do this for a time, but at some stage you must say something to him. Our trouble is we don’t know what to say to him that will reach his heart. You have shown us the way.’

The films and plays, which were also shown in other areas experiencing violence such as the Mizo Hills, had a similarly deep impact. After 25,000 people in the area had watched the MRA plays and films a member of the District Council said ‘But for Moral Re-armament there would be bloodshed and violence in the hills of Assam today.’

The profound change in Nichols-Roy and many others, which ushered in a new level of cooperation with the Assamese leaders and the Indian government, finally paid off. On April 2nd 1970 the new state of Meghalaya (‘Abode of the clouds’) was born. At the official inauguration of the state, the Indian Express wrote: ‘Since the Meghalaya formula emerged there has been little tensions between the people of the hills and of the valley. The birth of “Abode of the clouds” seems to have generated a climate of goodwill what few believed possible even a few months ago.’ For many people, the role of MRA was clear. B.P. Chaliha said: ‘MRA has transformed the climate of Assam. That is a fact.’ Even Nehru agreed, saying that they had ‘abated the hate in the Hills.’

Outcome

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**For More information:**
See [www.mra.org.uk](http://www.mra.org.uk) (International Moral Re-Armament web site) or [www.mraindia.org](http://www.mraindia.org) for the Indian MRA site. Also read the books by Michael Henderson published by Grosvenor Books which give a good overview of the work of MRA as well as inspiring stories of forgiveness and reconciliation.

**Deaths:** Unknown

**Cost of Involvement:** Unknown
Background

Serbia, in the twilight years of the twentieth century, was in the words of the International Crisis Group, gripped by a ‘democratic despotism’, where elections were free but not fair and where increasing state tyranny suffocated the freedom of expression and assembly of anyone voicing dissent at the Milosevic regime. Meanwhile the horrors of Bosnia and of Kosovo had shown the world just how destabilising President Slobodan Milosevic was both regionally and internationally, and yet it seemed that no-one was sure how to remove him from power. The 78 days of NATO bombing only appeared to strengthen his hand by confirming what he had been telling the people for years, namely that there was a worldwide conspiracy against Serbs. Indeed, at the conclusion of the NATO bombings, US President Clinton reiterated that President Milosevic continued to pose an ‘extraordinary’ threat to regional peace and stability.

Within Serbia the situation had been getting progressively worse for several years. In 1998 the state introduced a new draconian law that required all university professors to sign what was effectively a ‘declaration of loyalty’ to the state. Those who refused were fired. In addition all university governing and supervisory bodies were to be appointed by the state, including the deans of each faculty. Such a move was intended to stifle the nascent pro-democracy movement, which was gathering momentum across campuses throughout the country.

Involvement

In response to the imposition of this law, students from the University of Belgrade began boycotting lectures and classes. Their demands, for the newly state-appointed deans to be dismissed and for all professors who had been fired to be reinstated, began to gather more and more support despite, and indeed because of, increasing state violence against them. Amid mounting pressure the state capitulated, agreeing to the students’ demands. With this unexpected victory the movement known as ‘Otpor’ was born.

Otpor, which means ‘Resistance’ in Serb, made its debut in December 1998 with a graffiti-spraying campaign across Belgrade. Then they were a minuscule self-styled non-ideological ‘movement’ calling for, among other things, the removal of Milosevic, true democratisation and constitutional guarantees for human and civil rights for all. Yet in the space of eighteen months the ranks of Otpor swelled exponentially, numbering an estimated 70,000 members by the summer of 2000. Tapping into a vast pool of energetic and frustrated young people throughout the country, Otpor very quickly became a credible threat to the establishment.

From the very beginning Otpor had no leader, eschewing any form of hierarchy. ‘The idea was, cut off one Otpor head and other 15 heads would instantly appear’ said one Otpor member. This made it increasingly difficult for the state to shut them down. Their tactics varied enormously. On one occasion Otpor activists held a birthday celebration for Slobodan Milosevic in the city of Nis which drew over 2,000 supporters.

Citizens of the city were encouraged to write their birthday wishes and messages to Milosevic on a giant birthday card. Otpor wrote its own message which read ‘Thank you for the childhood you have taken from us, for the unforgettable war scenes you have given us...Happy birthday, Mr President, may you celebrate the next one...in the Hague.’ All the while, Otpor members canvassed the country spreading their message, daubing walls with their slogans and logos, daring to be bold and outspoken critics of the regime when the rest of the country was largely silent.
Following the NATO bombings, international support for Otpor grew. In March 2,000 in Budapest, the US-based International Republican Institute (IRI) organised a seminar for Otpor members on non-violent resistance. The event was run by Robert Helvey, who based his teachings upon Gene Sharp’s seminal three volume work ‘The Politics of Non Violent Action.’ Underpinning this work is the simple logic that political power can most efficiently be controlled at its source* - that the power of tyrants, even in the most monolithic of states, relies to a certain extent on the degree to which society grants the tyrant that power.

During the seminar, Otpor activists learned how to organise a strike, how to communicate with symbols, how to play hide and seek with the police, how to respond to interrogation and, crucially, how to infiltrate the regime’s ‘pillars of support’ - the police, judiciary, media and so on. The seminar evidently had a great impact on the activists. ‘This was the first time we thought about this in a systematic, scientific way’ said one Otpor member. ‘We will go back and apply this.’

After Helvey’s training, Otpor put together a user’s manual based on Sharp’s research and trained many of their 70,000 members throughout the country. The training served Otpor well. ‘We learned that fear is a powerful but vulnerable weapon because it disappears far faster than you can recreate it’, said one Otpor activist.

Perhaps the most striking example of their effect on the regime came on the day Milosevic announced the dates for a presidential election. Otpor, having been tipped off by a government insider a fortnight earlier, had over 60 tonnes of election propaganda ready and waiting which was immediately distributed throughout the country. The propaganda included over 5,000 cans of spray and around 2.5 million stickers with the slogan ‘He’s finished’, as well as Otpor T-shirts and mobile phones to help maintain communication between the groups. Otpor had successfully infiltrated Milosevic’s ‘pillars of support’.

When the opposition forces united to fight the election and began mobilising for the massive ‘Go to Vote’ campaign, Otpor was ready. Since most Otpor members were students who were entitled to vote, they already represented a significant voting block. However, many Otpor members were also covertly trained in election monitoring, just across the border in Szeged, Hungary. These people went on to train others and so by the time of the election there were almost 20,000 election monitors, two for every polling station, making it impossible for Milosevic to successfully rig the results.

When the results which handed the presidency to Vojislav Kostunica were annulled, Otpor sprang into action calling its supporters to converge at various locations throughout the country. While many observers thought the uprising was spontaneous, the targets had been carefully selected in a well thought out strategic plan. The uprising, which met little resistance from the state security forces, gave Milosevic no option but to concede defeat.

On the eve of the elections, the International Crisis Group commented that Otpor’s unconventional non-violent actions - their graffiti and fly poster campaigns and their daring acts of theatre - made fun of public officials and humanised the faces of the regime. ‘In doing so and in mocking its leadership’, they said, ‘the students and their associates managed to break down some of the fear that has silenced most Serbs for so many years. The consequent decrease in tension could embolden more voters to cast aside their anxiety and cast their ballots for their genuinely preferred candidate.’

Others agreed. ‘Through marches and mockery, physical courage and mental agility, Otpor grew into the mass underground movement that stood at the disciplined core of the hidden revolution that really changed Serbia.’

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*War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict*  
Oxford Research Group
Background
There is a wealth of evidence that demonstrates the direct correlation between the failure to control the supply of weapons and the incidence of violence. In Albania, following the collapse of the pyramid savings schemes in 1997, angry crowds overran police stations and army barracks stealing approximately 700,000 machine guns, 3.5 million grenades and several billion rounds of ammunition. As a result, literally overnight the protests turned into a violent armed rebellion and a state of emergency was declared. ‘The effects of this supply are clear for all to see’, said one commentator at the time. ‘Should tensions rise in either Macedonia or Kosovo, Albanians in these countries are markedly more likely to be supplied with weapons from supporters in Albania’ - thus raising the prospects of armed conflict. What followed in those regions bears tragic witness to that prediction.

The same logic applies to the supply of larger weapons. Following the Gulf War in 1991 the question of arms export controls became a key issue for many western countries. How, they asked, was Saddam Hussein able to accumulate such a vast array of weaponry, so much of which had been bought from Western countries? The willingness of Western countries to supply arms - or the means to produce those arms - to Iraq despite the severe tensions in the region not only increased the prospects of war in what was the most militarised region on earth but also raised the stakes of any resulting war. It also raised very serious questions for the supplier nations who fought in the subsequent Gulf War since their soldiers were threatened by weapons their government had sold to the Iraqis.

While a flurry of activity by the P-5 (largest arms sellers) states signalled a renewed sense of urgency in curbing the export of conventional weapons, this was soon dashed by an unprecedented selling spree by the US and other major suppliers to countries where there were significant tensions or regional instability.

Involvement
The failure of the international community to establish constraints on conventional arms exports prompted the UK non governmental organisation Saferworld to take action.

In 1993 Saferworld, an independent foreign affairs think tank working on international security issues, engaged a team of international lawyers to draw up a model text for a European ‘Code of Conduct’ on arms transfers. Such a code aimed to elaborate on the set of eight common criteria proposed by the EU following the Gulf War. These included considerations such as whether the importing country was in a region of tension, whether the country may use the weapons for internal repression and whether the country adhered to international norms regarding issues such as terrorism. However these criteria were not binding and lacked clear interpretation and as such were largely ignored.

At the same time as the model text was being drafted, Saferworld began engaging other likeminded non governmental organisations (NGO) in its efforts. By the time the document was officially launched in Brussels in 1995, 40 NGOs stood behind it.

Reactions to the document were, however, mixed. While a small number of NGOs argued that the document was not far reaching enough and was even ‘counterproductive’, others, including several EU governments (notably the UK and France) as well as representatives from the defence industries saw it as a threat to future export opportunities. Thus they were resolutely opposed to it.

Saferworld realised that in order to unblock much of this resistance, widespread support for the Code across the EU was needed. This is precisely what they set out to achieve. A vital part of the strategy was to bring on board high profile charities such as Amnesty International, Save the Children, Oxfam and Christian Aid.

As Elizabeth Clegg from Saferworld notes, ‘the involvement of mass
Internally displaced: Unavailable

Refugees: Unavailable

Membership organisations in supporting particular policies is essential in order to show that those policies have the support of a significant sector of society. By the end of 1997 their efforts were paying off, with 600 NGOs across Europe and 300 MPs from 8 member states pledging their support for the Code. Critically, the UK Labour party who were in opposition at the time, endorsed the Code and agreed to include it as part of their plans for a ‘Responsible Arms Trade’ under their much-touted ethical foreign policy.

 Whilst momentum began to build across Europe, Saferworld established a working group to consider what measures would be necessary in order to create a robust EU Code. Despite the best efforts of the lawyers who had drafted the model text, there were still concerns that the code would be interpreted differently, as had already been proved by the ‘creative interpretation’ by certain member states of the eight common criteria.

 For instance, while the German Government refused to agree a warship contract with Taiwan in 1994, France supplied $6.4bn worth of military hardware, including frigates and Mirage fighters.

 In May 1997 the Labour party came to power. The following year it was the turn of the UK to take the rotating EU presidency. This was the perfect opportunity to see whether the Labour government would honour its commitments. The key, according to UK government officials, was to persuade the French government to agree to the preparation of a joint UK-French draft of the Code that could be presented to the other EU partners. After much persuading the French agreed and the first draft was circulated to EU partners in Jan 1998.

 For Saferworld, who had been working for eight years on the development of the Code, the end was almost in sight. However, even as the Code was being deliberated by the EU decision makers, the working group continued to feed suggestions and analysis in order to prevent it from being watered down. This was reinforced by consistent public pressure applied by a Europe-wide coalition of NGOs, who ensured that the issue was consistently in the political limelight.

 Outcome

 At the end of May 1998 EU foreign ministers finally agreed the Code of Conduct. Under French threats to pull out of the entire agreement, all the ‘softer’ options were adopted. While many non governmental organisations including Saferworld were disappointed at the EU’s decision to adopt a less comprehensive code, the fact was that a politically binding code now existed.

 EU arms exporting nations now had to subscribe to a set of guiding principles before considering arms export license applications. Within the space of a year 193 export licenses had been denied, and the denial notifications were then circulated to all EU members states to inform them of the reason for their decision. In addition 13 non-EU states aligned themselves with the Code, four of which were among the world’s top 30 arms suppliers. Since 1998 Saferworld has continued to work towards tighter implementation of the EU Code and its wider adoption.

 Back in 1979 US Senator William Proxmire commented that supplying arms to the Middle East may not be ‘like throwing a lighted match into a gasoline tank, but it is like adding more gasoline to a tank that has exploded in flaming destruction over and over in the past few years.’ While the EU code of conduct is by no means a panacea, especially as some non EU countries may be more than willing to supply arms with less restraint, it is likely that there is less fuel in some of the world’s more unstable gasoline tanks.

 Visit Saferworld’s website at www.saferworld.co.uk. Also see the briefings produced by the British American Security Information Council at www.basicint.org. For a more detailed look at the development of the EU Code of Conduct read the chapter written by Ian Davis entitled ‘Development of a EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’ in a forthcoming book under consideration by SIPRI/OUP ‘The Regulation of arms and dual-use exports by EU member states: a comparative analysis of Germany, Sweden and the UK’. 
Background
The Beagle Channel, a strip of water that bisects the southernmost tip of South America, had been the source of tension between Argentina and Chile for over 100 years. Both countries claimed it as theirs, and fighting had flared up on more than one occasion. At stake were several small islands and their maritime extensions (30,000 square miles) with possible fishing and oil rights. In 1971 both countries decided to submit the issue to arbitration at the International Court at the Hague. The verdict gave the islands to Chile, while Argentina retained the navigation rights to its naval base in the channel.

To the surprise and shock of the Chileans, the Argentineans declared the decision null and void, arguing that the court, amongst other misdeeds, had shown a bias towards Chile. In early 1978 the Presidents of both countries met in an attempt to thrash out a deal, yet no progress could be made. After continued deadlock, both countries began preparing for war.

Involvement
Papal Nuncio, Pio Laghi, who had already been following the unfolding events, asked President Videla whether a three-way direct communication between Videla, Pinochet and the Pope would persuade the parties not to go to war. Videla reasoned that it might work and so Laghi immediately set about contacting Rome. On December 23rd at 10am, on the day of the planned invasion, Pope John Paul II notified both sides that he was sending his personal envoy, Cardinal Samore, to speak with both sides. Argentina pulled back its ships and reopened its borders, only hours away from war.

As a last ditch attempt, Chile formed a special working group to consider all possible options available to them. Since a judicial solution had already failed, they believed that mediation from a country with moral and political power would be the only solution. At the top of their ‘wish list’ was the Vatican. While both sides initially agreed, President Videla of Argentina was promptly ‘disauthorized’ by the Junta and the military gave the order to invade the disputed islands on the 21st or 22nd December.

Samore’s goals were to persuade both sides to (a) refrain from using force to resolve the dispute, (b) arrange for the military situation to revert to the status quo ante (c) resume dialogue, and (d) work towards a settlement. Samore also reiterated that he was not there to mediate; rather he was to use the Holy See’s ‘good offices’ in search of a solution.

So began a series of shuttle visits between Rome, Santiago and Buenos Aires, with Samore first gathering as much information about each side’s position, and then later acting as a messenger delivering proposals from each side to the other. As the meetings progressed Samore began to draft proposals of his own, based upon his judgement of the situation as presented to him by both sides. When it became clear that neither side would compromise, Samore decided that he should seek an agreement that would transfer the matter to papal mediation.

After considerable shuttle diplomacy, Samore brokered the Act of Montevideo, an agreement which satisfied all four of his original aims. While this was a significant achievement in itself, the task of mediating this long standing dispute had only just begun.

The mediation began in early 1979, with the Pope suggesting that the parties should concentrate on the ‘points of convergence’ i.e an issue where there was little conflict of interest. The Pope also requested that the media be kept away from the negotiations and all announcements would be carefully managed by the Vatican. This way neither side could use the media as part of its negotiation strategy.
Chile, then, was desperate for a foreign success. However, even if we accept this argument, it should not be overlooked that during the six years of negotiations, peace was maintained during some very rough times.

In a final analysis, then, the talks may have been critical not only for their pivotal role in helping reach a settlement through direct mediation but also for buying enough time - keeping the peace for long enough - to enable the political climate in each country to change to allow for the settlement to take place.

In 1983 Samore died, and was replaced by Secretary of State Cardinal Agostino Casaroli who, as the most important man in the Vatican after the Pope, added a great deal of weight and increased impetus to the renewed talks. Soon after another confidence building measure, largely brokered during informal meetings outside Rome between the chiefs of the two delegations, a Declaration of Peace and Friendship was signed.

From here on the pace of the talks accelerated and the mediation team signalled that a settlement was in sight. At this point Casaroli reverted to the original ‘ground rules’ i.e proposals between the two sides would not be transmitted to the other side but left with the mediation team thus giving them sufficient leverage to extract the best possible concessions from both sides. This tactic was successful and by October 1984 both sides announced that they had reached a settlement.

The treaty awarded the islands in dispute to Chile but the maritime boundary was tailored to accommodate Argentinean concerns. Both countries also agreed to promote economic ties.

In evaluating the impact of the Papal intervention, commentators have noted that by 1984, the domestic situation in both countries had changed considerably and that this may have been one of the most important factors for the resolution of the conflict. For instance Argentina had made the transition from military dictatorship to a democracy. This change had a significant effect on the way in which the talks developed, as military men were replaced by civilians. In Chile, the country became increasingly isolated, more so after 1982 when Pinochet dismissed the entire cabinet and replaced them with his military cronies.

Outcome

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Deaths:
None

Cost of Involvement:
Not available

Each side met with Samore and the mediating team separately. It was also agreed that any change in position or agreement by both sides was not binding until an overall settlement was reached. This way, Samore began to create some flexibility amongst the two sides’ positions. Importantly, the information passing between each side was strictly controlled by Samore, which gave him considerable influence as a mediator. Neither side knew what the other side offered or what the response was to an offer that they may have made. Later on, this convention was amended so that both sides would be told of each others position, but only after any potentially inflammatory statements had been discreetly edited out.

Despite these valiant efforts, by 1980 there was still no progress. The Pope therefore decided to put forward his own proposals for a settlement. While these were accepted by Chile, Argentina objected to them, without rejecting them outright.

For more information:

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Background

Interfaith coexistence interrupted by interfaith violence has been a feature of many Indian cities for years. However the general upsurge in support for the Hindu right, and the corresponding rise of Hindu extremism as exemplified by the destruction of the Babri Masjid Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992, has exacerbated tensions between Hindu and Muslim communities. This is especially true of areas with severe social deprivation, as is found in some of the sprawling cities. Ahmedabad is one such example. Two million, or 40% of the entire population, live in slums - vast and labyrinthine shanty towns adjoining the main city. Most of the houses in the slums are fashioned from whatever can be salvaged - pieces of corrugated iron, plastic sheeting, timber - and most lack even basic sanitation facilities. It is in these cramped, dirty and severely deprived areas that most of the interfaith violence has been concentrated.

The causes of the violence have varied over the years. In recent times it has been alleged that the ruling Hindu party, the BJP, has ‘engineered’ riots between Muslims and Hindus as a means of solidifying their political base and of making the Congress Party - which is largely in favour of a secular state - appear weak.

Involvement

In 1991 Saint Xavier’s Social Service Society (hereafter referred to as St Xavier’s), under the leadership of Fr Prakash, began to look into the reasons for the violence in the slums. Fr. Prakash recalls: ‘We decided to take a look at the why of the whole thing...what has to be done to change the situation? We looked at the life of the poor; how they are constantly subjected to... We looked at the politicians who don’t want to come to grips with the situation poor people are in. We concluded that the poor are being used.’

St Xavier’s had been working in Ahmedabad since the 1970s and had concerned itself primarily with relief work, providing food and health care to the most disadvantaged of the slum dwellers. Over the years its programme of activities broadened to include issues such as human rights, the environment and gender. However, their move into conflict prevention and mediation was not, according to Fr Prakash, a planned process. Rather it seems that it was more a ‘gut reaction’ to the plight of the people that they had been serving for years. They saw that violence in the slums only made the lives of those already seriously disadvantaged even worse. Therefore promoting ‘interfaith harmony’ seemed to be a logical extension of their relief work.

The range of peace initiatives launched by St Xavier’s included street plays, peace festivals and public awareness - what they called ‘myth busting’ in order to counter inflammatory propaganda spread mostly by Hindu extremists. One of the most interesting projects has been the setting up of informal ‘peace committees’ in each of the slums in which it operates.

These were made up of members from one of the formal, officially registered committees that they set up to help coordinate youth, credit and women’s programmes. According to Fr Prakash the peace committees were expected to, ‘automatically safeguard the peace of the area...[they] must respond to propaganda at its very roots.’

An example of their work in action occurred in Shahpur slum in the winter of 1991, when a group of Hindus approached the area intent on killing Muslims. On learning of this imminent trouble, the Hindu members of the Shahpur peace committee quickly mobilised, confronting the crowd and saying to them ‘you kill us first.’ The mob retreated and no violence occurred. As intercessionaries, by physically placing themselves between the mob and their intended victims, they were able to prevent violence.
Another example of the work of the peace committees is through ‘myth busting.’ During periods of increased tension, leaflets are often distributed by extremists in an attempt to incite, usually, anti Muslim violence. Often, children are paid to distribute the leaflets and even though many slum dwellers are illiterate, one study notes that ‘the novelty of receiving a piece of paper with a message for them leads them to ask a literate member of their community to read the patrika (leaflet) out loud.’

When the committee hears of this practice they usually hold a community meeting where the local people have the opportunity to learn whether the allegations are true. The committee then tries to identify who was distributing the leaflets, where they came from (usually from another area of the city) and why people feel the leaflets were distributed in the first place.

In this way the community meetings act as a safety valve, allowing the local people to ask questions and learn the truth. The essence of this strategy, according to Fr. Prakash, is ‘to counter false propaganda as soon as it takes off-bit by bit and point by point.’

A measure of St Xavier’s effectiveness is that the local authority regularly requests their assistance following a riot. Indeed Fr. Prakash was appointed to an emergency response committee by the District Collector and as such was not only notified immediately of any civil unrest but was also allowed to enter areas off limits to the public during such disturbances.

Part of their success must be attributed to their long history of working in the area. They have been in the slums for almost 30 years and thus are not seen as outsiders. Over the years they have gained the trust and respect of sections of the community. Yet there have also been numerous outbursts of violence that the St Xavier’s has not been able to prevent, some of which have been very serious. And, with only 20 full time staff and operating in just 20 of the 2,400 slums in the city, its impact is clearly limited. However, this does prompt the question: imagine if St Xavier’s had a presence or peace committee in each of the 2,000? Imagine what could be achieved then?

Outcome
As the above examples illustrate, St Xavier’s has been successful in preventing violence and reducing interfaith tension in some of the areas in which it works. Fr Prakash also points to the fact that the main newspaper in Ahmedabad has sponsored harmony-related competitions - proof he says of the impact the organisation is having on the community.

We looked at the politicians who don’t want to come to grips with the situation poor people are in. We concluded that the poor are being used.
1992
City Montessori School
India

Background
In October 1990, an extremist Hindu group calling themselves the VHP announced their intention to destroy the Babri Masjid mosque in the sacred city of Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. The mosque, a Muslim landmark built in 1528, was said to stand at the spot of the Hindu Lord Rama’s birthplace, and as such became the focus for anti-Muslim sentiment amongst militant Hindus throughout the country. A crowd of thousands attacked the mosque and were fired on by police, narrowly preventing the mosque’s demolition. The unrest continued, however, and on December 6th 1992, a group of Hindus marched on Ayodhya and this time succeeded in destroying the Babri Masjid, literally tearing it apart stone by stone.

A wave of rioting spread through the city and then across the country. The violence left more than 3,000 dead and countless buildings, shops and communities devastated in its wake.

With 40% of the population Muslim, Lucknow, the capital city of Uttar Pradesh, braced itself for violence. The risk of Hindu-Muslim fighting was heightened by the fact that only a skeletal police presence remained in Lucknow, with most of the police force being sent to Ayodhya to deal with the riots there.

Involvement
On hearing of the destruction of the Mosque, the District Magistrate of Lucknow asked the City Montessori School to convene a series of meetings that would bring together the heads of all the city’s religions. Time was of the essence since the violence was spreading rapidly throughout the country. Many people sensed that in a matter of hours, not days, Lucknow would fall prey to the heightened Muslim-Hindu tensions.

The City Montessori School (CMS), set up in 1959 and inspired by the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, is the world’s largest single school with over 23,000 students. The aim of this unique institution, a pioneer in the field of progressive education, is ‘to make each child a gift to mankind and pride of the human race.’ CMS has gone to extraordinary lengths to work towards this goal, guided by the belief that ‘Every child is potentially the light of the world as well as the cause of its darkness.’

The four building blocks of the curriculum, for instance, are ‘universal values’, ‘global understanding’, ‘excellence in all things’ and ‘service to humanity.’ Teachers are known as ‘teacher-guardians’ and tend to the personal and emotional needs of the children as well as their educational development.

In response to the District Magistrates request, CMS immediately convened a series of meetings in some of their buildings located throughout the city. Each day the religious leaders from each community met, prayed for peace, and urged their congregations to maintain communal harmony.

As Sunita Gandhi, ex CMS student, now president of the Council for Global Education and daughter of the founders of CMS says, ‘You can recognise the children that have been brought up in this system, they are compassionate human beings; they are world citizens.’

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Each evening the leaders returned to their communities in an attempt to calm tensions. These meetings also provided an invaluable opportunity for religious and political leaders within the city to meet face to face, to forge links, and to work collaboratively on solving the crisis, something that was denied to leaders in other cities such as Bombay, where violence escalated, leading to almost 900 deaths, 50,000 people homeless and with a further 150,000 people fleeing the city.

At the same time as the meetings were underway, the students of the CMS took to the streets to try to help prevent further violence. Hiring a number of jeeps with loudspeakers, the children and teachers appealed directly to the people of the city to refrain from violence. Each jeep was followed by thousands of children and their parents singing and carrying posters which read: ‘The name of God is both Hindu and Muslim’ and ‘All Religions are One’. At great personal risk, the marchers directly targeted areas of the city which were in immediate danger of descending into violence. Local people were encouraged to join the march to show their support for a peaceful resolution to the escalating tensions.

Outcome

Lucknow escaped the violence. Given its proximity to Ayodhya (only 140km away) and the high percentage of Muslims in the city, the absence of violence was remarkable. While CMS cannot claim exclusive credit, few have denied the pivotal role that the school played during this time.

The case of CMS highlights several key points. The first is the role of ‘bridge builder’ that CMS played. That the District Magistrate of Lucknow saw in CMS an impartial third party widely respected within the community was critical. Had the predominantly Hindu city officials tried to organise the meetings themselves it is debatable whether they would have achieved the same outcome.

The second point is the deep structural change within the city that CMS has brought about over the past 30+ years. Over 250,000 children have passed through CMS since it first opened its doors in 1959, the vast majority of which have come from Lucknow. Given that CMS encourages the family to participate in their children’s development at the school (from helping shape the curriculum to a myriad of other pioneering activities) there can be little doubt that a great many families in Lucknow actively participated in the CMS peace initiative.

John Huddleston, an official with the IMF, who visited the area during the tensions said of CMS, ‘This school system has a track record of more than forty years of making a significant contribution to the well-being of this city both in terms of quality and quantity... during the disturbance at Ayodhya many towns in the area experienced civil unrest. Lucknow was an exception and many have attributed this to the moral impact of the school on the people of the city over a period of time.’

For more information:
See www.cmseducation.org for more details about the school. Also see ‘People Building Peace’, (European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Utrecht, 1999).

Deaths:
2000 - 2500 Dec ‘92 - Mar ‘93
(Library of Congress Country Studies)

Cost of Involvement:
Less than $5000
In Northern Ireland few issues are as explosive as the annual Protestant parades and in particular those carried out by the Orange Order and its members. Named after the Protestant King William III, the Dutch Prince of Orange, who defeated the Catholic King James III at the battle of the Boyne on 12th July 1690, the Orange Order have used parades as a symbol of their Protestant/British identity for over 200 years. Since the late 1960s when the violence in Northern Ireland (popularly known as ‘The Troubles’) began, the international spotlight has focused on the annual parades which over the years have been marked by violence.

On Sunday 9th July 1995 members of the Orange Order gathered at the local Church of Drumcree, in Portadown, for the annual service commemorating the Battle of the Boyne. As they had done so for years, the Orangemen expected to march down the predominantly Catholic/Nationalist Garvaghy Road on their way back to the Orange Lodge in Portadown.

However, as a result of growing opposition to the marches and parades from the Garvaghy Road Residents Association (GRRA), hundreds of Catholics blocked the proposed route of the march determined not to let it pass.

In view of the potential for a violent confrontation, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) decided to prevent the Orange Order from marching back to Portadown - the first time this had happened in 188 years. Incensed, the Orange Order demanded that they be allowed to continue down the Garvaghy Road, refusing to be dispersed or re-routed. The RUC brought in an extra 1,000 police officers who stood facing the Portadown Orangemen. Thus began a tense stand off.

Word soon spread and tensions began to escalate throughout Northern Ireland. Thousands of Orange supporters began arriving in Portadown to stand alongside their compatriots. Four thousand soldiers were put on alert.

Most worryingly, there were fears that if the situation escalated it would derail the republican and loyalist ceasefires which had been implemented in late 1994 as part of the nascent peace process. As one commentator noted, ‘As in the late 1960s, it was beginning to look as if parades and street demonstrations would lead to civil disturbances serious enough to bring about renewed armed conflict.’

Involvement
The following day, as tensions continued to escalate, Brendan McAllister, Director of the Mediation Network, which was established in 1991 with the aim of promoting a culture of third party intervention in conflict, was invited by the RUC Assistant Chief Constable to help undertake some crisis mediation. McAllister agreed and brought on board another member of his team, Joe Campbell. By this time there were an estimated 10,000 Orange Order supporters gathered around the church in Drumcree. McAllister and Campbell immediately set to work, visiting representatives of the Orange Order, the GRRA and the RUC.

As McAllister notes, ‘As proponents of non-violent peace-building, mediators assume that in each situation of conflict everyone has a perspective which is valid and needs to be understood. Therefore mediation is about enabling those in conflict to communicate with each other, to improve understandings and let truth grow.’ However in the case of Northern Ireland the rules did not quite apply.

McAllister and Campbell noticed - through years of experience ‘on the ground’ - that the Irish people were reluctant to engage in face-to-face dialogue with their adversaries. As a result the Mediation Network developed a particular style of mediation more akin to intermediation or shuttle diplomacy.
This involved acting as a trusted intermediary to (a) help facilitate the flow of information about the conflict situation to each side, (b) help to infuse a ‘sense of other’ and encourage inclusive and creative thinking in each party by engaging them in confidential discussions and analysis of the situation, and (c) carry messages between the two sides. These techniques were used with particular effect during the Drumcree stand-off.

By the time McAllister and Campbell had visited all the main stakeholders in the conflict, had carried messages and facilitated face-to-face discussions between many of them and had offered their advice and analysis, it was late Monday night, and tensions remained dangerously high. Running battles had punctuated the tense stand-off as Protestants tried to break through the police barricades. Nearby shops and houses were attacked and police had fired plastic bullets into the crowd. Protestant emotions were further heightened by speeches given by prominent Unionists David Trimble and Ian Paisley, with Paisley telling the crowd that there was ‘no turning back’.

By dawn the next morning the situation had deteriorated even further. A deputy chief constable (DCC) informed the mediators that there were disturbances throughout Northern Ireland and warned that the manner in which the stand-off was concluded would directly affect the situation at the other ‘flashpoints’ throughout the region. Meanwhile an olive branch was offered by the leader of the GRRA - Brendan McKenna - who announced that if the parade went ahead the Catholic protesters would allow themselves to be physically removed from the streets by the police.

In view of the disturbances throughout Northern Ireland, the DCC said that the protesters would have to voluntarily remove themselves in order to eliminate any possibility of a confrontation between them and the police. Any such clashes ran the risk of precipitating violence throughout Northern Ireland. McAllister and Campbell arranged for the deputy chief constable to pass this view on, at a meeting with McKenna.

Selling this deal to the crowd of angry and determined Catholic protesters, however, proved difficult. McAllister suggested to the DCC that if the residents understood that there would be no parade next year, as had been indicated by senior police officers the night before, it would be easier for McKenna to get acceptance of the proposed formula. According to McAllister the DCC responded that there would be no question of parades going on without consent from the community.

Outcome

McKenna addressed the crowd with news of the compromise. A scaled-down march - without its band and with only one flag - would proceed silently down Garvaghy Road. The Orange Order had also agreed to re-route their parade the following day, on the 12th July. In return future marches would require the consent of the residents. McAllister went on to encourage the protesters to engage in a ‘dignified silent protest’ by the side of the street, which to the surprise of many, they did.

After 40 hours of deadlock the march took place. Only a thin line of police officers was needed to separate the two groups. The widely anticipated violence did not occur. The work of the Mediation Network had lasted 16 hours and as Joe Campbell notes, ‘this was the first formal recognition of mediation as a way of resolving community disputes.’

McAllister is quick to point out that, despite the success of their work, it did not result in a durable peace. Indeed, in 1996 the issue flared up again and has done so every July since. In their eyes, what is needed is process-focused peace work rather than event driven peace. Inspired by Mennonite conflict expert J.P. Lederach, members of the Mediation Network believe that it is important to think in generational terms when working for peace, for which building long term relationships based on respect and dignity is the key.

For more information:
Background
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a rash of inter- and intra-state conflicts throughout many of the former communist countries. In some cases suppressed identity needs rapidly resurfaced, often manifesting themselves as nationalist movements that paid scant attention to minorities. Estonia, one of the Baltic states, was one such example.

During Soviet rule, the percentage of ethnic Estonians fell from 94% to 61% as the USSR’s ‘Russification Program’ brought workers from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus into the country. For the Estonians, not only had they been invaded by what they saw as a ‘brutal Stalinist neighbour’ but they felt that their culture and identity was being eroded by the huge influx of ‘Russian speakers.’

Following Estonian independence in 1991 a nationalist government came to power and introduced a law that restricted Estonian citizenship to the descendents of only those people who lived in the country before Soviet occupation in 1940. This was soon followed by the introduction of a Law on Aliens, which many Russian speakers feared was a prelude to the mass expulsion of all non citizens. The combined effect of both laws significantly raised tensions not only between Estonia and Russia but also between Estonians and the large Russian speaking minority in the country. Russia, incensed by the new laws, cut off its gas supply to Estonia and declared that the welfare of these disenfranchised people was a Russian national interest. At the same time the continued presence of ex-Soviet troops in Estonia exacerbated already heightened tensions between the two countries.

International experts were beginning to fear that the situation might escalate out of control. Paul Goble of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warned that in Estonia ‘We are going to see massive conflicts because of the present linkage between [Russian] military force and the defence of the rights of ethnic Russians.’ The north eastern city of Narva - with its almost exclusively Russian speaking population and high unemployment - was singled out as ‘ground zero’ for a possible violent conflict.

Involvement
With tensions running dangerously high, the Estonian government quietly contacted the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to request their urgent assistance.

The OSCE is Europe’s most comprehensive intergovernmental instrument for security, conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. In early 1992, in response to the number of ethnic conflicts that were erupting in places such as the Balkans and the Caucasus, the OSCE decided to establish the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities. The function of the HCNM, best summarised by paragraph three of its mandate, is to ‘provide “early warning” and, as appropriate, “early action” at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues.’

The OSCE responded by despatching the HCNM, Max Van der Stoel, to the region in an attempt to defuse the situation.

One of the unique features of the HCNMs role is that the involvement of the HCNM is at his own discretion and does not need the approval from the OSCE Ministerial Council or indeed from the state involved. Such unique powers close the warning-response gap, allowing what is essentially an independent ‘insider third party’ to intervene at a moments notice. In Max Van der Stoel’s own words ‘The sooner third party conflict prevention is initiated, the greater the chance that the dispute will not reach a high level of tension and that the parties may still be willing (and politically able) to find compromises and accommodate each other’s demands.’ While the mechanisms available to the HCNM are not legally binding, he acts with the full support of the Permanent Council of the OSCE and in many cases, that of the EU and the Council of Europe, thus giving his recommendations weight.
As a result of intense discussions with the HCNM, President Meri of Estonia issued a communiqué in which he declared that he was officially requesting the expert opinion of the OSCE in the case of the new Law on Aliens. He also announced that he would set up a ‘Round Table of non-citizens and ethnic minorities’, which would deliberate on the key issues facing these communities, and then present the conclusions to the OSCE for comment.

In Estonia the situation on the ground continued to worsen. In July 1993, less than a month after the introduction of the new law and partly in response to it, the cities of Narva and nearby Sillamae announced that they intended to hold referenda to decide whether they should become autonomous zones within Estonia. The government declared the referenda unconstitutional and tensions between Russia and Estonia rapidly escalated again.

Russia delivered a series of thinly veiled threats that if Estonia did not accept the result of the referenda ‘Russians in Estonia could take on Russian citizenship. And Russia has the right to defend its citizens.’ Meanwhile, the extremist Russian National Salvation Front offered armed help to the citizens of Narva and extremists paraded on the Russian side of the Narva river in battle dress. With the situation critical, the HCNM rushed to see the presidents of the councils from both cities in an attempt to persuade them to call the referenda off. Failing that, he requested that should the question of the legality of the referenda be submitted to the National Court both leaders would abide by its ruling, which they agreed to. Significantly, they also agreed to respect the territorial integrity of Estonia. The HCNM also visited President Meri again and sought clarification and reassurances on a number of issues.

The President assured him that he was not planning to expel Russian speaking citizens from the country and that the government - while viewing the referenda as illegal - would not use any force the prevent them from being held.

Such assurances dashed rumours that were spreading throughout Narva and Sillamae claiming that quite the opposite was about to happen, thus exacerbating tensions in the area.

Despite the attempts of the HCNM the referenda went ahead. The results showed that the citizens of the cities were overwhelmingly in favour of autonomy. However, the assurances that the HCNM had won from the leaders of both cities and the government of Estonia derailed any attempts by extremist elements from all sides to exploit the referenda results for their own purposes.

The leaders of both cities abided by their agreement to honour the decision. Meanwhile the Law on Aliens and the Citizenship Law were both subject to the scrutiny of the HCNM and after a lengthy consultation process, both laws were amended to incorporate his recommendations.

As Rob Zaagman of the European Centre for Minority Issues argues, ‘the involvement of the High Commissioner was instrumental in dissolving a potentially dangerous standoff and preventing an escalation.’

Rob Zaagman, European Centre for Minority Issues

Outcome

Through the quiet - sometimes confidential - shuttle diplomacy of the HCNM the situation in the north eastern region of Estonia did not erupt into conflict, despite the predictions of many western observers. The question of the legality of the referenda was referred to the National Court where it was declared unconstitutional.

The involvement of the High Commissioner was instrumental in dissolving a potentially dangerous standoff and preventing an escalation.'

Rob Zaagman, European Centre for Minority Issues

For more information:

See www.osce.org/hcnm.html for the official web site of the HCNM. Also see the excellent reports written by the European Centre for Minority Issues on the work of the HCNM - available online at www.ecmi.de and the Foundation for Inter Ethnic Relations (email: fier@euronet.nl) which was set up to support the work of the HCNM.

Internally displaced: Unavailable

Refugees: Unavailable

Deaths: None

Cost of Involvement: $1,400,000 per year for all HCNM operations
1996 - 1998
Partners for Democratic Change
Hungary

Background
Ever since the Roma first arrived in Europe in the fourteenth century, they have been the target of virulent discrimination and extreme violence. In World War II the Roma were the only other ethnic group to have been singled out by the Nazis for liquidation, with between 250,000 and 500,000 killed in the extermination camps.

In Central and Eastern Europe, where the majority of Roma live, they were the targets of efforts at enforced assimilation by the Communist authorities. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the Roma have been politically and economically marginalized and have found themselves the targets of violence and pogroms, most recently in Kosovo. As a recent study of the Roma conducted by the OSCE concluded, “Even against the backdrop of a decade blighted by extreme forms of racist intolerance, the phenomenon of prejudice against Roma is singular.”

The north eastern Hungarian town of Tiszavasvari is one such case. By 1996 incidences of crime and violence in the town were increasing. The area had been particularly hit by the collapse of communism with many large industries closing down leading to massive job losses. Unemployment among the Hungarian population stood at 20%, twice the national average. However among the Roma population which was divided into two communities – the Romungro and Olah - the figure was much higher. The Romungro, who traditionally enjoyed a measure of interaction with the majority Hungarian population, suffered from 40% unemployment, while most of the larger Olah population lived in abject poverty, were cut off from both the Romungro and the Hungarian population and suffered almost 100% unemployment.

As crime in the town rose, so too did the incidences of anti-Roma violence. Among the majority Hungarian population the prevailing opinion was that the Olah Roma in particular ‘steal, are violent, beat up innocent people, and are arrogant.’

Local authorities, fearing that the situation might escalate, became increasingly frustrated that there was no body representing the Roma in the town through which these problems could be addressed.

Involvement
As a result of the deteriorating situation, Partners Hungary Foundation - a locally staffed and managed Centre of the US based Partners for Democratic Change - was contacted by an academic working at the regional university who knew of their work. A meeting was promptly arranged with the local mayor who was very keen for them to help.

Partners for Democratic Change (PDC) was set up by attorney Raymond Shonholtz in 1989, based upon his pioneering work in the US in helping launch the Community Board Program. The idea - to develop the capacity of local communities to express and resolve their own conflicts through conciliation and mediation as effective forms of dispute resolution - spread rapidly throughout the US and beyond.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, PDC was formed to apply the skills and experience of community mediation to the former communist countries of eastern and central Europe. From being primarily a training provider, offering courses in mediation, negotiation, problem solving and communication, Partners Hungary (PH), soon moved into more ‘hands on’ work which is where its main interest lay.

According to a recent study, the fastest growing sector of PDC’s work has been in cooperative planning, which is defined as ‘a methodology which involves third party facilitators engaging multiple parties (stakeholders) to work on complex and diverse problems’. These processes are highly inclusive and deliberately involve potential ‘spoilers’ PH’s work in Tiszavasvari is a good example of this approach.

Following their meeting with the town’s mayor, PH arranged a series of meetings with all the interest groups in the town, including local authorities and representatives from both Roma communities.
The key problems were identified as (a) the lack of Roma-Roma (Romungro-Olah) cooperation, (b) difficulties in communication and cooperation between the Roma and the Hungarian population and (c) open conflicts between Roma and the Hungarian community. With this information PH set to work organising a cooperative planning meeting that it hoped would bring all the stakeholders together to help address some of these issues. Preparations for the meeting took seven months. During this time, PH met with each party separately to help them clarify the agenda for the meeting as well as to encourage creative thinking about possible solutions. In order to help participants make best use of the meeting, PH organised a seminar aimed at helping develop communication skills, interest-based negotiation, and cooperative skills. This was especially important for the Roma participants, who were at a severe disadvantage having had no formal education or experience in official activities.

In January 1997 the cooperative planning meeting was held. Each party put forward suggestions for how tensions in the town could be reduced.

Working in small mixed groups the participants came up with a number of proposals, including improvements in living conditions, education and work prospects for the Roma and, importantly, measures to establish Roma organizations and leaders who could represent their interests. Within a month of the cooperative planning meeting the Tiszavasvari Roma Association was launched. This was a first: a local Roma organisation dedicated to representing Roma needs in the town.

The first major test for the new organisation and for PH came just a few months later, when it was discovered that the local school authorities had held separate graduation ceremonies for Roma children. Even worse, the school admitted that Roma and Hungarian children were taught entirely separately with Roma children being forbidden to use the gym or the school canteen. As the news spread, tensions within the town rapidly escalated.

PH began organising cooperative planning meetings every fortnight in order to bring all the stakeholders together. At the same time, PH persuaded the Tiszavasvari Roma Association to take a balanced view of the situation rather than escalating tensions by resorting to inflammatory speeches.

As a result of the cooperative planning meetings, a potential crisis was narrowly averted.

Outcome
As a result of the cooperative planning meetings, a potential crisis was narrowly averted. The Tiszavasvari Roma Association, with the guidance of PH, investigated the causes of the segregation in the school, which was found to be the fear of lice infection from Roma children. Steps were taken to address problem of lice infestation in Roma children and as a result the school authorities agreed to teach the children in the same classrooms.

A recent study conducted by the US research group ‘Collaborative for Development Action’ notes that the crisis redoubled the efforts of the local authorities to address the problems of the Roma community in Tiszavasvari.

Indeed many of the recommended proposals from the 1997 cooperative planning meeting were realized in the subsequent year. PH’s continued work with the Roma also helped them elect a local Roma Minority Self-Government (RMSG), which for the first time has given the Roma political representation. The setting up of RMSGs had been sanctioned by the Hungarian parliament in 1994 and had sprung up very slowly throughout the country, but with the onus on the local Roma population to organise and elect a RMSG few people believed that one would appear in Tiszavasvari.

The ‘Collaborative for Development Action’ study also highlights other very positive outcomes for PH’s work. These include increased participation of many Olah Roma in community planning processes, development of concrete and detailed plans to improve basic conditions for Roma, more positive contact between the two Roma groups and importantly, a marked decrease in Roma-Hungarian violence.6

For more information:
See the recent report (March 2000) written by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities which highlights the treatment of the Roma throughout Europe. To learn about Partners for Democratic Change visit www.partners-intl.org. Also see the European Roma Rights Centre (www.errc.org) which is an excellent resource on Roma issues. For other pioneering work on Roma issues see the Project on Ethnic Relations (www.per-usa.org).

Deaths: Unknown
Cost of Involvement: $268,000 the annual budget for Partners for Democratic Change, Hungary.
**Background**

On 16th January 1992, El Salvador’s 12 year civil war finally came to an end. The conflict, which pitted the government of El Salvador against left-wing rebels known as the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) exacted a terrible toll on the country. Over 75,000 people were killed, mostly civilians, and over 1,000,000 people displaced.

Under the terms of the UN-brokered Peace Accords, the demobilisation of over 40,000 combatants began immediately. A year on and approximately 10,000 weapons had been surrendered by the FMLN and thousands more had been discovered in hidden caches throughout the country, which were subsequently destroyed. This represented most of the registered weapons in the hands of the guerrillas. However, there were still an estimated 360,000 unregistered weapons in private hands - a legacy of 12 years of war which saw vast quantities of arms flow into the country. Despite the best efforts of the UN, the country was awash with weapons.

For a number of complex reasons, including complications in the reintegration of ex-combatants, the state of the economy, the proliferation of weapons and the increase in drug trafficking, violent crime was on the increase. Most of this violence involved military weapons from the war, including M-16s, AK-47s and M-3 hand grenades.¹

By 1995 the situation was desperate. In that year alone there were almost 8,000 violent deaths, roughly 21 per day, a higher figure than during the 12 years of civil war. El Salvador had become the most violent country in Central America. As a result the government decided to put the army back onto the streets. According to one report, ‘There was talk of the return of death squads and the politicisation of criminal gangs, in effect the restarting of civil war.’²

**Involvement**

Amidst the violence a group of business leaders from the Association of Distributors (ADES) decided that they should try and do something to help. While no doubt motivated by a genuine desire to help curb the violence that was crippling their country, they were also driven by self-interest. Many businesses were suffering badly as delivery trucks were increasingly being hijacked by heavily armed gangs, putting the lives of their staff at risk.

In response ADES launched the ‘Patriotic Movement Against Crime’ (MPCD) in November 1995 in order to encourage the government to commit more resources to combating crime. As support for the MPCD mandate grew, David Gutierrez, President of MPCD, received word that Fernando Mateo, the founder of a ‘Goods for Guns’ initiative in the Dominican Republic, wanted to launch a similar project in El Salvador.

In the Dominican Republic, for each gun that was surrendered a gift certificate worth $100 was handed over, which could be redeemed at selected stores. As Mateo pointed out, this was not a gun ‘buy back’ scheme as such but more a voluntary weapons return programme where the gun owner was offered a ‘token of appreciation for their support of a more peaceful society’. The distinction was an important one. Since many guns handed in were worth more than $100, a scheme which awarded proper compensation for the surrender of a weapon would have required considerably greater funding.

After much discussion, MPCD decided that it would embark upon a programme similar to that run by Mateo in the Dominican Republic. Key elements of the strategic plan included seeking support for the idea from government, business, civil society and church, engaging the local, regional and national media and developing a system for storing, transporting and destroying weapons.
From the outset close coordination with the government, military and police was vital. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) developed a sophisticated system for the destruction of the weapons collected, while the National Police Force (PNC) was responsible for the destruction of any explosive material. However, while representatives from the army, MOD and PNC were present at the collection site to help identify the weapons, assess their potential danger and determine their value, they were instructed to stay out of uniform so as not to intimidate or frighten people.

The entire process was anonymous. While every weapon was documented by the MPCD, MOD, PNC and the Rotary Club (who had supported MPCD from the beginning) no personal details were taken down and no questions asked. This absolute anonymity, designed to instil confidence in people considering dropping off a weapon, contrasted with the thorough auditing of every weapon handed in so that there was maximum transparency and accountability.  

The weekend was a remarkable success. The sheer number and variety of weapons handed in prompted MPCD to give out almost $60,000 worth of vouchers, despite only having $4,500 in the bank. The success of the weekend also presented MPCD with another problem. Many people handed in weapons not covered by the amended law, such as grenades and explosives. Thus the following day MPCD requested a further change to the law which was immediately accepted.

Profoundly encouraged by the response to the first collection weekend, further collections were arranged the following weekend and on many weekends thereafter. By the end of the second weekend MPCD had given away vouchers worth $103,000 despite only having $19,500 in funds. In view of the runaway success of the programme the President intervened, offering MPCD almost $300,000 to help them honour all the vouchers that they had given out as well as to continue with the programme.

Outcome

By June 1999 MPCD had carried out 23 separate collection sessions. During that time, over 10,000 weapons were handed in, more than were collected by the official United Nations Observer Mission to El Salvador Disarmament programme shortly after the war.

While critics have noted that the total number of weapons collected by MPCD is overshadowed by the figure reportedly circulating throughout the country as well as the number still being registered every month, the impact of the MPCD programme cannot be overlooked. On one hand the 10,000 weapons collected represent accidents and violent crimes that did not happen.  

Another point made by the British American Security Information Council notes that the MPCD initiative has had ‘a psychological as well as practical impact in El Salvador; the perception that a weapon is necessary for protection and self defence has diminished.’

For more information:
See the International Action Network on Small Arms (www.iansa.org) for more information on the international campaign to curb the trade in small arms. Also see the Bonn International Centre for Conversion’s web sites www.bicc.de and www.disarmament.de for excellent resources on efforts and strategies to convert military resources to civilian use.

Internally displaced: 577,000 in 1985 (UNHCR)
Refugees: 250,000 in 1985 (UNHCR)

Deaths:
25,000 battle related deaths from 1979-1992
(Correlates of War Project: www.umich.edu/~cowproj - COW).
Cost of involvement:
$1,300,000 to end of 1999
Background

A look at the history of the region reveals that Transylvania - with its predominantly Romanian speaking population - has, for the greater part of nine hundred years, been under Hungarian rule. However, with the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire following World War I, Hungary lost 75% of its land, including Transylvania, which was awarded to Romania. While the Vienna Diktat of 1940 gave Northern Transylvania back to Hungary, this decision was short lived. Having sided with the Axis powers during World War II, Hungary was stripped of Transylvania during the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 and it has remained part of Romania ever since.

Since then, relations between Transylvania’s Romanian majority and the large Hungarian minority (1.7 million) have often been tense, especially during the communist period under Nicolae Ceausescu’s assimilationist policies in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the overthrow of Ceausescu re-opened the question of the status of the Hungarians and gave voice to nationalists on both sides.

In 1990, violent clashes erupted in the Transylvanian town of Târgu-Mureș in a dispute over Hungarian schools in the area, which the local authorities used to raise the spectre of Hungarian separatism or irredentism. According to one report agents of the former political police were involved in the ethnic violence aimed at the Hungarians. The violence that threatened the region had long been anticipated by some experts. Said one, ‘Transylvania is the potential setting for one of the most troublesome ethnic minority crises of the current age.’

Involvement

In 1992 the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) launched an intensive effort to bring Romanian officials and Hungarian leaders together to seek a resolution to this escalating conflict. Founded in 1991 by Allen Kassof, PER was created in anticipation of the serious interethnic conflicts that were to erupt in central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe, following the collapse of communism.

‘Communism had not allowed ethnic rivalries to be an active issue’ says Kassof. ‘But we knew a lot of the leaders and could see from some of their attitudes that things could turn nasty.’

Kassof’s previous job as director of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) - a US institution that managed the American scholarly exchanges with Eastern Europe and the USSR during the Cold War - provided the essential leverage to enter the simmering conflict. IREX was well known and well respected by both Romanian and Hungarian officials and this, coupled with PER Executive Director Livia Plaks’s personal contacts as a native Transylvanian, gave the new organisation the opening it needed.

PER promptly convened an ‘unofficial’ meeting involving key Romanian government ministers and representatives from the UDMR, the political party representing the majority of the Hungarian population in Romania. PER’s decided to initially focus on bringing together the decision making elites. This was based on the view that with newly ex-communist countries, which still had a highly centralised political system, it was important to engage the centre first.

Before the meeting, Hungarian and Romanian representatives rarely had face-to-face discussions, despite some limited encounters within the parliament. It was made clear that the PER facilitated meeting was an opportunity for protected, open, and honest discussion rather than a staging ground for posturing over ‘official’ positions. For PER the key aim was to convince the protagonists to expand definitions of their self-interest in order to encompass behaviours more appropriate to resolving inter-ethnic conflict. This was a significant challenge since it required skilled dialogue and compromise which, according to Plaks, were not historically part of Central and Eastern Europe’s political system.
As Livia Plaks notes, ‘We showed the Romanians and Hungarians what they could lose if interethnic conflicts were left unmanaged - that they could end up with an isolated and declining economy and the possibility of losing out to their neighbours.’

To facilitate its work, in 1991 PER had established an office in the Romanian capital, Bucharest, and in 1992 added an office in the town of Tîrgu Mureș, scene of the violence which had precipitated the crisis. From these offices, many local initiatives were launched, including workshops with journalists and meetings between Hungarian and Romanian school teachers - all designed to ‘ground’ PER’s work in reality as well as to demonstrate a commitment to the process. Sensitive to the charge laid at the door of other NGOs of ‘parachuting’ in and out of conflict situations, PER began to embed themselves into the fabric of Romanian and Transylvanian society. As Kassof says ‘the participants need to know that we will stick with the process indefinitely.’

During a meeting held in Switzerland in 1993, the PER team had their first breakthrough. After several days of intense discussions the two sides agreed, among other provisions, to reinstate bilingual public signs and to create a council of national minorities. Seemingly modest concessions such as the use of bilingual public signs carries enormous symbolic significance and can make the difference between inter-ethnic coexistence and inter-ethnic conflict.

Outcome

Over the following years, through PER-convened meetings, a pattern of inter-ethnic dialogue was established at the highest political levels, leading to further breakthroughs such as the creation of 300 additional university places for training teachers for Hungarian language secondary schools.

However, one of the most significant outcomes was that it helped pave the way for members of the Hungarian minority to join the coalition government in 1996 - a first, for which PER is credited by both senior Romanian and Hungarian officials as having had a highly important role. PER has consolidated this achievement by their long-term commitment to the region, which has yielded results both locally and nationally.

Perhaps the most important success, however, is PER’s role in helping the leaders develop essential dialogue skills. ‘You taught us the art of dialogue’, said several of the leaders involved in the talks. Romania is now held up as an example of what can be achieved, despite the fact that many challenges lie ahead. The fact that the new government, elected in 2000, has decided to expand the scope of agreements favourable to the Hungarian minority, even though the Hungarian party is no longer a coalition partner and despite the large vote for of the nationalist Romanian party, shows that the framework for dialogue that PER helped to establish is now deeply institutionalised.

For more information.

See www.hungary.com/corvinus/lib/rum.htm for a very good resource on Hungarian/Transylvanian issues. Also see www.per-usa.org for more information on the work of the Project on Ethnic Relations.

War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict

Internally displaced:
Unknown

Refugees:
Unknown

Deaths: 8

Cost of Involvement:
$1,100,000 Expenditure in 1998 for all of PER’s work.
Background
Divided into six distinct and predominantly nomadic clan-families, pre-colonial Somali society was characterised by an almost total absence of formally institutionalised authority. This ‘radically egalitarian’ social structure was effectively turned on its head with the advent of colonial rule. Traditional mechanisms for conflict management began to disappear and with them the most effective method for ensuring some measure of co-existence between the clans, where competition and conflict over natural resources was commonplace. This decline was rapidly accelerated by the autocratic rule of General Mohammad Siad Barre who took power in a coup in 1969.

Opposition to Barre’s repressive regime soon grew and after a prolonged and hugely damaging civil war Barre was finally overthrown in 1991. This, however, precipitated the disintegration of Somalia, as the fragile anti-Barre coalition began to splinter and fight each other over control of the country. Between 1991 and 2000 Somalia was without a government, effectively ceasing to exist as a country.

Involvement
Unfortunately the newly installed SNM administration failed to live up to expectations, proving incapable of formulating coherent policies for the economy, health, education and most importantly law and order. In particular, the failure of the new government to re-organise and disarm the disparate anti-Barre guerrilla forces led to the rise in banditry and clan warfare.

As faith in the SNM administration faded, a remarkable grassroots peace initiative began to take shape, spearheaded by the traditional council of elders from each community, known as ‘Guurti’ whose authority had started to resurface during the anti-Barre war. Between 1992 and 1993 all sectors of society gathered together to initiate a series of peace conferences aimed at ending the violence in the region. Starting at the local level, where the emphasis was on addressing inter-clan tensions and specific local issues, these conferences gradually progressed upwards to district, regional and national levels. Through this process, seemingly intractable issues such as the disarmament of clan militias were resolved, as well as conflicts over resources and livestock.

In order to enforce and implement these local peace agreements, the Guurti appointed joint security committees which were placed at sensitive buffer-zones separating warring clans. Formed mainly of local elders, these committees were intended to respond rapidly to issues such as stock theft and violent attacks by bandits.

In reconciling warring clans, the Guurti brought in poets and religious leaders, who play a major role in Somali society. Somali people place a very high value on poetry, which in a largely nomadic society acts in much the same way as television and radio does in the west - addressing all aspects of Somali life. The Guurti also employed modern tools in order to facilitate the peace process. Radios were used to communicate with estranged or hostile groups, especially to prepare much of the groundwork prior to a meeting between warring clans. In addition, local peace committees were assisted by a secretariat and a technical committee. They also began communicating with each other to exchange information about suspected or anticipated stock thefts. In this way they acted as an early warning network which was able to intervene at a moment’s notice, often before the alleged crime was due to take place.
In total 48 mini conferences were held followed by three more extensive conferences, the last and most important of which was held at Borama and lasted several months. At the Borama conference 150 Guurti representing all the groups in the region not only produced separate local and national peace charters but also created an executive government which replaced the SNM interim administration.

This remarkable ‘bottom up’ participatory peace initiative was carried out with very little outside help. Only the Borama conference received substantial funding from the international community. The rest were financed through community self-help.

Outcome
While the rest of Somalia descended deeper and deeper into chaos, the newly formed Somaliland Republic was stable and relatively peaceful. Since 1993 there have been periodic bouts of violence, some of which have been very serious, but on the whole the area is still far from the violence that has plagued the rest of the country.

The Guurti also employed modern tools in order to facilitate the peace process. Radios were used to communicate with estranged or hostile groups...

The author of the study, A.Y. Farah, goes onto say that, ‘The supreme achievement and symbol of the vigour of these traditional grassroots processes is demonstrated in the appointment by the peace elders of the new Somaliland government - unprecedented in Somali history.’

Many challenges lie ahead for this self styled republic. To date, the international community has refused to recognise the new state and thus it has been starved of much needed foreign aid. Similarly, the newly installed government of Somalia (Sept 2000), the first in almost nine years, is unlikely to countenance the partition of the country. Yet these obstacles should not obscure the remarkable process that brought a reinvigorated sense of hope and optimism to this war-ravaged people.

For More information:
Background
The Lebanese conflict has been described as a series of civil wars fought for political control of the country as well as one in which the Middle East conflict found a new staging ground in a weak nation state.

On one level the conflict sees the Christian (largely Maronite) population whose political dominance was enshrined in a ‘National pact’ with the growing Lebanese Muslim population in 1943, fighting to hold onto the reigns of power despite the fact that the Christian population had dwindled from just over 51% in 1943 to around 30% by 1975. This view sees the Muslim population such as the Sunni, Shiite and Druse were fighting for greater political representation in line with a shift in the demographic balance in their favour.

On another level, however, the Lebanon conflict is an imported one. Following the creation of Israel in 1948 and the six day war in 1967, Lebanon received hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees. After Yasser Arafat and the PLO were driven out of Jordan, Lebanon became their base, with parts of Beirut becoming Arafat’s fiefdom. While the Lebanese Sunni population fully supported him, others, most notably the Maronites and Shiites, bitterly resented his presence.

The first bout of fighting that began in 1975 was largely between the Maronite militia known as the Phalangists and the PLO. However, as fighting intensified, militias allied to one of the 17 different religious sects in Lebanon began to carve the country up, region by region, town by town and in places like Beirut, literally street by street. Some were aided by temporary alliances with other militias and with the help of outside forces - most notably the Syrians, Israelis and Palestinians, leading to the destabilization, polarization and dismemberment of the country.

Involvement
In 1984, the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland organised two problem-solving workshops on the conflict in Lebanon. These were spearheaded by professor Edward Azar as part of his ongoing research into the dynamics of ‘Protracted Social Conflicts’. Both workshops were attended by a mixture of academics, political advisors and consultants who represented the various Lebanese religious and political communities.

The problem solving approach taken by Azar and his team for the Lebanese workshops was based upon the assumption that violent and prejudicial or peaceful and cooperative thinking and behaviour are learned phenomena, and that what is learned therefore can be modified. Thus problem solving workshops attempt to create the conditions for adaptive learning by providing a space where frank, face to face analytical discussions can take place. For Azar, the emphasis on creating an analytical framework - where participants can delve deeply into the nature and causes of the conflict - rather than zero-sum bargaining was essential.

The guidelines for the meeting were based upon those drawn up by academic John Burton, another pioneer in the field. The key points were that (a) discussions should be informal and should be between persons nominated by key leaders but not representing them, (b) discussions should be analytical i.e. structured so as to reveal the hidden motives and intentions of the parties, (c) a panel of individuals drawn from several disciplines should serve as a third party, and (d) no party would be required to compromise or submit to influence or power in any way that would prejudice its basic needs.

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The aim of the first workshop was to determine whether a united Lebanon was desired as a homeland for the various Lebanese communities. Almost immediately it became clear that participants had not been able to communicate with each other across the ‘green line’ in Beirut that separated the two sides. Thus the first day of the talks was taken up by a sharing of information and papers. Despite the fact that the participants came ‘armed’ with position papers and other lobbying materials, the facilitators were able to move the participants away from this potentially paralysing scenario into a more creative space. Soon the talks became more intense and as Azar recalls, ‘high levels of tension filled the air, emotions were clearly revealed and deadlocks were encountered at different times.’

The role of the facilitators was well defined. It remained neutral; its main task was that of questioning and making observations rather than proposing solutions. Each facilitator was selected for his or her intimate knowledge of the conflict (especially the social-psychological factors affecting parties in the conflict), cross-cultural experience and sensitivity.

When problems arose, the panel used a variety of techniques to get the ball rolling again. For instance one deadlock was ended when the panel portrayed the experience of other societies with protracted social conflicts such as Sri Lanka and Cyprus. This comparative method was used with great effect. As Azar notes ‘as the panel of facilitators compares cases and speaks about other conflicts and how those have failed or succeeded and why, then new creative ideas emerge, and the participants become excited by new insights into their own dilemma and its dynamics.’

It was also felt that the talks should be absolutely confidential. Carried out under the guise of an academic seminar, no publicity was allowed and only when there were substantive results at the end of the second meeting was the press informed.

The first meeting was an overwhelming success with all parties agreeing on a shared vision for Lebanon as an independent, unified Arab country and a meeting place between Christianity and Islam. Importantly the group drew up a list of shared needs and values relating to issues such as security, identity, equality and participation. By creating a shared vision for the future of their country the participants had made a vital step towards the transition from a war to a peace mentality.

The second workshop built upon the success of the first by asking, ‘What kind of united Lebanon was desired?’ While the question was not fully addressed a joint declaration was issued which clarified many of the key issues that had plagued Lebanese politics for many years. All parties also emphasised the need to co-exist as communities and to work together in some framework yet to be designed to reconstruct the country.

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The outcome of CIDCM’s work was described by Azar as ‘Freudian-based workshops among specific groups in conflict often start with sparks flying but end in warm handshakes.’

As Azar summarises, ‘CIDCM problem-solving workshops among specific groups in conflict often start with sparks flying but end in warm handshakes.’ This aptly described what happened at the two forums held in Maryland in 1984 and stands as one of the clearest outcomes of the talks. This relationship building developed into an informal network of community leaders, many of whom maintained communication in spite (and probably because) of the continued instability and violence in Lebanon. This network appears to have flourished and by 1988 the group drafted a paper called the ‘National Covenant Document’, which outlined ideas for beginning the reconciliation of Lebanon and initiating a much needed healing process.

The list of principles that made up the National Covenant Document was included as a basis for the Taif Accords held in Saudi Arabia in October 1989 and which ended the war. While fighting continued, the Accords did begin the transition from war to peace and as such the CIDCM contribution stands as an important piece in the process.
1989 - 1992

The Community of Sant’Egidio
Mozambique

Background
On April 25 1974, Portuguese fascism collapsed, taking with it Portugal’s strife-ridden empire. From her former African colonies, nearly a million Portuguese settlers fled, bleeding those countries of most of their skilled labour. Mozambique was no exception, with the exodus of 200,000 of the country’s most needed human capital. Under intense pressure from the main nationalist movement known as FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Mocambique) who argued that it should take power immediately and without elections, Portugal acquiesced, despite the fact that the country was manifestly ill-prepared for a smooth transition to independence.

FRELIMO’s support for the African National Congress (ANC) and its Marxist-Leninist ideology also brought similar economic and military retribution from South Africa. Thus by the time Mugabe won power in Zimbabwe in 1980, RENAMO had a new and covert backer, South Africa, and its forces already numbered 12,000 men, largely recruited from the sections of the population alienated by FRELIMO’s repressive policies. RENAMO had also gained a gruesome reputation as the ‘Khmer Rouge’ of Africa, through a catalogue of atrocities meted out on the civilian population, and as the war intensified Mozambique’s entire infrastructure and economy began to fall apart.

Between 1984 and 1989 various attempts were made to broker a deal between the two sides in the conflict. South Africa, Kenya, Zimbabwe and the US all tried but failed, and all the while the war was inflicting terrible damage on the country.

FRELIMO’s economic policies as well as its own brand of scientific socialism did little to help the country off to a good start. Furthermore its support for Robert Mugabe’s ZANU nationalist movement which was fighting Ian Smith’s minority regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) led to the creation of the Rhodesian-backed Mozambican insurgent movement, RENAMO, which launched military attacks on FRELIMO’s forces as well as the civilian population.

Involvement
The Community of Sant’Egidio originally became involved in Mozambique through their friend Dom Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira. The Community, a Catholic association founded in 1968 to live the gospel while serving the poor, was concerned at the restrictions and repression of the Catholic Church in Mozambique by FRELIMO.

This concern broadened as the Community began to learn more about the war, and soon they began to organise deliveries of humanitarian aid to the country. These efforts, members of the Community began to develop close ties with FRELIMO in addition to the growing relationship it enjoyed with the Italian government and the Vatican who knew of and had supported the Community’s humanitarian work. By the late 1980s the Community had even managed to build good connections with RENAMO through their involvement in negotiations to win the release of a Portuguese Sister who had been kidnapped by the group.

When the Kenya sponsored talks broke down, RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama travelled to Rome to meet members of the Italian foreign ministry. The meeting was organised by the Community, and Dhlakama signalled his willingness to initiate dialogue with FRELIMO in Rome under the auspices of Sant’Egidio. Mozambican President Chissano had already encouraged the Community to pursue the possibility of dialogue with RENAMO and thus the stage was set for a meeting.

The first meeting took place in July 1990 at the Community’s headquarters, a beautiful sixteenth century restored convent in the centre of Rome. At the talks were four observers: two from the Community of Sant’Egidio (Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi), one from Mozambican civil society (Archbishop Jaime Gonçalves) and one from the Italian Government (Mario Raffaelli). The tranquil setting and close attention paid by the Community to the needs of each group was vital in creating an environment conducive to dialogue.
Internally displaced: 5,000,000 War Torn Societies Project (WSP) - www.unrisd.org/wsp

Refugees: 2,000,000 (WSP)

Prior to each meeting, the mediating team would talk with each side to explore the possibilities for progress, as well as brainstorming and sharing information. No meeting was ever allowed to occur unless positive conclusions were foreseen. Success, then, was built incrementally.

The Community also carefully managed all contact with the international press and some of the talks were held secretly. According to Andrea Bartoli, a member of the Community, another important factor for the success of these meetings was the creation of synergies between all the parties involved. ‘These interpersonal bonds became significant assets that enabled members to better cope with difficulties encountered in later stages of the process.’

Outcome

For example the Italian, US and Portuguese governments provided various forms of support, including financial, logistical, military and legal assistance as and when necessary, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe helped foster direct personal dialogue between Chissano and Dhlakama towards the end of 1992 and Tiny Rowland of the British multinational Lonrho flew Dhlakama to and from meetings in his personal jet and provided RENAMO with financial support. These inputs, and many others, added momentum to the process, helping move the parties closer towards a settlement.

For more information:

See Accord - an International Review of Peace Initiatives. No3, published by Conciliation Resources - for an overview of the entire process. See also Cameron Hume’s book Ending Mozambique’s War (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1994) for an in depth account of the Sant’Egidio negotiations. For more information on Sant’Egidio see www.santegidio.org/

The UN was given the responsibility of overseeing the transition from war to peace which led to the holding of the first free elections in October 1994.

Deaths: 200,000 battle related deaths (COW: www.umich.edu/~cowproj)

Cost of Involvement: $350,000 total contribution from St Egidio

Meanwhile behind the scenes a whole team unpaid volunteers provided all the services needed to ensure that the meetings went smoothly, from secretarial and translation to catering and transportation. Throughout the meeting, Riccardi and Zuppi encouraged the parties to focus on what united them rather than what divided them so that ‘in the spirit of mutual understanding, they can engage in a dialogue in which they discuss their points of view.’

At the end of that meeting a remarkable breakthrough was achieved when both sides agreed to ‘dedicate themselves fully, in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding, to the search for a working basis...for building a lasting peace.’ Given that FRELIMO had hitherto refused to even acknowledge RENAMO, this blueprint for future talks was the crucial stepping stone on the road to peace.

Subsequent meetings followed this breakthrough with the team of four soon being asked to act as fully fledged mediators.

For the precondition for successful human communication is a positive psychological space. Andrea Bartoli

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Looking back it is true to say that the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Apartheid Government in South Africa, a particularly devastating drought in the early 1990s and a mutually damaging military stalemate all paved the way for each side to consider pursuing dialogue. However, since several efforts at negotiation had failed, it is likely that the Community of Sant’Egidio brought to the table something extra. One of the most important qualities was that it was trusted by both sides. As Bartoli notes ‘in so delicate a negotiation, the possibility of relying on trustworthy interlocutors was an essential element in fostering trust between the two sides themselves’. Bartoli adds, ‘The precondition for successful human communication is a positive psychological space.’ That the Community of Sant’Egidio created precisely that space is perhaps one of their greatest achievements, for it enabled the parties to the conflict to creatively explore new opportunities for achieving peace.
Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo
Argentina

1977 - 1983

**Background**

In 1976 a military coup ended the Peronist era and ushered in a period of repression which soon became known as the ‘Guerra Sucia’ - the dirty war. Spearheaded by Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla, the coup was driven by a combination of nationalism (heavily influenced by Catholicism, European fascism and nazism) and National Security Doctrine (NSD). NSD, enthusiastically propagated by the US through its army-run ‘School of the Americas’, emphasized amongst other things that the military had a responsibility to do anything necessary to protect the country from Communist subversion.

The killings and disappearances began immediately, continuing the work done by earlier paramilitary forces such as Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance. While the junta claimed that its aim was to destroy leftist armed subversion, the real targets included anyone who dared to oppose the regime such as workers, union leaders, intellectuals and students. 60% of the estimated 30,000 people that disappeared during the ‘dirty war’ were young adults in their twenties.

Soon the junta declared all political activity illegal, the judiciary was filled with sympathisers of the regime and all forms of media were either censored or subjected to routine threats. Civil society was comprehensively shut down.

**Involvement**

On Saturday 30th April 1977, 14 women met at the Plaza de Mayo, at the heart of Buenos Aires, to protest at the disappearance of their loved ones. For almost a year these women had been seeking answers, knocking on the doors of the Interior Ministry as well as police stations and jails throughout the country in a desperate attempt to learn what had become of the disappeared, the Desaparecidos. Now, at the Plaza de Mayo, surrounded by the institutions of the regime - including the Presidential Palace and the Interior Ministry - they brought their search for the truth out into the open.

Hebe de Bonafini, one of the original mothers and now head of the group, recalls their first meeting. ‘Nobody paid the slightest attention to us and we realised it had been a failure.’

Yet they persevered, agreeing to return to the square the following week and the weeks thereafter. At the same time, in order to enlist the support of other mothers, the women went from house to house, spreading their message. ‘Out of every five houses visited, three wouldn’t open the door, and when they did they didn’t speak or trust us. But there were two which would receive our message.’

By October 1977, despite increasing police threats and intimidation, the mothers had gained quite a reputation for their protests at the Plaza de Mayo. For instance during a visit by the then US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terence Todman meet with President Videla, to turn their cameras on them. Such publicity was quickly transmitted around the world.

Their work was fraught with danger. Within the space of one week - as the mothers prepared to place an advertisement in the national newspaper, La Nacion, to highlight their cause - three of their members, including their founder, were abducted and killed.
Argentina had quickly become a pariah. Privately the regime put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the human rights groups, including the most vocal of groups - The Mothers.

By 1980 the women, who by now were known as the ‘Association of Mothers of Plaza de Mayo’ and had taken to wearing white triangular scarves emblazoned with the names of their disappeared children, had an office, were publishing a regular newsletter and were further strengthening their alliances with human rights groups around the world. All the while their relentless pursuit of truth and justice had emboldened human rights groups, NGOs, the media and many others to add their voice to the growing anti regime chorus. What started as a small group of women in search of their missing children had rapidly developed into a powerful social movement, which continues to this day.

Outcome
Towards the end of 1979 - around the time the IAHRC report was released - the number of disappearances dropped dramatically. Soon after, with a slumping economy and a growing civil society movement more critical than ever of the junta, the generals embarked on their ill-fated attempt to capture the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, over which Argentina had a long-standing claim.

Its crushing defeat in the war with the British precipitated the collapse of the regime, leading to the return of a civilian government. Indeed it is widely acknowledged that human rights groups such as the Mothers had so seriously undermined the legitimacy of the regime that the generals were left with little option but to return the country to civilian rule following the war.

Yet such traumatic events only strengthened the women’s resolve. Every time one member of the group was arrested the entire group demanded that they were arrested. It was all or none. By 1978 the mothers’ protests were regularly heard in the corridors of power, at the UN, the US, OAS and beyond. Under President Jimmy Carter the US - Argentina’s close ally - not only stopped supporting Argentinean applications for much needed loans from the multilateral banks but also introduced a ban on private commercial arms sales and government-to-government military sales and training.

Meanwhile, Argentina was not only fighting a move by the UN Human Rights Commission to have the country blacklisted, but it was also defending itself against constant criticism from the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC). In 1979, following an investigative mission to the country, the IAHRC issued a damming report on the human rights abuses of the regime, based in part on the testimonies of the mothers.

For more information:

Deaths:
15 - 30,000 (various sources)

Cost of Involvement:
Unknown

If, as several scholars have argued, the level of disappearances fell as a direct result of international pressure on the regime, then one must credit the Mothers with having played a vitally important role, since they were not only the first (and subsequently most vocal) group to highlight the human rights abuses in the country, but were instrumental in mobilising national and international support. As the Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP), which was set up following the return to civilian rule, states: ‘The springboard for this universal mobilization of consciousness was the unsung, heroic achievement of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo’.

This reinvigorated civil society continues to serve the country well. As Alison Brysk, author of ‘The politics of human rights in Argentina’ remarks, ‘this sea change in social consciousness helped transform Argentina from a fractured society where violence was unquestioned across the political spectrum and all issues viewed as partisan, to a true civil society with growing respect for fundamental rights, greater tolerance, and attempts to limit state power.’
Background
On December 24th 1989 a group of 150 fighters calling themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by an ex-civil servant called Charles Taylor, invaded Liberia with the aim of toppling the corrupt and despotic regime of Samuel Doe. As they swept across the country the national army, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), launched a massive counter-insurgency campaign. Soon the country was at war.

The roots of the conflict can be traced back to the founding of the state in 1822 by a group of freed American slaves. From the very birth of the nation, the freed slaves, the ‘Americo-Liberians’ monopolised all positions of power and authority, excluding virtually all the indigenous groups from the interior, whom they considered ‘savages’. Resentment finally boiled over in 1980 when a group of men led by Samuel K Doe stormed the presidential palace, killed the President and took over the state.

While promising sweeping reforms, Doe soon revealed himself to be corrupt and brutal, steering the country towards economic, political and social collapse. As he purged the government of all ‘enemies’ he began to surround himself with members of his own ethnic group, the Krahn.

The attempted coup against him by former allies from the Mano and Gio ethnic groups provoked a vicious response from Doe, thus raising the spectre of a war based purely along ethnic/tribal divisions. This is what eventually happened. As one commentator notes, ‘The war degenerated from a calculated conflict for control of the state to a horrendous slaughter waged along ethnic lines’ between the Krahn dominated AFL and Taylor’s Mano and Gio backed NPFL.

Numerous efforts failed to put a stop to the fighting. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had installed a Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) after a ceasefire had been signed in November 1990, was quickly sucked into the conflict, engaging the NPFL in vicious battles.

Over the coming years the NPFL splintered and was joined by other groups, a succession of peace accords were signed and promptly collapsed and the country descended deeper and deeper into chaos.

Involvement
As the war raged, Mary Brownell, a retired school teacher, came up with a ‘wild idea’ – to form a women’s pressure group to appeal directly to the warring parties to end the bloodshed. Initially LWI chose to focus on one issue that affected everyone.

That issue was disarmament before elections, which had already proved exceptionally difficult to accomplish. The previous year, the Cotonou Accord had been signed, which like its predecessor, the Yamoussoukro Accord (1991) made provisions for ceasefires and disarmament before elections. Both accords had unravelled as the factions continued fighting.

LWI’s task, then, was far from easy. Against formidable odds, including a severe lack of finances, LWI succeeded in sending two women to participate in the Akosombo meeting in Accra, Ghana, where leaders were desperately trying to bolster the Cotonou Accord. Despite being recognised as observers only they made their presence felt, literally waiting in the corridors that led to the meeting rooms and lobbying every individual that walked past. While the effect of their presence is unclear, it is understood that many of the faction and political leaders were impressed by the LWI’s tenacity and determination in putting forward their vision and proposal for peace.
Between the formal negotiations that punctuated the ongoing conflict, LWI increased its advocacy work, contacting organisations and governments around the world in order to focus attention on the situation in Liberia. They also appeared on national and international radio and television programmes in order to gain more public support for their work.

In December 1994 another major meeting took place that brought all the warring factions together. Here too, at the Accra Clarifications Conference, the women made sure that their voices were heard, with six members of LWI forcing their way into the conference. Again they were denied official participation on the grounds that they were not direct parties to the conflict.

On the second day of the conference, before the parties began the official business, the floor was given over to the LWI. Brownell recalls ‘It was quite interesting to see those men who did not want us to sit at the table, consulting with us on various pertinent issues affecting the country.’

As consultants, then, the LWI became discreet but influential voices in the peace process. Indeed - perhaps as a result of LWI’s constant pressure - the Accra conference introduced the idea of including a woman in the five-man transitional government, as provided for in the Cotonou Accords.

Whenever the factions reneged on their promises the LWI took to the streets, helping organise demonstrations in the capital and outside the US embassy and UN offices. This included two very successful ‘stay at home’ campaigns in response to continuing attacks on the civilian population by various factions and the militarisation of Liberian society. Effectively paralysing the capital city, these acts of civil disobedience sent out a powerful signal to the warlords that the people wanted peace.

On one occasion the LWI even managed to bring the warlords together to participate in a workshop aimed at fostering closer communication and a greater understanding between each side in the conflict.

Outcome

Two further major meetings took place, at both of which LWI was present. At the last of these, in August 1996 - an ECOWAS summit in Abuja - Ruth Perry, a founding member of LWI, became head of the Council of State of the transitional government. Under her stewardship a new timetable for disarmament was agreed. Shortly afterwards, disarmament finally began and the LWI mobilised women to do what they could to support the process. As a result many women went to the disarmament sites to hand out drinks of water and sandwiches to the fighters who were handing in their weapons.

The disarmament exercise was largely successful, with 85% of combatants voluntarily disarmed. As the country geared up for elections, LWI sprung into action, training hundreds of election monitors as well as mobilising women throughout the country to vote. The elections, which brought Charles Taylor to power, signalled the end of the war.

So what impact did LWI have? ‘I say without any reservation that LWI made a great difference at that peace table’, says Brownell. While LWI certainly cannot claim the greatest share of the credit for the eventual success of the peace process, there is little doubt that theirs was a significant contribution. Their relentless lobbying for peace and disarmament at the highest levels, coupled with their ability to mobilise large sections of the population to call for an end to the fighting was a very important component in the process that ended seven years of war.
Background
US military intervention has been a feature of Nicaraguan history for almost one hundred years. Ever since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which effectively signalled to the European powers that Central and South America was a US sphere of influence, Nicaragua has been subject to the whims of US commercial, political and strategic interests.

In 1979 the Sandinistas came to power, overthrowing the corrupt and oppressive regime of Anastasio Somoza. The Sandinistas, a left wing force inspired by the Cuban revolution and driven by the manifest inequity in Nicaragua under the Somoza regime, were seen as an immediate and unequivocal threat to US interests. When, in the early 1980s, the Sandinistas began forging close links with the USSR, the US government began rapidly arming and funding the remnants of Somoza’s National Guard, which became known as the Contras.

Soon they were joined by disenchanted Sandinistas and peasants, many of whom were forced to serve against their will, as well as indigenous groups from the Atlantic Coast who were historically opposed to the Nicaraguan government. Contra attacks - on civilians as much as Sandinista forces - quickly destabilised the entire country, which soon found itself in a destructive civil war.

One region in particular, Nueva Guinea, was the scene of very heavy fighting between Contra and Sandinista forces. Its proximity to Costa Rica - home to many of the key Contra bases - had made the area a hotbed of Contra activity. In addition, according to one commentator, Nueva Guinea suffered particularly badly with the collapse of the Somoza regime since many infrastructure projects were abandoned when the Sandinistas came to power.¹

Involvement
The violence that plagued Nueva Guinea prompted a group of people - farmers, Protestant pastors, teachers and others - to act. They wanted people kidnapped by both sides released.

They wanted bitterly divided families, many of whom had loved ones fighting on both sides of the conflict, to be reunited. They wanted to make the region safer for civilians caught up in the fighting.

This group of determined civilians, calling themselves a local ‘peace commission’, approached the local branch of CEPAD - the Council of Evangelical Churches in Nicaragua - for help. CEPAD offered their unequivocal support and helped the people organise meetings with government and military leaders at all levels to win their support. CEPAD also provided office space, a secretary and vehicles for their work. At the same time tentative contacts were established with the Contra leadership in the hope that they would meet with the peace commission and present their aims to them face-to-face.

Initially both the Sandinistas and Contras were deeply suspicious of the group, believing them to be spies for the enemy. However, over time and because many members were church leaders, the nascent peace commission began to prove itself as a neutral party committed to peace.

Soon they began to win agreements from both sides for the community, such as the return of kidnapped family members, the right to return to their fields in safety to plant and harvest their crops and the right to travel about the countryside without being accused of being spies. Though small achievements within the larger context of the war, they were the first step in restoring a measure of normality to the lives of the people in the area. As one commentator notes, ‘Campesinos were no longer to be mere victims. Rather they became instruments of peace, agents of change.’²

As word spread of their success, so other groups of citizens, usually led by a local pastor or Catholic lay leader, came together to form peace commissions. By 1987 - the date of the signing of the Esquipulas Accord (commonly known as the Arias Peace Plan) that began the slow process of ending the war - there were 28 such commissions in Nueva Guinea.
Soon local peace commissions were trekking regularly into the hills to meet with Contra leaders, engaging them in a process of genuine dialogue. In many cases the commissions used their time with the Contras to voice their concerns over the abuse of local people by Contra forces. In other cases they talked to the Contras about recent developments in the peace process, breaches of ceasefire, the government offer of amnesty for any Contra fighters and any human rights violations by both sides. At a time when many Contras had no intention of laying down their arms, this channel of communication was vital in building trust between the local people and a force that appeared accountable to no-one.

By the time the war officially ended following a UN brokered peace accord in 1989 and the election of a new government in February 1990, there were 96 local peace commissions, supported and coordinated by regional/zonal peace commissions. Such was the trust built up over the years that in Nueva Guinea many of the Contras - as part of the demobilization process - agreed to hand over their arms only to the local peace commissions.

In other cases - where Contras refused to disarm whilst Sandinista forces were in the area - the local peace commissions engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the two sides, in many cases persuading the Sandinistas to retreat so that the Contras could descend from the hills, avoiding the risk of an armed confrontation with their adversaries.

The end of the war, however, did not see an end to the violence. Indeed the failure of the new government to honour all its commitments led to the Contras - as part of the demobilization process - agreed to hand over their arms only to the local peace commissions. For instance, one group of 200 Re-Contras continued to fight until 1994 when, after months of dialogue with a local peace commission, they finally handed in their weapons. The Re-Contra commandante recalls that at first he suspected that the peace commission members were spies for the government, but, ‘It became clear over time that they’re neutral people who watch out for the rights of all Nicaraguans.’ For him, the turning point came during a tense stand off between the Re-Contras and government troops when, in an act of remarkable bravery, one commission member switched hats and coats with him in order to protect him.

Outcome

According to Damaris Albuquerque, CEPAD Executive Director, CEPAD conceives peace not just as an absence of war but also as a state of general well being.
Background
In 1952 the democratically-elected government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman introduced land reforms that sought to redress the acute social and economic disparities between the two major ethnic groups in the country, the ladinos (people of Spanish or mixed descent) and indigenous Mayans. The predominantly urban ladinos dominated nearly all positions of authority and control. The country’s elite, made up almost exclusively of ladinos and representing only 2% of the population, owned almost 70% of the land, whilst 90% of Guatemalan farms owned by the predominantly Mayan population were too small to support the average family.¹

Arbenz’s attempts to expropriate land for redistribution prompted the country’s largest single landowner, the US-based United Fruit Company, to seek help from the CIA. Seeing this as an excuse to purge the Guatemalan government of any communist influence, they were willing to oblige.

Using a CIA sponsored mercenary army, Arbenz was overthrown in 1954, reversing all social reforms and setting in place a series of military backed repressive governments which systematically strangled any popular dissent.

Unable to effect change politically, a number of guerrilla movements began to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s. These soon united under one banner - the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). The army’s response, with the continued support of the US, was as one commentator noted, ‘unprecedented in its brutality’.² Entire areas of the country - thought to be harbouring guerrillas or their sympathisers - were depopulated.

Involvement
In 1981, in the midst of the regime’s scorched earth campaign, the Rev Paul Wee, a Lutheran Pastor, was visiting Guatemala as part of a National Council of Churches delegation. ‘Whole areas of Guatemala were being devastated, thousands of people being killed and those who had escaped came to us and told us their stories’, recalls Wee. ‘I had never heard anything so horrible in my life.’³

He made a promise there and then that he would do what he could to help.

In 1986 Wee became Assistant General Secretary for International Affairs and Human Rights for the Geneva-based Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the umbrella organisation representing most of the Lutheran Churches around the world. There, a small team was quickly assembled, including Gunnar Staalslett (LWF General Secretary), Leopoldo Niilus (Special Consultant for International Affairs to the LWF) and Petter Skauen (from Norwegian Church Aid) which promptly set to work in an attempt to bring the two sides in Guatemala’s long running conflict together. In many respects, their timing was fortuitous. In 1985 in the face of increasing international isolation, the country had returned to civilian rule. In 1987, as part of the Arias Peace Plan which sought to bring an end to the wars in Central America, a series of Commissions of National Reconciliation (CNR) were set up in a number of Central American countries. The CNR in Guatemala was the vehicle through which the government would make the first tentative contacts with the guerrillas.

By 1990 the LWF team had secured the support not only of the Catholic church, which was seen as a vital ally given its influence in Guatemala, but more importantly, from key leaders from both the URNG, the CNR and the Ministry of Defence. The stage was set for a meeting.

For Norwegian Gunnar Staalssett, the natural choice for the location of the meeting was Norway. As a low profile European country with no colonial past, a uniquely close relationship between government and non-governmental organisations and a foreign policy that gave priority to development and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, it was the ideal discrete and neutral partner in the talks. According to Staalssett, just one phone call to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was all it took to secure the much needed financial and logistical support.⁴

For five days in an isolated and picturesque government owned chalet somewhere outside Oslo the two sides talked. While the LWF team had taken on a mediating role, their primary task as they saw it was to facilitate dialogue between the two groups.
That night the LWF team and the group stayed up all night drafting what would become known as the ‘Basic Agreement on the Search for Peace by Political Means’ - not a peace accord as such but rather an agreement on how to reach an agreement. It was a momentous occasion. At 9am the next morning the document was signed which signalled the beginning of the end of the war. Wee remembers shaking with excitement. ‘I remember thinking that if nothing else happened in my ministry, I would be content’ he recalls.9

However the LWF role was far from over. Despite offering to withdraw from the process, they were asked to remain involved as people accompanying the process, helping to keep everyone honest.9

In the following months, based on what came to be known as the Oslo Accord, the CNR, supported by the LWF, arranged a series of meetings around the world between participants of the peace talks and sections of Guatemalan society.

Leopoldo Niilus recalls how he told the participants on several occasions, ‘Listen friends and gentlemen; this is your civil war. If you yourselves have a strong desire to find a peaceful way out and think that we can be of some assistance, please tell us. If not, say so.’

On the final evening came a breakthrough. During an after dinner discussion, the group began to tell each other stories about their childhood. Some of the adversaries discovered that they grew up in the same neighbourhoods; others even went to the same school together. As the night wore on, they began to talk about their shared vision for the country: peace, security and economic growth. ‘Suddenly there were tears’, says Wee ‘...abrazos (hugs) and a determination to hammer out an agreement.’ Looking back, Wee would call this the dynamics of grace: acceptance, prayer, confession, forgiveness, reconciliation and thanksgiving.7

For the URNG they arranged for the UN to carry forward the process the LWF, World Council of Churches, Latin American Council of Churches and National Council of Churches of Christ of the USA - who in 1988 had formed a special Central American task force to help bring peace to the region - arranged a series of ‘Ecumenical Encounters.’ These brought together people from all walks of life in Guatemala as well as international actors such as the Vatican, UN, OAS and US to help bolster the process. These consultations, which were held at various cities throughout the world came at particularly difficult times in the peace process and according to many people, helped revitalise it.

Outcome

Through fits and starts and over a period of six years the peace process finally came to its conclusion on Dec 29th 1996 in Guatemala City. There, the agreement on a firm and lasting peace was signed by the Government and the URNG, ending 36 years of war.

Over the years a variety of external and internal factors conspired to help bring an end to the war. The end of communism, the Arias peace plan and the return to civilian rule in the late 1980s were some of the more notable factors. However, the role of the LWF was pivotal. ‘Without you, we wouldn’t be here’ said Jorge Rosal, one of the four guerrilla leaders, to the LWF. The chief UN negotiator, Francesc Vendrell, agreed. ‘Nothing would have happened in the peace process without you.’11
Background
Mpumalanga township was built in the 1960s to house the thousands of black workers who supplied the factories of nearby Hammarsdale, a major industrial town. With the apartheid government starving the local area of almost all basic community facilities and services and with the unemployment rate estimated to be over 50%, the area experienced frequent bouts of social unrest.

In 1986 violence broke out principally between supporters of the United Democratic Front (UDF) - a front for the then-banned African National Congress (ANC) - and Chief Buthelezi of the IFP, massive violence erupted in Mpumalanga, with hundreds of houses being destroyed and many people killed. Local businesses suffered tremendously. The local bus company withdrew its service as a result of the escalating violence, workers began to leave their jobs and their homes in search of a safer place to live and absenteeism rocketed.

Involvement
In 1989, as the situation continued to deteriorate, local shop steward James Ngubane approached Steve Simpson, HR Manager for one of Hammarsdale’s major companies, SA Nylon Spinners, to ask for help. Having failed in his attempt to organise a meeting between the UDF and IFP leadership, Ngubane hoped that Simpson, who was also the Chairman of the local branch of the Natal Chamber of Industries, would throw his weight behind a renewed attempt at halting the violence.

For Simpson, the choice was clear. The boardroom of SA Nylon Spinners had for years been the venue for all major meetings throughout the entire region and so seemed the ideal setting for a meeting between adversaries. In addition, the violence was affecting businesses so seriously that many were contemplating closing down their operations. However, while Simpson was keen to help, the risks were also clear. The nearby Pietermaritzburg chamber of commerce had tried to intervene in the violence that plagued their region, but the initiative failed abysmally, with its leader being forced to resign.

With this in mind, Simpson proceeded slowly, firstly contacting black business leaders to seek not only their approval but also their full cooperation. The simple argument put forward by Simpson - that violence was bad for business - was powerful enough to win him the support he needed from the black business community.

Soon afterwards a small committee made up of two white industrialists and three black businessmen was appointed. Having quickly gained the support of the leadership of the local ANC/UDF and IFP for the meeting to take place, the committee arranged a series of pre-meeting workshops to ‘prime’ each side separately with tools and techniques which they felt would help the ANC/UDF and IFP gain a better understanding of the conflict and clarify their role in it. Such tools included environmental mapping (charting all the stakeholders in the conflict), force field analysis (a method used to get a whole view of all the forces for or against a plan so that a decision can be made which takes into account all interests) and other brainstorming techniques.
The meeting was scheduled for the 30th November 1989. Despite a huge outbreak of violence the night before and a demonstration by the IFP, the trust that had built up between the committee and both parties enabled the meeting to continue.

When the two sides finally entered the boardroom, the tension was immense. ‘It was a “high noon” atmosphere’ at the meeting, recalls Simpson.² On the one side of the room were 25 representatives of the UDF. On the other were only 6 representatives of the IFP. Both sides were determined not to look at each other. Simpson, who had been asked by both sides to act as mediator, began the meeting by writing the agendas of both sides in different colours. As he wrote, a pattern began to emerge. Both sides wanted freedom of movement. Both sides wanted better social amenities. Both wanted the police to stop intimidating the people. All wanted peace. ‘You could almost see the sigh of relief that there wasn’t a major conflict of interests’ recalls Simpson.³

That night a ceasefire was signed. The following day the leader of the UDF, Archie Gumede, and a representative of the IFP came to Mpumalanga to endorse the agreement. For the next ten weeks, the two parties met on average three times a week. During this time breaches of the ceasefire were discussed and meetings were also convened with the army and police, who were felt to be aggravating the situation.

By now, the NCI had taken on the role of mediator at the express invitation of both sides.

Outcome
The fragile peace was disrupted several times. In February 1990, following the unbanning of the ANC, violence erupted and by April the two sides had stopped talking altogether. Again the NCI coordinating committee stepped in to bring the ANC and IFP to the table, organising another meeting at SA Nylon Spinners. However this time the two sides agreed to meet without mediation, which was seen by all as a positive step forward.

The meeting, held in November, was a resounding success, a tribute to the leadership and determination of Meshack Radebe (ANC) and Sipho Mlaba (IFP) who became such close working partners that they were known as ‘the twins’. Following the meeting, joint rallies for peace were called by both parties. Soon after the ANC and IFP signed the National Peace Accord and peace was finally cemented in the area.

While Simpson acknowledges that the success of the Mpumalanga Peace Initiative must be attributed to the leadership of Meshack Radebe and Sipho Mlaba, who were ultimately responsible for taking the bold steps towards peace, the role of the Hammarsdale Industrialists must not be ignored. For without their guidance, support and active partnership of the process from the very beginning, the history of the township may have taken a very different course.

This pre-meeting training was absolutely vital. For instance, through the environmental mapping exercise it became clear that there were several smaller political parties in the area, with only minimal support, who were seen as ‘muscling in’ on what was essentially a conflict between the ANC/UDF and IFP. As a result, both sides were keen that the other parties be kept out of the meeting. Simpson communicated this to each of the parties separately and to his surprise they agreed to not interfere in the ANC/UDF and IFP discussions.

These pre-meeting workshops, which took place once a week for six weeks, served another vital function. Aside from helping each party focus on the real problems at the heart of the violence and helping them understand what they wanted out of the meeting, the workshops helped build the confidence of both sides. ‘It was like marriage guidance counselling’, notes Simpson, with his team encouraging, cajoling, and emotionally supporting the parties for what would be the first face-to-face meeting between each other for years.

For More information:
See the testimony of Professor John Aitcheson (University of Pietermaritzburg) at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (www.truth.org.za/hrvtrans/HRVPMB/pmb1.htm) for a good overview of the background to the violence that plagued Mpumalanga and the surrounding area.

War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict

Internally displaced: Unknown
Refugees: Unknown
Deaths: 14,000 for the entire country 1990 - 1994 (SA Human Rights Committee)
Cost of Involvement: Not available

When the two sides finally entered the boardroom, the tension was immense. ‘It was a “high noon” atmosphere’ at the meeting, recalls Simpson.²
Background
The civil war in Sudan ranks as one of the most devastating and protracted conflicts in the world. While international attention has focused on the war between the Muslim Government of Sudan and the Christian dominated south of the country, since the 1990s a parallel conflict has wrought extensive destruction to southern Sudan and to the lives of the people who have been living in the shadow of war for years.

In 1991 the main rebel force in the south, known as the SPLA, which was made up of predominantly Dinka people, split. The largest breakaway group, calling themselves the SSJA was made up of predominantly Nuer people. Since 1991 these two groups have been engaged in a devastating conflict which has cost the lives of thousands and has led to the almost complete disintegration of parts of the south. ‘The Dinka and Nuer were one’, said a Nuer fighter. ‘It all went bad overnight.’

Involvement
In June 1998, in response to this grave situation, the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) launched an ambitious initiative to bring Dinka and Nuer leaders together, just across the border, in Loki, Kenya. The initiative was born following tentative discussions that had been held between the NSCC and the SPLM/A the previous year in which the NSCC were asked to do what they could to help end the bloodshed.

Over a period of several months key individuals in the conflict were contacted and 35 were chosen to participate in the meeting. They included key Dinka and Nuer border chiefs, local pastors, senior church leaders and representatives of the two major military factional groups.

According to Dr William Lowrey, who facilitated the meeting, there were three main objectives: the first was to help Dinka and Nuer chiefs and church leaders reconcile with one another and rebuild or establish new relationships.

Secondly it was felt that both groups should be encouraged to not only tap into their own traditional peacemaking practices but also, where appropriate, gain an understanding of modern conflict management and reconciliation techniques. Lastly, it was hoped that joint Dinka-Nuer teams would develop strategies for building peace at the grass-roots and middle levels of society.

The NSCC - which since 1992 has been based in Nairobi, Kenya - was one of the few organisations that had contacts with both the Dinka and Nuer and thus was well placed to convene such a meeting. The NSCC had been working in Sudan since 1989 and was set up to represent the Christian churches in the areas not controlled by the Government of Sudan.

The meeting began in the traditional manner, with each member of the group telling their personal stories of how the conflict has affected them and their communities, speaking openly of the pain and suffering they had caused each other over the years.

According to Dr Lowrey, who facilitated the meeting, there were three main objectives: the first was to help Dinka and Nuer leaders reconcile with one another and rebuild or establish new relationships.

Participants were allowed to speak for as long as they wished and everyone had to listen without interrupting. For the NSCC this method - deeply embedded in Nuer and Dinka culture - was aligned with their own belief that listening is the beginning of rebuilding broken relationships.

This storytelling lasted for three full days. As they listened to one another they began to analyse the conflict more deeply. Lowrey recalls, ‘It was as though they were peeling back layer upon layer of pain and discovering afresh, that at their core, they are from one family.’ From this there began to evolve a common sharing in the suffering and a deep passion for finding a way to build peace and reconciliation.
Soon the chiefs began to frame the conflict as neighbour-to-neighbour and Dinka-to-Nuer, rather than between SPLA and SSIA. As a result they started to place the burden of responsibility for making peace on themselves. As Lowrey recalls, ‘one morning Chief William Ruai, the oldest of the Nuer chiefs, said: “I did not sleep at all last night. My body was so happy because my mind could only think about peace”.’

Finally two working groups were created, one representing each side of the Nile. Each group discussed possible strategies that would help each side work towards resolving the conflict, including roles and responsibilities, possible spoilers or barriers to the peace process and the date of and place for a major peace conference on the West Bank of the Nile. The working groups also recommended the NSCC start to facilitate a series of smaller meetings between dissident groups and factions on the East Bank to culminate in an overall East Bank meeting.

On the last day of the meeting, the Nuer-Dinka Loki Accord was initialled, using thumb prints rather than signatures since most of the participants could not write. After the thumb printing, each person was given an opportunity to express in words or acts the depth of their commitment to peace. Lowrey remembers one chief who began to dance in the middle of the group. ‘This old man at times can hardly walk,’ said Lowrey, ‘...his feet look like clubs. But it looked like the joy and hope of peace had captured his heart.’

These gatherings, facilitated by the NSCC, have grown in size to fully embrace whole communities, thus ensuring that all levels of society are brought into the process. Lasting several days and often involving hundreds of people, no issue is left unmentioned.

As a result women and children who had been abducted in raids have been released, cattle raids have ceased, and trade has resumed, as have old agreements over grazing and water rights and relationships are being restored.

An example of the spirit of inclusiveness in the peace building process can be seen at the signing of the Waat Lou Nuer Covenant in November 1999, again a direct spin-off from the Loki Accord. During the signing of the Covenant and the placing of thumb-prints on the document, a young boy was found crying outside the meeting hall. When asked why, he said it was because he wanted to put his print on the document. He was escorted inside and proudly put his mark on the paper. The peace, the elders told him, was being made for him.
Background
The long running conflict between the Colombian state and the left wing guerrillas, which has its routes in the period known as La Violencia, continues to exact a terrible toll on the country. Between 1988 and 1992 there were almost 38,000 political assassinations, most of which were committed by the state security forces or by state supported paramilitary groups.

As the state has faced mounting international condemnation for the way it has conducted its campaign against the guerrillas, it has increasingly turned to illegal paramilitary groups to do its work. During 1999 alone over 250,000 people were forced to flee their homes due to the violence, which according to Amnesty International has been a deliberate strategy employed by paramilitary forces to cleanse the civilian population from areas of guerrilla influence.

The city of Barrancabermeja, which is considered a stronghold of the FARC and ELN guerrilla groups, is one such example. There the citizens have been subjected to wave after wave of violence from the army and paramilitaries.

One member of the state intelligence network recently admitted that his job was to ‘Collect information on targets, members of subversive groups and delinquents and then kill them.” Targets included community leaders, human rights defenders, trade unionists and social and political activists. For instance, by 1993 six key members of the Regional Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CREDHOS), one of the most vocal human rights groups in the area, had been assassinated and most of the remaining leadership had fled the country.

Involvement
Shortly after setting up their first office in Bogota in 1994, Peace Brigades International (PBI) was invited by CREDHOS to establish a presence in Barrancabermeja. Given the grave danger that such organisations faced in the region, PBI accepted the invitation, setting up an office in 1995.

Peace Brigades International was conceived in 1981 at an international conference on non-violence in Canada. The idea, deeply rooted in the experiences of active non violent movements such as Gandhi’s Shanti Sena, began to coalesce amongst the various groups: to mobilise and provide trained units of volunteers, in areas of high tension, to avoid violent outbreaks. The theory behind the placement of such volunteers was not that they would offer physical protection but more that ‘there will be an international response to whatever violence the volunteer witnesses.’ As PBI veterans Liam Mahony and Luis Enrique Eguren note, ‘Behind such a response lies the implied threat of diplomatic and economic pressure - pressure that the sponsors of such violence may wish to avoid.’

According to Eguren, PBI - and indeed other organisations involved in protective accompaniment - need to meet a series of conditions in order that their work successfully deters aggression.
Hiding in a restaurant, he overheard the gunmen ask the restaurant owner ‘Where is that son of a bitch? I’ve come to kill him’. Fortunately Arenales managed to call the local PBI office. Soon PBI volunteers arrived on the scene, by which time the gunmen had left. The PBI volunteers accompanied him home and at his request began providing him with round the clock unarmed protection.

PBI then activated its Support Network in order to reinforce the protection provided by accompaniment. Hundreds of faxes, letters and calls from NGOs, government officials from around the world, citizens and churches arrived at the offices of the army and the Colombian government officials. In response, the commander in chief of the Armed forces telephoned the PBI offices offering to take measures to ensure the security and safety of Arenales.

Outcome
By expanding the political space available to human rights organisations - in other words by increasing the opportunity for such organisations to conduct their work without fear of violent attacks - PBI has no doubt made a significant contribution to the lives of many people living in Colombia. Likewise, PBI’s work has also shrunk what Eguren calls the ‘impunity space’ - the space available to repressive regimes for violent action.

There is no doubt that the work of PBI has saved the lives of specific individuals in Colombia and in other countries in which it operates. Nineth Montenegro de Garcia, founder of the Guatemalan human rights pressure group GAM, said: ‘Thanks to their [PBI’s] presence, I am alive. That is an indispensable truth. If it had not been for them, I would not be telling you this today.’

As Eguren comments, ‘Accompaniment without international support is a façade with no real protective value.’

From the outset PBI faced enormous difficulties. Shortly after arriving in Barrancabermeja, they narrowly escaped a paramilitary ambush whilst investigating a false report of a massacre. Activating their Emergency Response Network soon brought diplomatic representatives from three European countries to the area to pledge their support for PBI’s work.

This high level pressure fulfilled one of the key requisites as outlined above - proving to the aggressor that PBI has international ‘clout’. Within a very short space of time PBI was accompanying a number of prominent human rights organisations that had been threatened or attacked over the years.

One example illustrates PBI’s work in action. On the night of March 5th 1999 Pablo Arenales, a key member of CREDHOS, was the target of a failed assassination attempt whilst making his way home from work.
Background

The conflict in Colombia today can be traced back to the intense and often violent rivalry between the Conservative and Liberal parties, which dates back to the very foundation of the state. It reached its nadir in the period 1946 - 1964, which was known as La Violencia, with the conflict claiming over 200,000 lives. While the conflict was ostensibly between competing political parties, it was used by the ruling elite (who owned over 90% of the country's wealth) to silence the peasant stand against harsh working conditions and inequitable land distribution which had been gathering momentum since the 1920s.

State violence against peasants, who were denounced as communists, was absolute, with many losing their farms and over 1 million fleeing the country, seeking refuge in Venezuela. During ‘La Violencia’ many peasants formed ‘resistance committees’ in an attempt to protect themselves.

While the creation of a power-sharing agreement between the two parties and a near permanent ‘state of emergency’ de-escalated the conflict, the peasants and other already excluded groups found themselves even further marginalized. With a stagnating economy, members of the resistance committees became willing recruits for the guerrilla movements that emerged in the mid 1960s, most notably the Soviet influenced FARC, which remains the largest group today.

Since then the government, often in league with paramilitary groups known as autodefensas, has waged a bitter war against these guerrillas and, by extension, members of the civilian population suspected of being 'sympathisers' or living in guerrilla controlled areas.

Since 1985, 2 million people have been forced to abandon their homes largely due to the attacks perpetrated by the paramilitaries. The village of San Jose de Apartado, in the Uraba district, is one such example. The citizens, living in an area predominantly controlled by guerrillas, have been accused by the army/paramilitaries of siding with the enemy. Likewise, the guerrillas have kidnapped, executed and terrorized the civilian population they claim are government collaborators.

In 1996 and 1997 the town and surrounding region was attacked by paramilitaries whose attempt to deprive the guerrillas of civilian support manifested itself in extreme violence against the local population. 16,000 people were displaced, whole villages emptied and many prominent townsfolk assassinated.

Involvement

In response to this crisis, the displaced villagers of San Jose de Apartado, along with villagers from 28 smaller hamlets, met with their local bishop to discuss the possibility of creating a ‘neutral zone’ in which the civilian population would be respected. Workshops were held with the Intercongregational Commission for Justice and Peace, involving members of the local community and community leaders. The idea quickly began to develop.

Likewise, the guerrillas have kidnapped, executed and terrorized the civilian population they claim are government collaborators.

During one of the workshops it was noted that the term 'neutrality' had been appropriated by the Governor of the area to mean areas which were under government control. This was clearly not acceptable for the people, who sought to distance themselves from both sides in the conflict. 'For us, the meaning of neutrality was different,' recalls one member. 'We decided, then, to change the name while keeping the same objective in mind: to remain neutral towards all the armed actors on the conflict.' Thus, after much discussion, on March 23rd 1997 the ‘Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado’ was established. Pax Christi, a non-governmental Catholic peace movement that had worked in the area for over 10 years, was present, as were several other organisations - including the media - to witness the event.
Members of the community realised that they needed to embody the peace that they were seeking to achieve in their area. For this to happen they laid down a set of ‘ground rules’ which prospective members of the peace community were expected to subscribe to. These were (a) to participate in community work efforts, (b) to say ‘no’ to injustice and impunity, (c) not to participate directly or indirectly in the war, (d) not to carry weapons, and (e) not to manipulate nor give information to any parties in the conflict.

Workshops were arranged for the members of the village explaining the commitment that they were about to make. The work of the community was divided into separate groups and committees. For instance, health, education, work, sports, culture and women’s committees were established, all of which were intended to develop a sense of community solidarity.

An Internal Council was set up to coordinate the peace activities of the community - with a specific function to promote the resolution of conflicts through dialogue. In addition, observers, such as those from Pax Christi, have been important in providing a level of international attention on the area.

Within a very short space of time eight other peace communities were set up by displaced people from smaller hamlets in Uraba district whose inhabitants had fled during the fighting in 1996 and 1997. Despite the concerns of many people that it was not safe to return to this conflict ridden area, the setting up of the peace communities prompted the return of thousands of peasants to their homes, mostly without incident.

Outcome

There are now more than 20 peace communities in the Uraba and Choco region, involving thousands of villagers. With increased international attention, citizens in other areas throughout Colombia are calling for the creation of peace communities there.

According to one Pax Christi observer, the concept of peace communities - to allow displaced citizens of the region to autonomously reconstruct their lives in communities that are self-proclaimed zones of peace - really works. Others agree. On a visit to San Jose, Oxfam Director David Bryer said that the peace initiative ‘offers a grain of hope for all Colombians, and for the international community, in search of peace and respect for human rights.’

International NGOs have started to return to the area, thus adding to the prospects of further development and stability. Indeed Carlos Castano, leader of the largest coalition of paramilitary forces known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), promised to respect the peace communities, as did the army and some guerrilla leaders. However these promises have not been honoured and there have been 60 murders since the setting up of the peace community in San Jose de Apartado, the majority committed by the paramilitaries.

Despite the huge challenges that face the people, the concept of the peace zones/community has taken firm root in Uraba and offers a tantalising and pragmatic alternative to the years of bloodshed and conflict that have plagued this area for over twenty years.
Background
Like the majority of African states, Nigeria consists of many different ethnic groups forced to coexist within the artificial borders drawn up by the British. When Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960, the three largest ethnic groups in the three major regions of Nigeria wrestled for control of the federal government: the Muslim Hausa-Fulani in the North; the Christian/Muslim/anist Yorubas in the West; and the Christian Ibos in the East. Soon tensions began to escalate, culminating in violent and fraudulent elections in 1964 and 1965.

In a January 1966 coup an Ibo took power, promptly suspended the fragile national and regional constitutions, thus precipitating fears from the other major groups that they would be marginalized. This led to widespread demonstration and riots, especially in the North. By July 1966 a coup led by Hausa army officers ousted the Ibo leadership and placed Lt Col Jakubu Gowon at the head of a new military regime.

Gowon however, was not able to control the rioting in the North and it is estimated that around 10,000 Ibos died and around 1.5 million people fled to the southeast. There the regional military governor Lt Col Chukwuemeka Ojukwu became leader of the Ibo secessionist movement, with his administration even refusing to recognize Gowon’s legitimacy.

Relations between Gowon and Ojukwu rapidly deteriorated and despite several attempts to reach some form of settlement, in May 1967 Ojukwu declared the independent Republic of Biafra. One week later war broke out.

Involvement
A fortnight before war broke out, Adam Curle and John Volkmar visited Nigeria to express their concern about the deteriorating situation. As members of the Quakers - one of the historic peace churches with a strong tradition of quiet peace work around the world - Curle and Volkmar were able to meet with the majority of the individuals involved from both sides of the conflict, including Ojukwu.

Upon their return home, Curle and Volkmar, at the insistence of the President of Niger (who had been a member of a failed OAU effort to reach a settlement at the beginning of the war) set about planning a series of secret meetings between representatives from both sides that they hoped would lead to formal discussions. Both Gowon and Ojukwu agreed to the proposal, which was no small achievement given that Gowon, deeply sceptical of what he saw as ‘outside meddling’, had refused the offer of help from other well known organisations.

From the very beginning both Curle and Volkmar made it clear that they wanted a limited role. Their job as they saw it was to establish the preconditions for effective negotiations, their principle function being that of message carriers, thus bridging the communication chasm that often exists between conflicting parties.

Several qualities became essential to the success of the Quakers in winning the confidence of both sides. The first was their dogged neutrality. Ojukwu was particularly adept at portraying the Nigeria-Biafra conflict as a war of genocide against the Ibo people, and with the help of a Swiss PR firm gained massive popular sympathy throughout the world. As a result many groups such as the Vatican and World Council of Churches were seen as pro-Biafran. Curle and Volkmar however, made it clear that they would take no sides, which meant that they would listen to and acknowledge the concerns of all parties involved in the conflict, something that others had failed to do.
This art was practiced with great effect in Nigeria where Curle and Volkmar were able to correct many misperceptions that each side held about the other. In particular they explained to Gowon that far from breaking the will and spirit of the Ibos, the bombing campaign and economic blockade were actually strengthening their resolve.

Over a period of two and a half years the Quakers continued their message carrying function, meeting with top-level representatives from both sides regularly. In between they supported the efforts of other mediating interventions such as that by the Commonwealth and the OAU. Here too they can claim significant credit, since many key Biafran officials recall that it was the determination of the Quakers that persuaded the Biafrans to join in the negotiations.

Outcome
Despite the efforts of the Quakers and very many others, the war was pursued to its very end with Biafra surrendering in January 1970. In one respect, then, all efforts can be seen as ultimately unsuccessful. However the fact that Gowon appears to have greatly respected and admired both Curle and Volkmar may have had a significant impact on his actions at the end of the war.

Instead of the widely anticipated violence and retribution against the defeated army, Gowon’s forces were doing everything to help their former enemies, giving them their own food, tending to the wounded, giving them money.

As Curle recalls, ‘a wonderful spirit of reconciliation and brotherhood prevailed at all levels.’ Biafrans who before the war had held high Federal positions were reinstated on full pay, Gowon called for three days of prayer, an amnesty for all soldiers was put into effect and the government instigated it’s three ‘Rs’ programme: reconstruction, reintegration and reconciliation.

It is very difficult to establish precisely what prompted Gowon to embark on this astonishing road to reconciliation. However, several well informed people told Curle and Volkmar after the war that their influence on Gowon was a major factor in what one scholar calls ‘the most extraordinary post-civil war reconciliation to have occurred in modern history.’

For more information:
Read C.H. Mike Yarrow’s excellent book ‘Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation’ (Yale University Press, 1978) which provides a thorough analysis on the work in Nigeria and elsewhere. Also see Douglas Johnston & Cynthia Sampson’s book ‘Religion, the missing dimension of statecraft’ (Oxford University Press, 1994) for their chapter on Quaker work in Nigeria. For more information about the Quakers see www.quaker.org.uk/ or www.afsc.org/.

Internally displaced: Unknown
Refugees: Unknown
Background
In February 1990, during the opening of South Africa's Parliament, President F.W. de Klerk changed the course of South Africa's history. The ANC and other hitherto outlawed groups such as the Pan Africanist Congress were unbanned and Nelson Mandela was released from prison. Talks continued between Mandela and de Klerk, effectively beginning a peace process which promised a new dawn in South African politics.

For black South Africans who had lived for generations with racist policies under minority white rule, there was an overwhelming sense of optimism and hope. But the optimism proved short-lived. 1990 turned out to be the most violent year on record with over 3,700 deaths resulting from political violence. Most of the victims were supporters of either the ANC or the Inkatha Freedom Party, bitter rivals whose hostility towards each other had broken out into open warfare.

By the end of the year it was clear that the violence threatened to undermine the talks between de Klerk and Mandela, thus putting the entire peace process into jeopardy. The business sector feared that economic sanctions would continue if the violence went unchecked. As one commentator noted, "The impression gained ground among church and business leaders that violence was out of control and that neither the political leadership nor the security forces were able to address it effectively."

Involvement
In May 1991 the Consultative Business Movement (CBM) and the South African Council of Churches (SACC) met in an attempt to find a solution to the escalating violence. The SACC, an alliance of anti-apartheid churches, had tried and failed on several occasions to launch a major peace initiative, beginning with a conference that would bring together all the sides in the conflict.

The key problem was that in the eyes of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, head of the Inkatha Freedom Party and one of the key protagonists in the conflict, the SACC was pro-ANC and thus was not an "honest broker". Without Buthelezi's support any peace initiative was dead.

Meanwhile the CBM - an association of progressive South African business leaders - had only been marginally more successful in their efforts to move the peace negotiations along. Headed by a young former minister for religion, Theuns Eloff, who had been shunned by his church for having met with the then banned ANC in the mid 1980s, the CBM had for some time believed that it should lend its support to efforts aimed at ending the violence.

Beginning with a series of low key meetings with all the major protagonists in the conflict, CBM stepped up its involvement following the announcement that the ANC was planning to boycott a peace conference scheduled for the 24-25th Mat and organised by de Klerk. De Klerk and the ANC seemed to be on a collision course, running the risk of derailing the faltering peace talks.

Despite CBM's willingness to help, however, they also ran into problems since the ANC were deeply suspicious of big business who were seen as pro-government.

Meeting just a week before de Klerk's conference, the CBM and SACC agreed that business, church leaders and civil society should join forces to help move the peace negotiations forward. Further meetings were immediately arranged which brought other important players such as the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) into the discussions. As Peter Gastrow notes, "For the first time ever, church, business and trade union leaders were putting their heads together, albeit informally, to seek an answer to the problem of political violence."
In all there were representatives from about 20 of the main organisations in South Africa.

For hours the group brainstormed all the causes of the violence and the possible remedies. At the end of the meeting a series of key recommendations were made that included the development of a code of conduct for political organisations and the security forces as well as the creation of peace secretariats at a national, regional and local level. Preparatory committees were established which were charged with the task of hammering out a document on the issue assigned to it, which could be ratified by each party.

The committees immediately set to work, ably supported by CBM as the secretariat. It was agreed that all the documents would be signed at a ‘National Peace Convention’ on September 14th. As the documents were collated they became known collectively as the ‘National Peace Accord.’

Outcome
The National Peace Convention was a remarkable occasion. Apart from three far right political organisations, the leadership and representatives of all of South Africa’s political parties were present. Each group signed the collection of documents, thus committing themselves to working cooperatively towards healing the country and preventing further bloodshed.

The signing of the National Peace Accord - what Gastrow calls a ‘negotiated revolution’ - was a milestone in South Africa’s history. As well as setting up a network of peace committees throughout the country to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, the Accord provided for a code of conduct for the security forces and political parties, the establishment of a commission of enquiry regarding the prevention of further violence, and wide ranging socio-economic reconstruction and development especially in areas of high tension.

While violence did continue and indeed increased as the country moved towards its first truly free elections, there is no doubt that the violence would have been far greater without the Accord. According to International Alert, the NPA’s greatest achievement lay in ‘developing a “peace culture”, in securing an ideological commitment from the principal political actors to “political tolerance” and in being able to establish procedures and mechanisms for crisis management.’

Susan Collin Marks, author of ‘Watching the Wind’, which explores the workings of the regional and local peace committees set up by the NPA, agrees. ‘The peace Accord changed South Africa and South Africans... it provided a buffer against violence that allowed the 1994 elections to proceed and catapult us to democracy...’

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This new spirit of cooperation continued with increased vigour following de Klerk’s announcement that Louw Alberts, a prominent Afrikaner, lay preacher and someone who enjoyed the trust of de Klerk and many of the black churches, had been appointed to organise a more representative peace conference. That de Klerk had agreed to such a move - which prevented the ANC boycott of the peace conference from derailing the peace talks - was largely down to the efforts of the CBM/SACC coalition. Alberts promptly set to work forming a facilitating committee made up of church and business leaders drawn largely from the group brought together by the CBM and SACC just weeks earlier.

The facilitating committee immediately proposed that a preparatory meeting or ‘think tank for peace’ should be scheduled for June 1991 that would bring all the parties together to devise a strategy for ending the violence. When the meeting date arrived the facilitating committee realised that for the first time ever the South African government, the leadership of the ANC and IFP sat around the same table, together.

For more information:
Read Peter Gastrow’s ‘Bargaining for Peace’ (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1995) for a full account of the development and implementation of the National Peace Accord. For an excellent personal account of the life of a regional and local peace committee read Susan Collin Marks’ ‘Watching the Wind’ (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2000). To learn more about the South African Council of Churches see www.sacc.org.za

Deaths:
14,000 1990 - 1994
(SA Human Rights Committee)

Cost of Involvement:
Not available

War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict

Oxford Research Group
Background

Wajir district lies in the arid and inhospitable north-eastern area of Kenya. Its inhabitants are almost exclusively of Somali origin, having been separated from the rest of the Somali nomadic community at the end of the 19th century during the partition of Africa by the colonial powers.

Following Kenya's independence from Britain in 1963, two major conflicts were fought over this area, the first between Somalia and Kenya over control of the territory, the second between the Kenyan government and the Somali population living in the area who launched an unsuccessful war of secession. While the war ended in 1967 an official state of emergency, which had been announced by the government at the beginning of the fighting, continued until 1992, during which time the people were further marginalized, isolated and starved of any development assistance. Severe droughts in the region made competition for scarce natural resources acute, leading to intense and violent confrontations between the three major clans in the area.

Adding to these problems were the massively destabilising wars fought just across the Kenyan border in Ethiopia and Somalia. Refugees, weapons and bandits filtering across from these countries into Kenya only increased lawlessness and insecurity in the region.

In 1992 there was another severe drought and 70% of cattle and 30% of camels belonging to the clans died. Fighting soon flared up between the predominantly cattle-keeping Ajuran clan and the predominantly camel-keeping Degodia clan over alleged land encroachment and cattle raids. This quickly sucked in the third major clan in the area, the cattle keeping Ogaden. Soon the clans were at war with one another, each openly recruiting mercenaries from Somalia and Ethiopia and forming temporary alliances with smaller clans in an attempt to defeat their enemy. By 1993 the situation was desperate. Widespread looting, murder and destruction of property had led to a complete disintegration of the entire area. Following the death of a UN worker, all international NGOs pulled out of the area and the death toll threatened to spiral out of control.

Involvement

In June 1993, in the absence of any government help to mitigate the crisis, a group of Somali women launched ‘Wajir Women for Peace’ in an attempt to solve the problem of violence themselves. Almost immediately, the group set very strict guidelines for membership of the group. Said one of the leaders to the group, ‘You must commit yourself to continuing the peace work no matter what happens: If my clan were to kill your relatives, would you still work with me for peace? If you can’t say “yes”, don’t join the group now.’

The first major task was to talk to the major clan elders, who were responsible for fomenting much of the violence and thus were vital if peace was to be restored to the area. The members of the group (by now renamed the Wajir Peace Group or WPG) also enlisted the support of elders from smaller clans who were asked to act as mediators. According to Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, the meetings with the warring elders were ‘stormy and difficult.’

She recalls ‘Some elders resented “these children” (as they called members of the WPG) questioning their actions and usurping their roles’. However they finally agreed to the setting up of a standing committee made up of ten elders from each of the three major clans and ten elders from minority groups. That there now existed a forum where the clan elders could meet and discuss the problems facing the district was a milestone in itself, but the Wajir Peace Group did not rest there.

A series of meetings between the clan elders finally led to a major conference in September 1993, aided and supported by the local Member of Parliament, where the clans agreed on a ceasefire and a cessation of stock theft as well as a range of other measures designed to consolidate peace in the area. This code of conduct, known as the ‘Al Fatah Declaration’ was heralded as a major breakthrough and thrust the WPG into the role of prime peacemaker in the region.
Other interesting initiatives undertaken by the WPG included a gun return programme, securing publicity for local peace accords through the BBC World Service, peace festivals and a training of trainers programme to ‘proliferate peace’ amongst the many areas of the district.

One of the most interesting WPG innovations was the creation of a ‘Rapid Response Team’ made up of members of the District Security Committee, elders, youth and women. When violence flared up, the team was sent immediately to convene a meeting between the affected parties. In the majority of cases, the elders were directly contacted and through careful mediation a settlement was reached. In Batulu, for example, a quarrel between two young men from different clans escalated and one of the men was killed.

The victim’s clan immediately avenged his death by killing a member of the other clan. By the time the Rapid Response Team arrived, seventeen people had been killed. After a series of carefully mediated meetings it was agreed that the first murder should be dealt with by Kenyan law and the rest through traditional justice which involved the payment of fines in the form of camels. The clans agreed and the violence was ended.

In order to consolidate the peace, the WPG began an extensive outreach programme targeting first the youth and then the business community, carrying out public meetings and problem solving workshops which tried to tap into the root causes of the conflict. Religious leaders were recruited to appeal to the clan members to reject violence. This training was then extended to members of the Kenyan police and army who had been responsible for many grave injustices, as well as civil servants and other civil society groups.

In addition, the government started to take a more proactive role, committing resources and support for the entire process. When, for example, a vehicle hijacking took place, the government security forces tracked down and arrested the perpetrator, thus preventing the clans resorting to revenge which would have only escalated the violence.

Furthermore, recognizing that peace and development are intimately connected, the WPG and all its peace projects have been organised under the regional District Development Committee and has been renamed “Wajir Peace and Development Committee”.

As Abdi says, ‘Most of what was accomplished was done by people with “a heart for peace” rather than training in conflict resolution. The various peace groups in Wajir operated on the assumption that everyone has a stake in peace; thus all groups must be included in working towards peace.’

Outcome

Through these and other initiatives undertaken by the WPG the area has been transformed, despite the continuous flow of illegal firearms from neighbouring Somalia and Ethiopia. Normal life has resumed in Wajir, local citizens have raised almost $25,000 themselves in order to build new schools and Mosques, NGOs have returned to the area and organisations such as the World Bank have approved large infrastructure projects such as new roads and an airport to help develop the area.

For more information:

Deaths:
1,500 (Various sources)

Cost of Involvement:
Unavailable

Internally displaced:
Unknown

Refugees:
Unknown

‘...If my clan were to kill your relatives, would you still work with me for peace?
If you can’t say ‘yes’,
don’t join the group now.’

War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict
Witness for Peace
Nicaragua
1983 - 1990

Background
When, in 1979, the Sandinistas overthrew the Somoza dynasty, which had ruled over Nicaragua for over 40 years, they inherited a country riddled with inequality. While Nicaragua experienced rapid industrialisation under the Somozas, little of the wealth that was generated trickled down to the poor. Most remained in the hands of the Somoza family, their cronies and a very small elite who also controlled most of the land in the country. This gross inequality precipitated the formation of the Marxist Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional; FSLN) in 1961. Their success in capturing city after city in 1979 was largely due to the popular support that they enjoyed throughout the country.

Soon after the Sandinistas took power, the US began funding and training rebels stationed in Honduras and Costa Rica, known as the Contras, in an attempt to topple the government. Like many of the Central American countries, the history of Nicaragua is punctuated with instances of US military intervention, either direct or by proxy.

In an era when the US administration was obsessed by the threat of communism, the Sandinista's plans to nationalise industry, expropriate land belonging to the Somozas and the elite and redistribute it to the poor was too much to bear. Contra attacks started sporadically but soon escalated into a devastating civil war.

Involvement
On April 9th 1983 a delegation of US citizens from the Carolina Interfaith Task Force on Central America arrived in the Nicaraguan settlement and tobacco farm of El Porvenir, which sat only a few miles from the Honduran border. El Porvenir had already been attacked by the Contras, laying waste to one of the most productive farms in the region. Civilians had been wounded, some were missing, and it was known that the Contras were preparing to finish the job off before moving onto the town of Jalapa. As the US citizens surveyed the devastation, one of the local people pointed out the Contra base, visible in the distance. ‘Why aren’t they shooting now?’ said a member of the delegation. ‘Because you’re here’ came the reply.

The realisation was clear for all the members of the delegation. ‘If all it takes to stop this killing is to get a bunch of Americans down here, then let’s do it’ said one. Thus began the experiment that launched Witness for Peace.

Three months later, a second much larger group arrived in Jalapa to ‘stand with the Nicaraguan people’ - again in the hope that their presence would deter Contra attacks. Upon their return to the US the members of the delegation set to work spreading the word of what they had seen in local, regional and national newspapers, on television, radio and at congregations throughout the country. The group soon formed a coalition made up of concerned groups in the US, including mainstream churches, smaller churches such as the Quakers and Mennonites as well as other organisations such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation and Peace Brigades International.

The newly-formed coalition agreed that a long-term team would be supported by short-term visits by delegations, lasting between one and two weeks. Within a very short space of time 17 delegations had been scheduled taking them into mid 1984. Each long term team member and short term delegate was intensively trained prior to their visit to Nicaragua. Training included role plays involving ambushes and kidnappings as well as documentation skills so that they became, in their own words, ‘living media’ - a voice for the voiceless which would challenge the US administration’s attempt to portray the war as one in which the Contras were freedom fighters and the Sandinistas a dangerous communist threat.
By the end of 1984, 46 states had been home to a Witness delegation. With each delegation came further reports of Contra atrocities, which through the Witness network in the US became one of the most trusted sources of information for the International Press on the war.

**Outcome**

In 1988 after the leaders of Central American countries signed a follow-up agreement to the celebrated ‘Arias Peace Plan’ which aimed to end the wars in the region, Congress voted not to provide any more aid to the Contras. A ceasefire between the Contras and Sandinistas soon followed and in 1990 elections were held which produced a shock win for the opposition. By the time of the elections almost 4,000 US citizens had joined one of over 180 Witness delegations. Over 160 long term witnesses had served on the team, some for as long as 3 years. This represented the largest and most sustained international non violent presence in a war zone in modern history.

What impact, if any, did Witness have over the years? On one level Witness certainly provided a specific and general deterrent to Contra attacks by accompanying villagers and living in villages at risk of violence.

For instance during the period that Witness delegations were stationed in Jalapa the anticipated Contra attacks never occurred. While analysts of the war in Nicaragua point to other factors such as the state of the Contra and Sandinista forces at the time, others such as Sixto Uloa, a Baptist lay leader who helped launch the organisation, are convinced that ‘Witness for Peace...made the counterrevolution move away from Jalapa’.² This story is heard many times where Witness established a presence.

Another, more controversial outcome is suggested by Ed Griffin Nolan in his account of the work of Witness during this period. Nolan argues that the presence of significant numbers of US citizens throughout the country, and especially at a port close to where US ships were patrolling, may have helped prevent a US invasion of the country, which seemed highly likely following the US invasion of Grenada.³ While this is subject to much debate, there is no doubt whatsoever that one of the biggest achievements for Witness was to make the US policy in Central America very public, long before it might have become so in their absence.

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**Witness delegations - enjoying the relative protection that their US nationality offered them - soon began following the Contras with notepads and cameras to record everything that they saw.**

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**For more information:**

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**Deaths:**
43,000 1982-1990 (COW)

**Cost of Involvement:**
$650,000 1999 total expenditure of WFP, Nicaragua.

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**War prevention works:** 50 stories of people resolving conflict
Background
For much of its life as an independent country, Somalia has been at war; first with its neighbours, Kenya and Ethiopia, and then with itself. While the most recent conflict has been framed as a competition between various clans over resources and power, its roots can be traced back to the clash between traditional nomadic Somali society - which is characterised by an almost total absence of formally institutionalised authority - and the straightjacket of the modern state introduced by the colonial powers.

The situation only worsened under the autocratic rule of General Mohammad Siad Barre who took power in a coup in 1969. His brand of ‘Scientific Socialism’, which saw clans as backward and primitive, coupled with his over-centralised one party system, damaged Somali society in equal measure and sowed the seeds of the present conflict. Not only did traditional mechanisms for managing relationships between clan groups continue to disappear, but the monolithic state that Barre had created - concentrating power and political control into so narrow a base - offered a tantalising prize for the rival clans if ever he should fall.

While a temporary alliance between the clans was able to topple the Barre regime in 1991, the coalition quickly fragmented as clans fought for control of Mogadishu, and by extension the entire country. As fighting intensified, the country was plunged into anarchy. As one commentator noted, what began as a liberation struggle against the dictatorial rule and corruption of the military regime degenerated first into a murderous pattern of internecine aggression and reprisals, and later into a seemingly aimless stalemate between clan-based militia groups, punctuated only by irregular and unconvincing claims to supremacy by one leader or another.

Involvement
Worsened by a devastating famine in 1992 in which around 300,000 people died, the war decimated Somali society. Millions of people were displaced and hundreds of thousands fled the country. Yet amidst the chaos of war, women began to find new roles previously denied to them. With their men fighting, missing, dead or unemployed, women began to take control of trade, from fuel and food, gold and qaad (khat) - a popular drug - as well as relief distributions.

Where before women were excluded from all community level decision making processes, they now took on positions which gave them considerable power and influence.

‘The war touched an inner strength in Somali women’ said Shammis Hussein, founder of the Somali Women’s Trust, a local non-governmental organisation. For example, at the start of the war, one woman, Dabasso Isse, approached the Red Cross in order to secure a small amount of food to give to hungry street children in Mogadishu. With a handful of women Isse turned an abandoned building into a kitchen that served two meals a day to the children. Within two years she was in charge of 140 kitchens funded by the Red Cross, dispensing 200,000 meals a day and employing 3,000 women. A representative of another aid agency which started employing women to help with their programme remarked in 1992 that, ‘Intellectually, they [Somali women] are tremendously powerful...They’ve been crucial in our relief efforts.’

As women began to take up more prominent roles, they began to form groups to help promote women’s rights, peace, reconciliation and development. In trying to bring about an end to the war, women were not only responding to the critical situation facing the country but were also tapping into their traditional role as ‘peace promoters’. Traditionally the competition over scarce resources led to the practice of inter-clan ‘bride exchange’. However when a woman marries outside her clan she retains her father’s kinship ties, thus acting as a bridge between the two groups.

During the war, the role of women as ‘bridges’ between clans served a very important function in places such as Somaliland where they were the only means of communication between belligerent clans. In Mogadishu and other cities in the south, women acting as ‘clan ambassadors’ were able to cross faction lines and defuse tension between warring groups and in several instances, negotiate the release of hostages.
In 1997, as part of its capacity building and networking efforts, COGWO organised a major workshop which sought to analyse the possible role of women in bringing peace to Somalia. From that workshop evolved another coalition - the Peace and Human Rights Network - which in 1998 organised a major peace demonstration in Mogadishu which drew over 100,000 people.

All the while COGWO members were establishing strong links with organisations around the world, thus focusing the world’s attention on the situation in Somalia, as well as launching other initiatives such as the establishment of ‘peace centres’ in the country which offer training in conflict management and peacebuilding.

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Outcome
Following a major peace conference in Djibouti in April/May 2000 and after a decade without a functioning state, a Transitional National Assembly was formed, leading to the election of the country’s first president since the fall of Barre. In view of the important role played by women, the decision makers participating in the conference agreed to the women’s demands to be represented in the Transitional Assembly. Indeed the role of women in helping promote peace had been noted by the President of the United Nations Security Council back in 1999, by which time violence on the ground had decreased.

A recent study by UNIFEM agrees, noting that ‘in many cases women have taken an active role in peace processes both locally and nationally’ and that ‘the gains that Somali women have made across the country and within the diaspora have already left a profound imprint on the fabric of Somali society.’

While it is clear that the actions of women’s organizations such as COGWO helped reduce the level of violence in certain specific instances during the war, it is also likely that the cumulative effort of all the women’s groups did make an important contribution to the peace process. Addressing the UN Security Council in October 2000, one member of COGWO was unequivocal in her opinion that the peace conference in Djibouti would not have materialized without the groundwork that had been put in by the women over the years.

Very quickly the number of women led NGOs began to blossom. For instance, in 1996, following a number of conflict resolution workshops for Somali women organised by the US based Centre for the Strategic Initiatives of Women (CSIW) a new organisation was formed - the Coalition for Grassroots Women’s Organisations. Initially representing 18 different women’s organisations COGWO has rapidly grown into one of the most promising and high profile peace and development networks in Somalia, its members initiating a wide variety of initiatives.

For instance, the CSIW reports that in the town Merca, members of COGWO placed themselves between two warring factions, effectively stopping the fighting. Another women’s group - IIDA Women Development Organisation - in collaboration with an Italian NGO called COSV and with EU funding, ran a successful demobilisation project for 150 ex militia members, offering them education, housing and alternative income opportunities.

For more information:
Read the UNIFEM paper ‘Somalia between peace and war’ for a good overview of the role of women during the conflict. To learn more about COGWO see the Centre for the Strategic Initiatives of Women (www.csiw.org). Of the dozens of excellent websites dedicated to Somali issues see www.somalianews.com/ (Somalia News) and www.banadir.com/ (Banadir)

Outcome
Following a major peace conference in Djibouti in April/May 2000 and after a decade without a functioning state, a Transitional National Assembly was formed, leading to the election of the country’s first president since the fall of Barre. In view of the important role played by women, the decision makers participating in the conference agreed to the women’s demands to be represented in the Transitional Assembly. Indeed the role of women in helping promote peace had been noted by the President of the United Nations Security Council back in 1999, by which time violence on the ground had decreased.

A recent study by UNIFEM agrees, noting that ‘in many cases women have taken an active role in peace processes both locally and nationally’ and that ‘the gains that Somali women have made across the country and within the diaspora have already left a profound imprint on the fabric of Somali society.’

While it is clear that the actions of women’s organizations such as COGWO helped reduce the level of violence in certain specific instances during the war, it is also likely that the cumulative effort of all the women’s groups did make an important contribution to the peace process. Addressing the UN Security Council in October 2000, one member of COGWO was unequivocal in her opinion that the peace conference in Djibouti would not have materialized without the groundwork that had been put in by the women over the years.

Very quickly the number of women led NGOs began to blossom. For instance, in 1996, following a number of conflict resolution workshops for Somali women organised by the US based Centre for the Strategic Initiatives of Women (CSIW) a new organisation was formed - the Coalition for Grassroots Women’s Organisations. Initially representing 18 different women’s organisations COGWO has rapidly grown into one of the most promising and high profile peace and development networks in Somalia, its members initiating a wide variety of initiatives.

For instance, the CSIW reports that in the town Merca, members of COGWO placed themselves between two warring factions, effectively stopping the fighting. Another women’s group - IIDA Women Development Organisation - in collaboration with an Italian NGO called COSV and with EU funding, ran a successful demobilisation project for 150 ex militia members, offering them education, housing and alternative income opportunities.

For more information:
Read the UNIFEM paper ‘Somalia between peace and war’ for a good overview of the role of women during the conflict. To learn more about COGWO see the Centre for the Strategic Initiatives of Women (www.csiw.org). Of the dozens of excellent websites dedicated to Somali issues see www.somalianews.com/ (Somalia News) and www.banadir.com/ (Banadir)

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Background

On the 21st October 1993 a rebellion within the Burundian army led to the killing of the country’s first democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye. As word spread of his assassination, Hutus across the country - spurred on by rumours that Tutsis were planning to kill Hutus - began attacking their Tutsi neighbours. The Tutsi dominated army quickly retaliated, killing thousands of Hutus.

Within the space of a month 25,000 - 50,000 people had been killed and a further 500,000 - 700,000 people had fled their homes. Since then, Burundi has struggled to free itself from the grip of a paralysing civil war, which to date has claimed over 200,000 lives.

In Ruyigi province, east of the capital city, over 3,000 people were killed in the violence that engulfed the country in October 1993. As in other areas communities, which for generations had seen Hutus and Tutsis living together despite the waves of violence that had visited the country over the years, were now shattered.

Involvement

In the immediate aftermath of the bloodshed, members of ActionAid Burundi met to discuss how to carry out relief work in response to the emergency situation created by the conflict. ActionAid Burundi (AAB), a branch of the UK-based international development NGO ActionAid, had been working in Burundi since 1976, focusing initially on building schools and providing educational equipment, later moving onto rural development and a more participatory approach to poverty alleviation.

AAB was one of the few international NGOs to have remained in the country when the massacres began. In Ruyigi, while all other major NGOs left the country or retreated to the relative safety of the capital, Bujumbura, AAB opted to stay, despite the fact that ten members of their multi-ethnic team were killed. Now with the worst of the killings over, they were faced with the monumental task of helping the people rebuild their lives. However, given that violence had devastated the country, they proceeded with a dual focus.

Not only would they continue with their relief and development work, the relief work would be carried out in such as way as to lead to longer term development work with the aim of encouraging peace and reconciliation.

The first task was to conduct a rapid participatory assessment of the needs of the community. Whereas the conventional approach to emergency distributions is for the distributing agency to conduct the assessment and then organise the disbursement, AAB turned to the people in the communities instead and encouraged them to identify their needs.

This approach - known as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) - is based on the premise that local people are capable of carrying out their own investigations, analysis, and planning. Rather than a top down methodology for information gathering and project planning, PRA requires researchers/NGO field workers to act as facilitators to help local people conduct their own analysis, plan and take action accordingly.

Through PRA techniques it was discovered that the sous-colline (sub hill), rather than the colline (hill), was the administrative unit where the greatest amount of social interaction took place. Here a sense of ‘community’ still existed. AAB promptly engaged groups of people at the sous colline level to form multi ethnic committees that would undertake surveys of the needs of the households in their vicinity. Once the surveys were complete the committees were given the requisite materials to distribute themselves.

For the first time since the violence Hutu and Tutsi were working together. As Arman Nzeyimana, previously with AAB and now working for ActionAid in Haiti says, ‘By encouraging the establishment of committees we are encouraging the restoration of traditional values of cooperation. These values stood Burundi in good stead for centuries, and it is essential that we restore them if Burundi is to have peace again.’
As Robert Dodd, who conducted an evaluation of the AAB work in Ruyigi notes, ‘Whereas the rehabilitation of 1,000 houses fulfils a basic human need...the process was also designed to contribute to peace through encouraging people to work together again, and on a large scale, and also to create the necessary conditions which would enable other people to return.'

The example of Bazilissa Nizigama, a Tutsi living in Butaganzwa commune of Ruyigi illustrates AABs impact. After spending two years as a refugee in Tanzania and a further year in Burundi in a camp for internally displaced people she finally returned home. Through the AAB programme her house was rebuilt by friends, family and members of the community, both Tutsi and Hutu. ‘I can only thank God and ActionAid for my good fortune. I am amazed that the people who destroyed my house, because I am a Tutsi, are the same people who rebuilt it. Now by helping build houses for other people, I am repaying them for their help.’

AAB also launched a series of smaller projects with the same aim: to contribute to social cohesion and development as well as consolidating peace. For example a community newsletter called ‘EJO’ which AAB had been publishing for years, as part of their adult literacy programme, quickly became a vibrant platform for peace and reconciliation. Almost entirely written by members of the community EJO has a regular monthly circulation of 40,000 copies and is in constant demand.

While the emergency phase was soon over, AAB realised that in order to establish peace throughout the region, they needed to persuade displaced people that their colline of origin was safe. They did this in three ways: (1) by encouraging people who had remained in their homes to resume normal daily life; (2) by creating the necessary physical and psychological conditions which would enable the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return; and (3) to encourage communication between all sectors of the community and especially between Hutu and Tutsi.

AAB began by initiating a major resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation project, again using the sous-colline committees to identify the families most in need of housing. They then provided roofing, doors and windows on condition that the community built the walls of each house. 1,000 houses were built in this way.

Outcome

In Ruyigi province alone, AAB supported the construction of 4,500 houses. Within a relatively short space of time, normal life returned to the area. Markets reopened, many refugees and IDPs returned and, according to Robert Dodd, people began talking openly and honestly about their yearning for peace. In addition, people were more willing to talk about what it meant to be a Hutu or Tutsi, a subject that was taboo only a few years earlier. While violent conflict plagued other parts of the country, and continues to do so, these encouraging signs in Ruyigi should not be underestimated.

According to Dodd, one of the clearest reasons for AABs success in Ruyigi was that it was well respected within the community, having worked there for many years, and that it was steadfastly committed to the area. ‘The fact that AAB did not cut and run when the crisis broke, thereby deserting the communities at a time of their greatest need, has been commented on by members of the communities.’

Deaths:

- 200,000
  from 1993 - 1999 (various sources)

Cost of involvement:

- Unknown

Deaths:

- 200,000
  from 1993 - 1999 (various sources)

Cost of involvement:

- Unknown

Internally displaced:

- 580,000 (2001)
- 800,000 (1999)
- 500-700,000 (1993) (IDP database)

Refugees:

- 1,200,000 1993-2001
  (US Committee for Refugees)

For more information:

- See www.actionaid.org for details of ActionAid’s work around the world.
- Also see ActionAid’s booklet ‘Peace building in Africa - case studies from ActionAid’ (ActionAid, London, 2001) for more about their peace building work.

War prevention works:

- 50 stories of people resolving conflict

Oxford Research Group 69
Background
The economic and political marginalisation of the ‘Middle Belt’ region of Nigeria provides the backdrop to the conflict between the Tiv and Jukun people. There, up until the 1950s, the two groups had coexisted peacefully for many years. There was only one paramount chief in the area, the Aku Uka - a Jukun king - and the Tiv were expected to pay tribute and allegiance to him, which they did faithfully. However, rapid demographic change saw the once ‘minority’ Tiv population outnumber the hitherto predominant Jukun group three-to-one in certain areas such as Wukari. This caused significant tensions as the Jukun, who considered the Tiv as ‘immigrants’, began to feel that their political influence was being eroded.

With the advent of party politics in the 1950s, tensions began to escalate as the Tiv and Jukun initially allied themselves with different parties. The rivalry between the parties manifested itself into violent clashes between the two groups in Wukari. Even when they sided with the same party violence erupted and this happened sporadically between the 1950s and 1980s.

In 1991, with the approach of elections in the newly created Taraba State, which the Jukun feared would lead to a Tiv ‘take-over’ of the region, matters came to a head. Fighting soon erupted, which rapidly developed into the most devastating conflict since the Biafran war. A number of accounts also suggest that the mobile police forces (MOPOL) were allegedly complicit in the violence, helping Jukun groups kill Tiv people and destroy Tiv villages. As a result the area was comprehensively ‘cleansed’ of Tiv people and the region left in ruins. Only when the army was brought in did the fighting finally end.

Involvement
In 1997, five years after the war had ended, the region was still in ruins. A ‘graveyard peace’ prevailed. The Tiv were still conspicuously absent from the area, the economy had collapsed and the Jukun were reluctant to negotiate any real settlement with the Tiv for fear of losing the advantage gained during the war. The Jukun also now completely dominated local politics and were more than happy to keep it that way.

In June of 1997 Academic Associates PeaceWorks (AAPW) conducted a peace education programme for teachers and students from 15 secondary schools in the Wukari area. Founded in 1992 with the aim of building capacities for the management of conflict through study, intervention and greater awareness, AAPW had already worked in other ‘hotspots’ in Nigeria and was known for its role in establishing a National Corps of Mediators, made up of senior and respected Nigerians who were extensively trained in mediation and conflict management skills.

The principal aim of the peace education initiative was to enter the community and gain the people’s cooperation in the most nonthreatening way possible. The Jukun had particularly entrenched positions with regard to any negotiation with the Tiv and most people were very wary of any ‘outside’ interference, even though many felt that the community itself was not in a position to break the deadlock between the two groups. In such a situation a discreet entry was needed and ‘peace education in schools’ provided just that.

For AAPW, the fact that the schools and local authority cooperated in the education programme smoothed the way for them to begin a tentative exploration of the conflict and opportunities for its resolution.
In July and August 1997 AAPW conducted a low key fact finding mission in order to produce a full account of the causes and dynamics of the conflict. When the analysis was complete, having been reviewed by AAPW staff and selected members of the Corps of Mediators, it was decided that two members of the Corps of Mediators should be sent to Wukari to prepare the groundwork for a series of workshops on conflict management aimed at the key protagonists in the conflict.

The first workshop, for the youth leaders in the area, was held in a neutral town and covered a whole range of issues from learning practical mediation and conflict management skills, to analysing the roots to the conflict that had divided their community.

Since the majority of the combatants in the conflict were drawn from the various youth groups, the tension at this first meeting was acute, with many face-to-face confrontations.

However, according to Judith Asuni, Director of AAPW, once members of the two sides started to remember their childhood ties, the barriers between them began to break down and by the end of the workshop the two sides had formed a ‘Wukari Reconciliation Forum’ in order to bring real peace to the area.2

The second workshop, which was aimed at Wukari elders, elicited a similarly positive response. It was discovered that the needs of the Tiv and Jukun were not mutually exclusive as had been expected. The Tiv needed, above all else, land, schools and heath facilities, while the Jukun feared the erosion of their culture and authority. As a result of this understanding the Tiv agreed to acknowledge traditional Jukun authority whilst the Jukun agreed to re-open schools and health facilities (and open new ones) as well as return Tiv land.

After the AAPW workshops in 1997-8 the youth groups and elders joined forces to establish the ‘Wukari Peace Committee’ which worked amongst the community to effect change at every level of society. Since then AAPW has made repeated visits to the area to make sure that the process of peace and reconciliation is kept on track.

Outcome

Since AAPW’s work in Wukari the area has seen a gradual return to peace and stability. As Asuni notes, ‘It is unrealistic to expect tension to completely disappear within a few years,’3 but the signs so far are encouraging. While there have been potential ‘flashpoints’ between the Tiv and Jukun regarding land disputes and the re-opening of Tiv schools, there have been relatively few instances of violence.

Furthermore, Tiv people have started to return to the area and the economy is slowly picking up.

One interesting by-product of the work in Wukari has been that the youth and elders who participated in the AAPW workshops have been active in helping solve a nearby conflict which has led to over $100m destruction. Such a transfer of knowledge is an extremely encouraging sign that an indigenous capacity for conflict prevention and resolution is beginning to develop, thus raising the prospects that disputes in the future may be nipped in the bud before they escalate beyond control.

For more information:

Read the AAPW’s book ‘Community Conflicts in Nigeria. Their Management Resolution and Transformation’ (Spectrum Books, Nigeria, 2000) for a good overview of their work in a number of conflicts. Also see Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper, No.9 (1997) entitled ‘Transformation of minorities in post colonial Nigeria’ by Dr Abdul Raufu Mustapha - available online at www2.qeh.ox.ac.uk Also see www.aapeaceworks.org for more information on AAPW.

Internally displaced: 250,000

Refugees: Unknown

Deaths: Unknown

Cost of involvement: $40,000

War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict

Oxford Research Group
Background
Since 1984, the Turkish government has been locked in a bitter war with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been demanding an independent Kurdish state for the 15 million Kurds (almost 25% of the country’s population) living in Turkey. The violence of the PKK has been met by an equally brutal counter insurgency campaign which has left over 30,000 people dead, around 3,000 or one third of all Kurdish villages destroyed and two million people internally displaced.

The effects of this protracted conflict have been far reaching. Even though military rule ended in 1984 and the leader of the PKK was captured in 1999, the military still rules and, to a lesser degree, the extra judicial killing of Turkish citizens by the state, are still features of the political landscape of the country, as are ‘disappearances’. This is true not only in the south east, where most of the Kurds live, but throughout the entire country.

Freedom of speech is not only severely repressed under a series of draconian laws designed to protect the Turkish state against, amongst other things, the threat of Kurdish separatism, but is also met with unwarranted violence by the security forces. Those most at risk are Turkish human rights groups and members of pro Kurdish political parties. However, few people are safe from the reaches of the security forces.

In March 1995, 23 people were shot dead in Istanbul by plainclothes police officers who opened fire on a protest against police inaction over an armed attack on a café. In 1994 Mehdi Zana, the former mayor of Diyarbakir, began serving a two-year prison sentence for attending a press conference in Brussels in which he read out the testimony he had just given before the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the European Parliament.

Perhaps the most insidious aspect to the conflict has been the culture of impunity that has developed within the country’s security apparatus, which many observers call a ‘state within a state’. The elected government is reluctant to prosecute this shadowy and unaccountable force. ‘Even if I saw with my own eyes that the state had burned a village, I would not believe it’, said the then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller when she was told by a delegation of village leaders that soldiers supported by helicopters had destroyed their villages.

Involvement
Between 1990 and 1996 Amnesty International (AI) conducted ten investigative research missions to Turkey in addition to numerous trial observations. Aside from focusing international attention on the human rights situation in Turkey, AI’s aim was to build as complete a picture of the extent of human rights abuses with a view to making recommendations that could be implemented by the Government without compromising their perceived security. These research missions culminated in the launch, in 1996, of a major campaign on human rights abuses in Turkey and an accompanying report entitled ‘Turkey - no security without human rights.’

Amnesty International (AI) was born in 1961 after British Lawyer Peter Benenson read a newspaper article which reported the sentencing of two Portuguese students to seven years in prison for raising a toast to freedom. He promptly wrote an article entitled ‘The Forgotten Prisoners’ which called for an international campaign to protect human rights. Offers of support came flooding in and within one year the organisation had taken up 210 cases and had branches in seven countries. Today AI is the largest international voluntary organisation dealing with human rights in the world. It can also rightly claim to be one of the highest visibility non governmental organisations the world today.

While its prolific output and advocacy work has no doubt pushed the issue of human rights to the forefront, AI’s work in Turkey reveals its multi-level approach to confronting human rights violators.
AI’s Urgent Action Network consists of a streamlined procedure for finding and responding to urgent information about threatened individuals and quickly getting it to a pool of concerned people who agree to be ‘on call’ to send immediate letters, faxes, emails or telexes to government authorities regarding specific cases.

Each Urgent Action includes specific details about the individual or group as well as background information regarding relevant patterns of human rights violations in the country, recommended actions, addresses of responsible governmental authorities and general guidelines to use when composing appeals. In more than 30% of all Urgent Action cases there is some improvement in the situation of those concerned.

Of the 1m AI members around the world around 80,000 are members of the Urgent Action Network. This represents a significant international constituency, able to spring to action at a moments notice.

Since 1996, 249 Urgent Actions (UA) have been issued in Turkey - approximately 130 new and 119 follow-ups since January 1996. Many of these have yielded positive results.

In September 2000, 11 members of the pro-Kurdish HADEP party were arrested and detained having just participated in a local HADEP meeting. Knowing that they ran the risk of being tortured and possibly killed whilst in prison, AI immediately launched a UA. In December the group were released. All of them had escaped torture. Given the systematic and widespread use of torture in Turkish prisons, lawyers for the group believe that it was solely due to the UA that their clients were released unscathed.

Outcome
In AI’s 1998 ‘Turkey Campaign Retrospective’ it was noted that one of the aims of the campaign was to achieve reform of the draconian detention procedures.

In March 1997 the Turkish parliament adopted a new law substantially shortening the maximum period of police detention. The then prime minister referred explicitly to AI when introducing the legislation. Furthermore, reports of ‘disappearances’ and extra judicial executions have fallen since AI’s comprehensive campaign. While it is impossible to attribute this fall solely to the action of AI there can be no doubt that AI played a highly significant role.

On 8 November 2000, the European Commission presented its regular annual report on Turkey’s progress towards accession (membership to the EU), stating that Turkey still does not meet the Copenhagen political criteria (democracy, rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities). While EU membership is likely to be the biggest driver for the Turkish government in improving its human rights record, without groups such as AI maintaining continuous pressure, the culture of impunity that plagues Turkey’s security forces would in all probability be a lot easier to maintain.

In July 1994, for instance, AI submitted the cases of three prisoners convicted under the infamous Anti-Terror Law to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. In May 1995 the Working Group declared the imprisonment of the three men to be ‘a violation of their right to freedom of opinion and expression’. Such high profile and top level petitions have been extremely important in focusing international attention on the human rights record in Turkey, especially since the Turkish government has refused to invite the OSCE or the UN Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups to visit the country. In their absence AI provides an essential presence, reminding the state that its crimes do not go unnoticed. This carries particular significance given Turkey’s attempts to join the European Union, whose strict criteria for membership includes adherence to human rights norms.

Meanwhile at the grassroots level, many of AI’s members engage in what AI calls ‘Urgent Actions’. Urgent Actions are designed to provide a quick, effective response to situations of urgency involving prisoners, detainees and other threatened individuals.

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Internally displaced: 400,000 - 1,000,000
2000 (USCR)

Refugees: Unknown

For more information:
See www.amnesty.org.uk for a comprehensive look at AI's work throughout the world. Also read Jonathan Power's new book ‘Like Water on Stone’ (Penguin Press, London, 2001) which charts the history and development of Amnesty International, as well as some of its achievements over the past 40 years.

Deaths: 30,000 - 40,000 battle related deaths 1984 - 1999 (Uppsala)

Cost of Involvement: $17,000,000 1999 annual budget for all Amnesty International.
1995 - 1999
Christian Peacemaker Teams
Israel and the Occupied Territories

Background
When Jews began to flock to Palestine during the first half of the twentieth century, inspired by Theodor Herzl’s call to create a permanent homeland, they imagined returning to places such as Hebron and Jerusalem - the biblical heartland of the Jewish people, rather than cities such as Tel Aviv and Haifa.

Hebron, said to be the oldest inhabited city in the world, is inextricably linked to the Jewish identity. The Jewish patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were buried there. Abraham purchased his first piece of land there. Yet Hebron is a city in the heart of the occupied territories, an Arab Muslim city for over 1,700 years. Muslims, too, revere the burial place of Abraham and as such they regard Hebron as both a religious and national treasure. Home to 130,000 Palestinians and 500 Israeli settlers, Hebron thus exemplifies the challenges facing the Middle East peace process.

Since Israel took the West Bank during the Six Day War in 1967, tensions have escalated between the Palestinians and the Israelis in the city, as well as between the Palestinians and Israeli police/military (principally the Israeli Defense Force - IDF). This has been exacerbated by the growth in right wing settler movements, raising the stakes and increasing the probability of further violence.

In 1994 an Israeli settler from the oldest settlement in Hebron opened fire on Muslim worshippers inside the II-Ibrahim Mosque, site of Abraham’s tomb, killing 39 people and wounding 125 others. The IDF killed a similar number of Palestinians in the ensuing demonstrations and while the entire city was put under a severe curfew, the settlers were exempt and were allowed to wander the city free. Such measures have only served to increase resentment and bitterness within the Palestinian community against the Israelis.

Within four years a slightly more modest version of Sider’s dream had been set up with the two other historic peace churches, the Brethren and the Quakers. The CPT steering committee drafted strict guidelines that would be applied before a team entered a conflict situation. For instance, they would ask themselves, ‘Is the proposed action one our constituency can support?’ and ‘Is there a trusted welcoming body in the crisis setting with whom we connect?’ ‘Is the timeframe for the mission clear?’

Like all CPT recruits, members of the Hebron team were given intensive training on a wide range of subjects, from cross cultural understanding to the biblical teachings of non-violence. Once on the ground the team, which varied in size between two and six full time people, started out by identifying local peace groups with which to work as well as establishing a ‘street presence’ along some of the most volatile intersections between Israeli settler and Palestinian communities. This involved making local people aware of their activities, noting down any violence and in some cases physically ‘getting in the way’ between the two sides.

Involvement
In 1995 Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) was invited by a prominent Palestinian Christian human rights advocate to the West Bank to help document settlement expansion. When CPT explained to staff at Hebron’s municipality the nature of their work in other areas of the world such as Haiti, which involved maintaining a civilian peace team as a violence deterring presence, they were invited to do the same in Hebron.

In 1984 at the Eleventh Mennonite World Conference in Strasbourg, Ronald Sider gave a talk that sent shockwaves throughout the Mennonite community. ‘Unless we are ready to die developing new non-violent attempts to reduce conflict,’ he said, ‘we should confess that we never really meant that the cross was an alternative to the sword.’ His proposal - that a new non violent peacekeeping force of 100,000 Christians should be assembled, trained and sent into the middle of violent conflicts to stand peacefully between warring sides - gathered massive support.

In 1995 - 1999
Christian Peacemaker Teams
Israel and the Occupied Territories
Involvement

The Occupied Territories

Israel
The third Sunday, as promised, CPT members rode on the bus without incident. No further bombings occurred during this time. This tactic has been used to great effect on many occasions involving the planned destruction of Palestinian houses by right wing Israelis intent on building new settlements. As one CPT member said ‘We learned again that focusing the light of public attention on an evil situation can make a big difference.’

One of CPT’s core objectives is to promote the cause of non violent direct action and they do this skilfully through their regular email briefings, faxes, press releases and articles which keep a spotlight on their peace work.

On two consecutive Sundays in March, Palestinian suicide bombers targeted the No.18 bus to Jerusalem killing several Israeli civilians. In response CPT mobilised its media network, sending press releases to all Arab and Israeli local, national and international journalists as well as supporters and the relevant authorities explaining that it intended to ride the bus on the following Sunday as a public witness against violence.

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The second example is perhaps the most extreme form of intervention that CPT has been involved in. On January 10th 1999 around 200 Palestinians marched in protest at the closure of the Il-Ibrahim Mosque as well as a curfew placed on the Palestinians living in the part of Hebron still under Israeli control.

As the crowd approached the Mosque, Israeli soldiers took up positions behind several concrete barriers and prepared to shoot. At this point two CPT members stood in front of the Israeli soldiers shouting ‘Don’t shoot. This is a non-violent demonstration!’ The soldiers lowered their guns and not a single shot was fired. The confrontation lasted 90 minutes and all the while Palestinian leaders urging the youth not to throw rocks at the soldiers which would have only escalated the situation. The stand-off ended when the Palestinian elders knelt in prayer in the road. One Palestinian lawyer remarked of the CPT intervention ‘You have a lot of moral power that both sides recognize. Running around without guns throws [both sides] off and gives you leverage.’

By placing themselves in what one writer called, the dangerous but holy space between the weak and the violent, CPT has without a doubt helped de-escalate tensions between Israelis and Palestinians on numerous occasions. As the eyes and ears of the international community CPT publicised the threats to peace and raised the profile of non violent direct action in Hebron. As one recent analyst notes, CPT members became ‘conflict lightning rods’ - absorbing aggression that would have been directed at others. Another commentator noted that CPT actions were ‘a kind of teach-in for the larger community, to combat wrongs by making them visible.’

Outcome

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While a recent evaluation of CPT raises a number of important issues related to such outsider third party interventions, CPT nevertheless offers a practical and inspiring model which brings hope to areas experiencing conflict.
Background

The border dispute between Ecuador and Peru, which was one of the most protracted in the western hemisphere, dates back to 1884. Since then the two countries have been engaged in armed conflict 34 times, most recently in 1995.

The dispute arose shortly after both countries won their independence from Spain. Both Peru and Ecuador, like most of the newly independent Latin American countries, accepted the principle of *uti possedetis* which stipulated that they should inherit the colonial administrative borders that were in place at the time of independence. However, like many of their neighbours, parts of the Peru-Ecuador border were fuzzy, due largely to tracts of unexplored mountainous areas which rendered precise boundary demarcation difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, since they had all been part of the Spanish crown there was hardly a need to map out borders to the last inch.

Following major violent clashes in 1941, Peru and Ecuador signed the Rio Protocol which effectively demarcated 95% of the border, including most of a contested region known as the Cordillera del Condor. Four countries - Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the United States - agreed to guarantee the observance of the Protocol.

In 1947 the U.S. Air Force discovered a river in the Cordillera del Condor, changing the geography of the region, which prompted the Ecuadorian government to declare the Rio protocol’s boundary provision null and void. From that point onwards, tensions remained high, resulting in periodic bouts of violence as Peru and Ecuador fought for control of the region. In January 1995 these tensions escalated into a short but violent war - the most violent since the dispute began - followed by ceasefire, drawn up by the Guantaror nations. However further skirmishes in March 1995 showed that the situation remained critical.

Involvement

In April 1995, in an attempt to find common ground between the two countries, the Conflict Management Group (CMG) - a non governmental organisation founded in 1984 by Professor Roger Fisher from Harvard Law School - proposed a ‘facilitated joint brainstorming’ session to the then Ecuadorian president and former Peruvian deputy minister of foreign affairs.

According to CMG, a key feature of facilitated joint brainstorming (FJB) is its use of training-as-intervention. Rather than bringing the two sides together to negotiate, FJB uses problem solving exercises and negotiation training itself as a vehicle to build bridges among parties in conflict. The two sides agreed, and in April 1995 eleven participants were brought together for a week-long workshop in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to explore ideas and techniques that might facilitate better communication and help them manage their differences more effectively.

As CMG notes, “some of the most important elements of a FJB workshop are implemented before the participants ever enter a seminar room.” Carefully selecting the appropriate influential participants from each side, building allies in each country to support the FJB process and preparing official channels at the highest levels to receive and follow up the results of the exercise are critical to the success of the initiative.

Over a period of weeks CMG staff visited the capital cities of both countries in an attempt to seek the support of both governments for the meeting. During this time CMG identified one ‘anchor’ from each side - someone who could act as a trustworthy sounding board who would also be able to help identify other participants. Great effort was made by CMG to ensure that a ‘safe environment’ was created, so that participants would have the chance to get to know each other as human beings rather than members of the enemy camp. For instance, participants were invited by CMG staff to join them on the first night, prior to the start of the workshop the following day, to have an informal dinner which was an important ice breaker.
Throughout the week the participants were sensitised to a variety of skills and techniques designed to build strong working relationships, enhance communication and develop their active listening, problem solving and empathy skills. For example, one exercise had participants think six months into the future and write a 'victory speech' for their president, which would include the major themes that the leader would like to use to explain a future hypothetical agreement.

Participants were then paired up with a team member from the other side and common themes from both speeches were discussed, with a view to redrafting both speeches to make them consistent, while highlighting those ideas that would be most compelling to their own constituency. Through this exercise participants began to identify shared interests such as economic development, trade and protecting the environment. Following further exercises, the group then began to brainstorm options that addressed the interests that lay behind their positions and evaluated those options from their own perspective and from the perspective of the 'other side', thus becoming more aware of the importance of 'joint ownership' of any proposal.

Outcome
Feedback from the workshop was overwhelmingly positive, exceeding the expectations of both the participants and CMG facilitators.

According to CMG participants were relating to each other in ways that were clearly more positive than any formal encounters to date. Perhaps most tellingly Jamil Mahuad, who became President of Ecuador in 1998 said: 'That one-week session in Cambridge has had a lasting impact on the way Ecuador and Peru deal with the boundary problem and deal with each other.'² Such bridge building was an important component of the entire week long process.

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While it is unclear precisely how this workshop influenced the formal negotiations, Mahuad's statement suggests that the contribution made by CMG certainly had an impact on the nature and direction of the relationship between the two sides. In fact it wasn't until 1998 that an agreement was finally reached between the two countries, brokered by the Guarantor nations and led by Brazil. However CMG was again involved behind the scenes directly assisting President Mahuad in helping him improve both his negotiating style and the channel of communication between him and President Fujimori of Peru. This help, too, is reflected in a letter President Mahuad wrote to Roger Fisher two weeks before the signing of the final agreement in which he said 'I know of none who have done more to make this peace possible than you and the Conflict Management Group.'³

In spite of efforts made by CMG staff to persuade participants that they had been invited in their personal and not official capacities, that they were not to seek any form of agreement and that this was not even an 'unofficial negotiation', participants still turned up on the first day armed with files, maps and presentations in order to defend their positions. CMG facilitators persisted, believing that the entire day should be dedicated to informal interaction. Their efforts were quickly rewarded when the first exercise, which involved participants introducing each other, offered a clear sign of how things were to develop. One senior military official from Peru remarked, 'Well...I have already failed the first assignment. I know very little about what my colleague from Ecuador does for a living. What I do know is that we both have handicapped daughters and we spent our time talking about that passion in our lives.'² Such bridge building was an important component of the entire week long process.

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For more information:
Read Beth A Simmons paper Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru, United States Institute of Peace publication 'Peaceworks'. Also see www.cmgroup.org for more about the work of CMG.

Deaths:
575 - 700 battle related deaths 1941-1998 (Uppsala)

Cost of involvement:
$150,000

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**Background**

The conflict in Tajikistan was both a civil war pitting the North of the country against the South and one in which democratic-Islamic forces fought the communists. The roots of the conflict lie in the development of *mahalqaral* - localism/regionalism - a practice that in sharp contrast to the other Soviet republics in Central Asia was integrated into state policies from the late 1930s and persisted until the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was especially true of economic development, with 70% of the republic’s entire budget going to the northern region - the traditional breeding ground for the communist leadership of the Soviet republic. This further marginalized the southern regions, which is where the nationalist, democratic and Islamic forces began to gather momentum.

In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, elections were held, which were won by the old communist clique based in the north.

A series of repressive measures pursued by the authorities against the supporters of the opposition, as well as their efforts to foment hysteria over the threat of Islamic fundamentalism from the South led to a rapidly escalating political crisis, which soon turned violent.

Although the opposition forces formed a brief alliance in September 1992 to force themselves into a coalition government, it was not recognized by the communists and after two months of continued fighting, they relinquished control to supporters of the old regime. However, the fighting continued, with government forces bombing suspected ‘Islamic fundamentalist’ areas, escalating the war and causing massive population displacement.

**Involvement**

In 1981 the Soviet-U.S. Dartmouth Conference established the Regional Conflicts Task Force, which focused on US-Soviet interactions in regional conflicts. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Regional Conflicts Task Force decided to use its decade-long experience to establish a dialogue between the parties involved in the Tajikistan conflict.

The idea, according to Harold Saunders, former US Assistant Secretary of State and Co-Chair of the Regional Conflicts Task Force with Gennady Churkin, was not to mediate a peace agreement ‘but to create a group within the conflict with the capacity to develop its own peace process’. The approach that the Task Force adopted was based upon a concept developed by Saunders called ‘Sustained Dialogue’. It argues that many conflicts are not ready for formal mediation and negotiation. Given that formal negotiations seldom explore the issues of identity, fear, historic grievance and injustice, which are vital to the resolution of a conflict, Sustained Dialogue provides a space where citizens outside government can begin to change the relationships between themselves.

In March 1993, after meeting with over 100 key figures in the Tajikistan conflict, ten were selected to participate in the first meeting which, since the opposition was banned, was held in Moscow. This was the first stage in Saunders’ ‘Sustained Dialogue’ methodology: deciding to engage - identifying participants, defining the problem, agenda setting and creating a safe environment for the talks to take place.

While each participant came in an unofficial capacity, the senior leadership from both sides gave their tacit approval for the meeting to take place - a significant achievement in itself.

As the group met for the first time, Saunders, Churkin and their Russian-U.S. team encouraged participants to first map the relationship together - to learn to talk analytically and honestly about the relationship, rather than to dwell on ‘positions’. In this way the group began to explore the core problems, grievances and feelings that underpinned the conflict. The participants also agreed to listen carefully, to speak from the heart and with respect for the sensitivities of others. After this and subsequent meetings it was agreed that the participants would brief their respective leaders, as well as selected governments such as the US, in addition to the UN. This gave all parties the opportunity to assess the situation as it developed, especially with a view to launching formal negotiations.
The following month the government agreed to official UN-mediated negotiations with the United Tajik Opposition. Three Dialogue participants were included as members of the two negotiating teams. Saunders is at pains to stress that the Dialogue cannot claim exclusive credit for either the creation of the United Tajik Opposition or the launch of formal negotiations. The UN had, for instance, been trying to persuade both sides to launch a formal negotiation process for several months. However, UN, US, and Tajikistani officials attest to the significant role of the Dialogue in helping to pave the way for formal negotiations to take place.

Once the UN negotiations began, the Dialogue re-defined its goals. While the official talks would seek a negotiated agreement to end the conflict, the Dialogue would focus on longer term problems, especially how to engage all levels of Tajik society in the considerable task of supporting the outcome of the official negotiations. This division of roles was important for all involved to avoid confusion, competition and duplication.

Over the following months this 'unofficial dialogue' produced a series of proposals which it believed would help the process of reconciliation. This was the final stage in the process - Acting together - finding ways to implement 'ideal scenarios'. One such idea - to create a National Forum enabling Tajikistanis from around the country to meet and discuss the future of their country - was drafted and eventually signed by the president of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, though it is yet to be established.

Outcome

In 1997 a peace agreement was finally signed. Several key provisions within the accord - such as the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission - were first aired during the Dialogue meetings. Even after the agreement was signed the Dialogue continued to meet and to put forward suggestions which would further the aim of national reconciliation. In February 2000, the Dialogue formally registered their Public Committee for Democratic Processes to broaden citizen engagement in the political process.

While there have been significant challenges for the country since the signing of the accord, including sporadic bouts of violence, the signing of the accord has led to a measure of stability which the Dialogue is working to help consolidate. It must be remembered that by the time formal negotiations began in April 1994, members of both sides had been meeting unofficially under the 'Inter-Tajik Dialogue' banner for over thirteen months. This constituted the only substantial contact between the pro-government and pro-opposition forces during this time and allowed much needed bridge building to begin.
Background

From the very moment the state of Israel was born in 1948, a complex set of seemingly irreconcilable issues took root pitching the Jews and the Arabs at polar extremes. Of these the most fundamental was that neither the Jewish nor Arab leadership would acknowledge each others’ claimed right to the land.

Following the Six Day War in 1967, Israel took the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. With the occupation came the responsibility for over 1.5 million Palestinians which proved to be a fundamental ideological and security problem for the Jewish leadership. The West Bank was the real biblical heartland for the Jews, more so than any of the lands originally assigned to them in the UN partition plan of 1947 and as such they were loath to relinquish any of it. Yet it was clear that peace would be impossible without returning at least some land to the Palestinians.

Involvement

In 1989 Terje Rod Larsen, Director of the FAFO Institute for Applied Social Sciences in Norway, began an extensive social survey of the living conditions of the Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Despite some progress over the years, by the 1990s the issue was still unresolved. The Gaza strip was proving to be a ‘security nightmare’ for the Israelis who were keen to pull out but were unwilling and unable to negotiate with the PLO, who they regarded as a terrorist organisation and was still outlawed. The PLO on the other hand was unwilling to agree to a deal which only gave it the Gaza strip, fearing that such a move would spell the end of any claim to the West Bank. In their eyes, any agreement on self determination in the Gaza strip would have to be part of a more comprehensive package handing back the West Bank, or at least parts of it.

As he talked to more and more people from both sides Larsen began to realise that what was needed was a forum to bring the two sides together, to foster trust and common interests, to break down the hostile image that each side had of one another. He envisioned this forum as a ‘back channel’ to the official Madrid/Washington Middle East talks that had been launched in 1991 with great fanfare under joint US-Russian sponsorship.

After considerable shuffling between his Israeli and Palestinian contacts, Larsen received word that both sides were willing to meet in secret. Norway, uniquely, enjoyed good relations with both the Israelis and Palestinians and thus was trusted by both to be an ‘honest broker.’ With the unequivocal backing and enthusiastic input of the Norwegian foreign ministry the process was launched.

From the very start the Norwegian team - spearheaded by Larsen, his wife, Mona Juul, who worked in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Jan Egeland, Norway’s Deputy Foreign Minister - realised that secrecy was the key for the type of negotiation they were setting up.

It was felt that only with absolute secrecy, to allow the participants to fully explore all the possibilities, could progress be made. Thus it was agreed that the number of people who would know about the real nature of the meetings was kept to an absolute minimum and the FAFO living standards research be used as a front so as not to attract too much attention. As Egeland notes, FAFO ‘provided an academic camouflage that gave the parties their much needed “deniability”’.1

At the first meeting in January 1993, held in a beautiful and remote wood-built mansion in the Norwegian countryside, Larsen made clear his position. ‘If you two [groups] are going to manage to live together, you’ve got to solve this problem between you. You own the problem. If you need some help from us, please ask for it. After lunch you should go into the meeting room and I will wait for you outside - unless you get into fisticuffs!’2
The three days of discussions were so successful that the participants decided to begin working on a ‘declaration of principles’ - essentially a framework for how the two sides could reach an agreement.

While both sides also gave the Norwegians the green light to arrange further meetings, Larsen was convinced that the participants needed to make progress on an interpersonal level, to build trust and even intimacy with one another in order for the talks to succeed. Accordingly, at every meeting during the frequent intervals between discussions, Larsen encouraged the Palestinians and Israelis to talk to each other about their aspirations, their dreams and hopes - to connect with each other on a personal level.

This approach is known to have had a significant impact on several members of the group, with new strong relationships being forged between people who just months earlier had considered each other arch enemies. As one analyst notes, ‘Increasingly the personal relationships were what gave the secret negotiations their momentum. There was a shared will to succeed even when the outlook was at its most bleak.’

Aside from the ‘nuts and bolts’ achievements which saw Gaza and Jericho handed back to Palestinian control, the key breakthrough was the signing of a mutual recognition pact. Through this landmark agreement, both the Palestinians and the Israelis recognised each other - the first time ever. This could pave the way for future negotiations.

While the success of the talks must be attributed to a number of global and local forces at play - including the collapse of communism, the deterioration of Arafat’s power, the installation of new Labour administration in Israel and the eruption of the Palestinian intifada - the Norwegian role must claim significant credit for the landmark outcome. As the chief Israeli negotiator, Uri Savir said to the Norwegian team, ‘The Oslo spirit… this special harmony you conveyed to us, between man, nature and conduct - was contagious in creating a new Middle East Spirit. You are peacemakers in the true sense of the word, facilitating peace for the sake of peace itself. You have the quiet yet intense passion that helped channel our passions in a constructive direction.’

Outcome

After 9 months of intense behind the scenes meetings a deal was struck. When it was revealed to the world US Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that it was ‘not just a conceptual but a psychological breakthrough.’

For more information:
Read Jane Corbin’s book - 'Gaza First - the secret Norway Channel to peace between Israel and the PLO' (Bloomsbury Publishing, London 1994), which gives an excellent and thorough examination of the entire Oslo process. Also see Uri Savir’s book ‘The Process: 1,100 days that Changed the Middle East’ (Vintage Books, London 1999) for an insiders view of the secret negotiations. See www.fafo.no for more info on FAFO.
Background
In August 2000 after two and a half years of intense negotiations, a peace agreement was finally signed in Arusha, Tanzania, which, it was hoped, would end the conflict in Burundi. Yet without agreeing a ceasefire and with some rebel leaders conspicuously absent from the talks, the prospects for a real and lasting peace were remote. As the International Crisis Group reported in December 2000, ‘Far from quelling the level of violence, the peace agreement marked the start of a resurgence of violence.’

In towns and cities throughout the country, including the capital, Bujumbura, youths - organised into paramilitary groups who had been told by their leaders to ‘kill before you are killed’ - were still patrolling the streets. For them, the peace agreement meant little. It was business as usual.

Involvement
Amidst the violence that has plagued Burundi over the years JAMAA, which means ‘Friends’ in Swahili, was launched. For Adrien Tuyaga, founder of JAMAA, the idea surfaced during the killings that spread throughout the country in 1993. With a Tutsi mother and a Hutu father who was killed when Tuyaga was only six years old during the massacres of 1972, the inter ethnic bloodletting in 1993 presented him with a stark choice. ‘I was in the middle,’ he says. ‘I thought I would be killing my mother if I joined the Hutus and betraying the memory of my father if I joined the Tutsis. This is how I started to think of ways to pull people together.’

Tuyaga began by contacting other youths who came from ‘mixed’ families as well as those who had not yet been sucked into the violence. Together they discussed how best to reach the youth militias who were responsible for most of the violence in the city. How, they asked themselves, could they change the attitudes of these youths? How could they help re-establish relationships between neighbours?

The first activity that JAMAA organised was a football match between members of a predominantly Tutsi quartier (region) of the city and a Hutu quartier. ‘We targeted the leaders, because they could start or stop the violence. It didn’t matter how well they could play soccer,’ said Adrien. The idea was to create some form of communication between the Hutus and Tutsis in the quartiers and this would be the first step in such a process.

The football match was a resounding success and so JAMAA began organising further matches - but this time the teams were mixed, with Hutus and Tutsis playing on the same side. ‘At first people were confused, but they soon got used to it and they liked it,’ said Adrien. ‘A Hutu defends a Tutsi or a Hutu falls over and a Tutsi team-mate rushes to help. People came to support their area rather than support Hutu or Tutsi’.

The football tournament has been phenomenally successful in doing what many considered the unthinkable - bringing Hutu and Tutsi youth together.

As JAMAA grew so the scope of its activities widened. It first targeted its attention on the northern quartiers of the city which had been worst hit by the violence. The first stage of their work - ‘trauma counselling’ - involved talking to Hutus and Tutsi youth about their experiences of violence and how it had affected them. This was followed by strenuous efforts to reintegrate these youths back into the community. In order to do this JAMAA teamed up with a number of international NGOs to provide employment opportunities.

‘There is no work here’ says Tuyaga, ‘and if there is no employment for these young men, all this will fall apart.’ With funding from a variety of NGOs many of the youths were able to set up small businesses and learn new skills such as carpentry and welding. For example, one micro-credit facility was only available to applicants whose proposed business involved a multi-ethnic group.
Emile, once an active member of a Tutsi militia, echoes these sentiments. ‘Look. I didn’t profit from any of the killings. I was poor before, and I am poor now... [the politicians] told us to kill, and now we have to pick up the pieces, not them.’

An example of Gardons Contact action can be found during the time of the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 2000... by extremists warning of an imminent uprising and telling people to remain at home otherwise they would be killed.

JAMAA immediately sprung into action, launching a ‘yes to life, no to violence’ campaign with other NGOs in the city. Through the Gardons Contact network of ex-militia members, posters, leaflets and banners were distributed throughout the city which reaffirmed this message, asking the local people to join them in rejecting violence and to wear a piece of white cloth around their wrist as a symbolic gesture of their choice for peace.

According to Tuyaga and others, the message was understood: ‘The uprising did not occur. Some leaders changed sides from violence to peace’.

Louis Putzel, Country Director for Search for Common Ground, which has supported JAMAA since its inception, agrees that the strategy worked, ... because some of the youth involved in the Gardons Contact initiative had been known in the past as perpetrators of violence.

One of the most outstanding projects implemented by JAMAA was developed in response to the increased violence in Bujumbura during 1999. With the Washington based NGO Search for Common Ground, JAMAA launched ‘Gardons Contact’ (Let us keep contact). The idea was to build a mutually supportive and robust network of ex-militia leaders and youth-at-risk who, during times of escalating tension, would encourage each other, and the wider community, not to resort to violence. Days and nights are spent together, drinking beers, telling jokes, discussing politics and socialising - building what Tuyaga hopes will be long lasting friendships.

Members also talk about what is needed to persuade others to abandon the militias. Victor, once a member of one of the most feared Hutu militias and now part of Gardons Contact, believes that with support and resources, he could entice ‘hundreds’ of Hutu fighters back to civilian life. ‘They need to see there is an alternative,’ he says.
1974 - 1980
Moral Re-Armament
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Background
Starting with Ghana in 1957, African countries began to win back their independence from their colonial masters. In the 1960s France relinquished control of its African colonies, in some cases (such as Algeria) reluctantly. The British did the same, with the majority of countries achieving independence by the mid 1960s.

In Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) the story was different. In 1962 the right-wing Rhodesia Front (RF) came to power, their goal being Rhodesian independence under guaranteed minority rule (less than 10% of the population was white). In 1965 after several attempts to persuade Britain to grant independence, Ian Smith, leader of the RF government announced the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on November 11th, 1965. Soon after, Zimbabwe became the focus of international sanctions as well as attacks spearheaded by ZANU and ZAPU, the two prominent African nationalist organisations fighting for Zimbabwean independence.

The violence rapidly escalated and the country descended into a full scale and protracted war that caused thousands of deaths and vast population displacement. Between 1966 and 1979 countless peace initiatives were launched and failed, the Rhodesian economy began to collapse, 20% of the white population fled abroad and the violence showed no signs of abating.

In late 1979 at a landmark conference at Lancaster House in London, the warring parties finally agreed on a ceasefire, a transitional government and a settlement on a new constitution. While greeted with much jubilation many people feared that whichever side lost the upcoming elections would re-ignite the war. These concerns were not without foundation. One month before the elections it was discovered that a Rhodesian army general was preparing a coup in case the whites lost the elections.

Conversely, had the whites won the election the ZANU/ZAPU Patriotic Front forces were said to be waiting with ‘pangas (machetes) in hand to kill every white in sight’1 if the word was given.

Involvement
Joram Kucherera, a member of Moral Re-Armament (see pages 14 and 106) knew that if bloodshed was to be prevented, ‘Two people have to meet - Smith and Mugabe. There’s no other way.’2

Moral Re-Armament (MRA) had been active in Southern Africa since the 1920s and many African nationalist leaders, including Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU and Mugabe, had heard of their work. Through key members such as Alec Smith, Ian Smith’s son, MRA flourished in Rhodesia and between 1975 & 1979 they launched a variety of initiatives aimed at ‘building bridges of reconciliation’ and finding a solution to the war that was devastating the country.

MRA’s focus on personal transformation as the key to social transformation is evident in the numerous events that were organised by the group. At a major MRA conference held in 1975 which was attended by many people directly involved in the war, Alec Smith, in classic MRA style, apologised to the audience for his own early naivety, prejudice and ignorance and appealed for forgiveness as well as for a renewed effort to help end the war.

This MRA belief in the power of personal apology as a way of breaking down barriers between people and opening dialogue had a significant impact on several members of the audience, one of whom was a man called Arthur Kanodereka who recruited young men into Mugabe’s guerrilla force. He formed a close friendship with Smith and the pair travelled the country sharing their message of reconciliation and peace.3
Other people personally transformed by the MRA approach included Gordon Chavunduka, secretary general of the ANC who with MRA member Desmond Reader (a well-known professor at the University of Rhodesia), went on to help organise many intimate meetings between ANC leaders and members of Ian Smith’s cabinet. These meetings, coupled with others arranged by Alec Smith, brought his father in contact with many of his political rivals, and were vital in paving the way for the crucial encounter between Mugabe and Smith on the eve of the elections. As Alec Smith recalls in his memoirs: ‘There’s no doubt that during these years my father’s attitude softened...over a period of four years or so I exposed him to men who had a different way of looking at things.’

Alec Smith then set to work on his father, persuading him that a meeting with his nemesis, whom Ian Smith had called ‘the apostle of Satan’, was essential as the country teetered on the brink of renewed war. After several days of deliberations both sides gave their consent. Given the precarious security situation which had seen several assassination attempts on Mugabe’s life within the space of a few weeks, it was agreed that the meeting would be held at Mugabe’s house at night.

Kucherera was the only person to accompany Smith that fateful night. When Smith met Mugabe, recalls Kucherera, he ‘was surprised with the warmth of the welcome. It was the contrast of what he expected to see. The man he regarded as a terrorist was very disarming.’

Both men knew that the election would see Mugabe elected a leader of the country. For the next two hours, the men talked. Mugabe explained that he wanted to retain the confidence of the white population and he sought the advice of Smith in this matter. He also offered Smith an olive branch: two cabinet posts would be given to white ministers nominated by Smith.

When the meeting was concluded Smith was driven back to his house by Kucherera. During the journey, Smith said, ‘This is a remarkable day for Rhodesia.’

The much-expected white exodus was averted, a renewed war was almost certainly prevented and the transition of power was relatively peaceful. Lord Soames, responsible for governing the country during the transition period reflected, ‘Every time we thought the thing would explode in our faces, some miracle came about. When we went out there I was not one who believed in miracles. I think I am reversing my position now.’
1992 - 2001+
Moldovan Initiative Committee of Management

Moldova

Background
Moldova's conflict can be traced to the carving up of the country and its predominantly Romanian speaking people by the Russian and Ottoman empires. The eastern part of Moldova (Bessarabia) was ceded to Russia, while western Moldova remained in Ottoman hands until 1877 when it became part of the newly-established state of Romania.

By the end of the First World War Romania had doubled in size, absorbing the eastern half of Moldova too. The Soviet Union, in an attempt to exert influence over the disputed territory, promptly established the ‘Autonomous Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic’ on a strip of Ukrainian land east of the Dniester river and encouraged Russians and Ukrainians to settle there. In 1944 Soviet forces retook Russia's lost Moldovan territory and merged it with the Autonomous Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moldova declared its independence in 1990, announced changes to the language laws in favour of its Romanian speaking majority and signalled its intentions to reunite with Romania. Moldova’s minorities, especially the Russian/Slavs east of the Dniester river (Transdniestr) feared that they would be the victims of discrimination and were resolutely opposed to the growing pro-Romanian sentiment in Moldova.

Only days after the declaration of independence by Moldova, Transdniestr broke away and formed its own republic. By the end of 1991 there were violent clashes between Moldova and Transdniestr, which soon sucked in minorities such as the Gagauz as well as parts of the Russian army into the widening conflict. In July 1992 a ceasefire was negotiated, yet sporadic bouts of violence continued and the two sides in the conflict were no nearer to a resolution.

Involvement
In October 1992 Joe Camplisson, Director of the Northern Ireland-based Inter Community Development Services (ICDS), visited Transdniestr as part of his efforts to develop a community development strategy for the region. He had already begun a similar process following requests from Moldovan community leaders and was invited to do the same for Transdniestrians in an attempt to help them adjust to the new post-communist economic climate. However, an encounter with an elderly woman in a local health centre radically altered Camplisson's focus. ‘We don’t really want to know about jobs and economic recovery and all of those things’ she said. ‘All we want is peace. We want peace, but we don’t want their flag, or their language or to be Romanians.’

Reminding him of the situation in Northern Ireland, he promised the elderly lady that he would do what he could to help.

Camplisson quickly won the support of all the major stakeholders in the conflict, including the presidents of Moldova and Transdniestr, who requested assistance in attempting to resolve the conflict. He began assembling a group of conflict experts from the UK and USA who would help him organise a series of workshops which would complement and feed into the official OSCE/Russian/Ukrainian supervised negotiations that were underway.

During his time with the CRC he was heavily influenced by the theories of renowned academic John Burton. The key for Burton to unlocking some of the world’s most intractable conflicts was understanding the basic unmet human needs that underpin the motivations of parties at war with one another. He also believed that people can only ultimately satisfy their own needs by recognising that the needs of their enemy have also to be met.

Camplisson’s previous work in Northern Ireland for the Community Relations Commission (CRC) had given him a valuable insight into the dynamics of conflict.
One expert likened MICOM’s function to ‘the introduction of additional squares to a chessboard when the players reach stalemate.’

This meeting was also viewed as highly constructive. Many of the participants said that together the Canterbury workshops had helped them look at the conflict more deeply. Others also reported that the supportive environment engendered by MICOM enabled them to develop cooperative approaches to their problems. Indeed many of the ideas that evolved from the workshops were incorporated into a series of agreements between the two sides.

In 1995 the official talks broke down again. This time MICOM was asked by both sides if they could help kick-start the process, but to their surprise Campilsson refused. He firmly believed that such meetings were doomed to fail until the parties began addressing the roots of the conflict rather than constitutional / legislative matters which would at best temporarily ‘contain’ the conflict.

Instead he suggested a study visit to Belfast which he hoped would provide them with new insights. They agreed and in March 1996 the group visited Northern Ireland, participating in a variety of activities which helped them draw parallels between the two conflicts as well as extract useful lessons learned. The visit was a resounding success with one key participant commenting, ‘After what we have learned about Northern Ireland I think our reconstruction will take less time.’

Outcome

In May 1997 an historic protocol was signed between the two parties, which was seen as a crucial step towards peace. In view of the substantial contribution made by MICOM a signed copy of the Protocol was presented to Campilsson by the Presidents of Moldova and Transdniestria. Since then MICOM has continued to support both sides in their quest for a peaceful resolution to this conflict.

A recent analysis of MICOM is unequivocal in its praise for their work. Officials interviewed note that not only has MICOM managed to ‘unblock’ the official peace process on several occasions but has, in some instances, helped shape it. They also point to a marked increase in trust between Moldovan and Transdniestrian negotiators which has led to the implementation of confidence-building measures such as the reduction in peacekeeping forces from 2,000 to 500. Other highly significant outcomes from the MICOM work include the emergence of the JCDC which is accepted on all sides as an ‘indigenous neutral third party’. Uniquely, through recent joint MICOM/ JCDC initiatives which have brought top level decision makers into contact with grassroots leaders, a cross fertilisation of ideas has taken place, with chief negotiators attesting to the added insights that have helped inform their decisions and approach to conflict resolution. While many challenges lie ahead for Moldova and Transdniestria all parties have acknowledged the highly significant role that MICOM has played and continues to play in helping move the peace process along towards what all hope will be its eventual resolution.

For more information:

Read Michael Hall’s pamphlets ‘Conflict Resolution - the missing element in the Northern Ireland Peace Process’ and the updated version of ‘Hidden Frontiers’ (Island Publications, Co Antrim Northern Ireland, 2001) for a good overview of MICOM’s work and its implications for the Northern Ireland peace process. See also http://home.moldpac.md/~savelkin/frontpage.htm for an excellent account of the Moldovan conflict and the current peace process.

Internally displaced: 60,000 (UNHCR)

Refugees: 60,000 (UNHCR)

Deaths: 1,000 (source: various)

Cost of involvement: $210,000 per year
Background

The principal cause of tension between the various ethnic groups in the north of Ghana revolves around the rivalry between those groups with a paramount chief (predominantly Muslim) and those without, known as acephalous or ‘headless’ groups (whose leadership is predominantly Christian).

Traditionally land ownership, and by extension, political authority, is vested in paramount chiefs and is held on behalf of the ethnic group to which the chief belongs. However, only four of the 18 ethnic groups in the north of the country have paramount chiefs.

The other acephalous groups have thus resented the concentration of land and political power in the hands of the four ethnic groups, to whom they are expected to owe allegiance and pay tribute. In addition, the population of some of the acephalous groups had been increasing rapidly and this has led to a corresponding increase in the demand for representation in national and regional politics, in particular through the creation of paramount chieftaincies for them.

In February 1994 an argument broke out in a small town in the region between two men over the purchase of a guinea fowl. One of the men from the Nanumba ethnic group was killed, and in a very short space of time rumours began to spread that the ethnic group to which the killer belonged, the acephalous Konkombas, were attacking the Nanumbas.

Soon whole villages became involved in a bitter and violent conflict that sucked in neighbouring ethnic groups allied to either the Konkombas or Nanumbas. In June after intense negotiations carried out by the government appointed Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT) a ceasefire was signed, by which time an estimated 10,000 people had been killed and at least 423 villages had been burnt or destroyed. This however was not the end of the violence. In early 1995 fighting broke out again, with at least 110 people being killed.

Involvement

In an attempt to help bring peace to the area, a network of development NGOs known as the Inter NGO consortium (INGOC) - originally created to co-ordinate the humanitarian response to the conflict - invited the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) to bring its expertise to bear on the situation in Ghana. Since 1991 NPI had gained a considerable reputation in mediation and training in several countries, and was keen to help in whatever way possible.

NPI Director Hizkias Assefa and Program Officer Emmanuel Bombande began a series of extensive field trips in order to understand more fully the nature of the conflict and its possible resolution. They also used their time on the ground to identify specific individuals who would be able to act as ‘bridge builders’ - later called ‘voices of reason’ - between the highly divided communities.

Given the deep suspicion and tension between the groups, it was felt that the only way to bring the parties together would be under the pretext of ‘providing advice to development NGOs operating in the war-ravaged areas on how the latter could continue with their development work.’ The issue of development, which affected all the parties equally, was a convenient launch pad for what would ultimately become an exploration of the conflict and its possible resolution.

The first meeting, held in Kumasi (deemed to be a neutral location) brought together elders and influential people from the four main communities. From the outset, the atmosphere at the meeting was very tense with the Konkombas being blamed for the entire war. However, as the discussion developed NPI staff managed to create a space where each side could talk candidly about the real causes and consequences of the war.
They were also charged with the task of organising meetings which would promote the need for peace, to invite committee members from the other ethnic groups to these meetings to break down the animosity between the groups, and to identify other people who could participate in a second Kumasi workshop.

The second Kumasi workshop was held in September 1995, and followed the same pattern as the first. Suspicion, anger and fear gave way to optimism, hope and a renewed sense of determination to resolve the chronic problems between the groups. One comment summed up the mood of the group: ‘We the people who participated in these meetings will leave here back home as peacemakers. Our example will help others understand the need for them to also come together to talk about their differences without using arms. Thank you facilitators...Allah bless you all.’

Further Kumasi meetings were held, involving more powerful and more extreme elements from all sides as well as smaller ethnic groups which had been sucked into the violence. For Hizkias Assefa, this approach which he called the ‘Process of Expanding and Deepening Engagement’ developed from his involvement in a number of conflicts for many years. As the name suggests the process starts with a small number of key individuals and issues and gradually expands outwards to include all members of society.

In the meantime there were several spin-off peace initiatives by members of the peace committee as well as agencies involved in INGOC. All these added momentum to the movement towards a normalisation of relationships between the ethnic groups.

Outcome

By the fourth Kumasi workshop it was clear that all parties were actively seeking a real and lasting peace. After several days of intense negotiations the ‘Kumasi draft agreement on peace and reconciliation in the northern region of Ghana’ was initialled by delegates from the various ethnic groups.

It was agreed that the accord would be taken to all the towns and villages so that it could be discussed and ratified by the communities rather than just by the elites.

Using this ‘bottom up’ approach it was felt that the people themselves would ‘own’ the peace, rather than have it thrust upon them. On March 30th 1996 after a final Kumasi workshop had integrated and amended the document in light of the suggestions made by the people themselves at the public meetings, the final document was signed, signalling an end to the hostilities amongst the groups in Northern Ghana.
Background

In May 1994 Mali found itself teetering on the brink of a full-scale civil war. For almost four years government forces had been locked in an increasingly violent conflict with various armed Tuareg and Arab groups from the North of the country. As the conflict escalated some of the groups in the North began fighting each other, lawlessness increased throughout the region and civilians were increasingly caught up in the fighting.

The causes of the conflict in Mali can be traced to the huge disparity between the North and the South of the country. The North, predominantly populated by nomadic Tuaregs and Arabs, had since colonial times been marginalized both politically and economically. Under the authoritarian regime of Moussa Traore, Tuaregs were denied positions at every level of government as well as the army. A crippling national debt also led to massive under-investment, particularly in the North, where there were virtually no roads, schools or hospitals.

This coupled with frequent droughts, which hit the North hardest, resulted in huge - mainly Tuareg - refugee flows out of the country. Many of these refugees were refused entry to other countries and thus became increasingly bitter towards their own government. As one commentator notes, ‘For many nomads, such feelings were so strong that they were ready to take up arms against the government.’

In 1991 Traore was overthrown and by 1994 Mali’s first democratically elected President was enjoying his second year in office. Yet peace remained elusive. In recent years several peace initiatives had been launched, the most important of which was known as the ‘National Pact’ and was signed in 1992, but it and its predecessors all failed to bring peace to the country.

As fighting continued, the government tried another approach, instituting a series of measures designed to encourage civil society to take the lead in the peace effort. First they organised regional meetings, known as ‘Regional Concertations’ that brought together people from all walks of life to discuss the problems of the region. Soon, they began pulling troops accused of committing atrocities back from the front line. These efforts began to pay off, as local village chiefs began organising intercommunity meetings involving warring groups to try to bring an end to the fighting.

Involvement

While sporadic, localised and ad hoc, these intercommunity meetings revealed that local people were finally beginning to assume responsibility for peace in the area. Through these meetings, various peace treaties were signed between warring factions, leading to an almost complete cessation of violence. But this was only the beginning. Communities were still heavily armed and in many cases bitterly divided, the economic and social life of the region was almost completely devastated and the situation was unlikely to improve until communities began breaking down the barriers of suspicion and fear that still separated them. Peace treaties alone were not enough.

It was at about this time that Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) was approached by various parties involved in the conflict - government, rebels and local people - to help support the fledgling peace process. For some time the NCA had secretly been developing networks with and between some of the major actors in the conflict in an attempt to encourage dialogue on the possibilities for peace and so the invitation to participate more fully was readily accepted.

Since 1984 NCA had been working in a very inhospitable and isolated area of north-eastern Mali called Gourma. Their emergency relief work, in response to a massive and prolonged drought, quickly became the largest development project in the region. Even when the area descended into violence, the NCA didn’t leave, despite losing eight Malian NCA workers in the space of two years. This persistent and long term involvement is seen by NCA as the single most important reason why they were trusted by all sides in the conflict. One Malian put it another way. ‘The presence of NCA in Gourma even in the most difficult periods kept reminding us that peace was possible. Otherwise they would have left.’
The first few meetings were so successful that Lode and his team were asked to move onto other areas beyond Gourma. With further funding from NCA and then from a consortium of international donors, Lode and his team set about designing a comprehensive plan covering the entire North of the country. As the meetings grew in size and importance, the NCA team was assisted by 'Mobile Units for Support to the Peace Process and Development' which had been set up by the government following the National Pact to help re-establish political administration throughout the country and promote peace and development.

This extra support was needed since some of the larger meetings involved thousands of people.

Outcome

In all 37 intercommunity meetings were conducted between August 1995 and March 1996. Through these meetings peace was finally restored.

At the end of March, the leaders of the various rebel movements, representatives of the government including President Konare and many international observers attended a ceremony in Timbuktu, in which they declared the indivisibility of Mali, their support for the Malian constitution and the renunciation of violence. They then set alight a huge pyre made up of thousands of guns surrendered as part of a parallel UNDP demobilisation process. This powerful and highly symbolic act became known as the 'flame of peace' and signalled an end to six years of war.

Since then the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants has continued apace, the government has decentralised authority and the army is being retrained - all vital if peace is to be permanent.

The International Peace Research Institute of Norway (PRIO), in carrying out an evaluation of NCA’s work in Mali for the Norwegian government asks, ‘Could peace have been achieved in Northern Mali without the efforts of the NCA and of Kare Lode?’ Their answer is clear. ‘There can be no doubt that the NCA contribution was a very important one, but - and this is necessarily speculative - the conditions for peace were already there: what the Kare Lode initiative helped to do was to translate these conditions into an actuality.’

The presence of NCA in Gourma even in the most difficult periods kept reminding us that peace was possible. Otherwise they would have left.

Internally displaced: 30,000 (Kare Lode)
Refugees: 150,000 - 200,000 (Kare Lode)
Deaths: 6,000 - 8,000 (Kare Lode)
Cost of involvement: $1,500 - $3,750 per meeting

For more information:
Background
As in Rwanda, Burundi’s conflict has popularly been portrayed as one in which the ‘age old’ ethnic rivalry between Hutu and Tutsi routinely manifests itself into extreme violence and in which the current bout of killing is just part of a long line of atrocities committed by each side down the years. A more considered analysis shows that while there have been very serious mass killings in the past, the tendency for these crimes to be repeated is largely down to the deliberate and calculated use of violence by members of a small self appointed and self advancing elite, acting in the name of the two main ethnic communities in their ongoing struggle for political power and material privilege.*

The current phase of the civil war began in 1993 with the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu and the country’s first democratically-elected president, by elements within the Tutsi dominated army. Like Rwanda, Burundi’s Tutsis had been favoured by the Belgians throughout the colonial period.

With the introduction of identity cards, the hitherto porous classification of ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ was firmly set, as was the privilege and patronage afforded to the Tutsis. While Rwanda saw the Tutsi elite overthrown, Burundi’s Tutsis, in particular the Tutsi dominated army, held onto power and were determined not to relinquish it. When Ndadaye was assassinated, the reprisals and counter-reprisals that followed left over 100,000 people dead within the space of a year.

Involvement
Towards the end of 1994, as violence in Burundi again began to spiral and the spectre of the Rwandan genocide hung over the entire region and the international community, the Washington based non governmental organisation ‘Search for Common Ground’ (SFCG) visited Burundi with the aim of seeing what contribution it could make to the peacemaking effort.

Launched in 1982 SFCG works in many of the world’s ‘hot spots’ in an attempt to help prevent and resolve international and inter-ethnic conflict. Their experience with media projects in conflict situations prompted it to look at the possibility of launching a radio studio in Burundi.

During the Rwandan genocide, the role of ‘Radio Mille Collines’ which broadcast a relentless barrage of hate speech in the weeks leading up to and during the genocide was well known. With 90% of the population listening to the radio for their news and views, the call by Radio Mille Collines to ‘clean up the cockroaches’ was heeded. Meanwhile, a station called ‘Radio Voice of the People’ began to broadcast from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) calling on Hutus to rise against their Tutsi oppressors. In Burundi the main radio station was controlled by the state, whose army had been complicit in some of the country’s worst excesses of violence. Thus it was clear that impartial radio output was desperately needed.

The first set of programmes focused on the plight of Burundian refugees and the internally displaced. Interviewing both Hutus and Tutsis who had been forced to leave their homes as a result of the war, the Studio Ijambo staff then invited political leaders to comment on the situation.

From the very outset their task was monumental. The culture of secrecy and lies that plagued the country not only meant that uncovering the truth was a considerable challenge but also dangerous. Within weeks of the launch of Studio Ijambo, one Hutu member of the team was killed by the army, dismembered and dumped into a latrine. Undeterred, the team continued their work amidst increasing violence in the streets of the capital and throughout the country. They signed agreements with the state radio station, which agreed not to alter any of the content, and an independent station operating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Radio Agatashya) – thus giving it a potential audience of over 6 million listeners.

With a small multi-ethnic team, Studio Ijambo was launched in March 1995. While the overarching aim was to provide balanced news coverage, Studio Ijambo set out to produce programmes that defined the conflict in terms of its impact on the everyday life of people - essentially to illustrate that there were no winners in this war. It sought to propose solutions to the crisis facing the country and wanted to encourage and reinforce the credibility of local journalism.
According to three surveys carried out in 1999-2000 around 85% of the entire population regularly listen to the drama, making it the most popular radio programme in Burundi. In addition, 82% of those surveyed believe that Studio Ijambo’s programmes greatly help reconciliation. The Studio now produces 20 hours of programming a week and broadcasts on four radio stations in the country.

As their work became more widely known, so more international news organisations requested that Studio Ijambo produce news ‘packages’ for them. The staff also began to notice that journalists from the state radio station began to copy their approach to programming, focusing more on the human dimensions of the consequences of the war rather than what leaders of each faction were saying, which tended to exacerbate tensions.

Outcome
Over the years, Studio Ijambo has been recognised both nationally and internationally for its role in helping defuse tensions, correct potentially explosive rumours, promote peace and reconciliation and report the truth. 'It’s true that you report everything, but from time to time try not to expose what we are doing,' said one army spokesman.

Other senior figures attest to the important role the studio has played in calming otherwise explosive tensions and rumours. Rumours in particular could be catastrophic. For example in 1988 in Northern Burundi, based on a false rumour, Hutus massacred an estimated 5,000 Tutsis believing that the Tutsis were preparing to kill them.

In 1998 in recognition of this work, the European Community Humanitarian Office presented Studio Ijambo with its award for ‘Humanity in the Midst of Conflict’. More importantly, says Francis Rolt, in 2000 the Studio was presented with an award naming it as a ‘Great Citizen of Peace’ by a group of Burundian youth associations. 'It’s essential that the work we do is recognised here in Burundi...this is the best prize we could receive,' says Francis Rolt.

The message, that one can co-exist peacefully despite the horrors of the past and the challenges of the present, is clear and unequivocal.
Background
In March 1991 a small guerrilla force calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia with the aim of liberating the country from the corrupt and despotic military regime of Joseph Momoh. Led by a former corporal in the Sierra Leone army, Foday Sankoh, the RUF looted from villages, assassinated figures of authority and mutilated innocent civilians. With the support of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the RUF - which rapidly grew in strength - launched attacks across Sierra Leone, displacing half the country’s entire population, destroying most of the crumbling infrastructure and causing enormous loss of life.

Pujehun District of Sierra Leone, close to the border of Liberia, was one of the first areas to suffer from RUF attacks in 1991 and continued to suffer throughout the war. For more than five years parts of the district were controlled by the RUF, driving thousands of people from their homes.

In 1996 elections were held, which brought Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power. By the end of the year he had signed a peace treaty with the RUF. However the peace was short lived. In May 1997 a coup ousted Kabbah, returning the military to power, this time with the backing of the RUF. In Pujehun, as in many other areas throughout the country, people who had only just returned to their homes after years away, again fled, many to refugee camps in Liberia.

Involvement
Despite being refugees themselves, members of a small community-based organisation called the Sulima Fishing Community Development Project (SFCDP) - set up in 1996 to help improve the standard of living for people in the Soro Gbeima Chiefdom of Pujehun - were determined to do what they could to help. With seed funding from Christian Aid and DANIDA, SFCDP’s initial aim was to carry out an assessment of the conditions faced by Sierra Leonean refugees in the camps located just inside Liberia.

The situation in the refugee camps was critical. Members of each warring faction were openly recruiting refugees to bolster their numbers. Heavy fighting in and around the Mano bridge area, which linked Sierra Leone and Liberia, was stretching tensions between the pro- and anti-RUF refugees to the limit. Meanwhile, the distribution of humanitarian aid had been hijacked by a number of corrupt, self styled ‘welfare groups’ which meant that large numbers of refugees were not receiving anything. These events and others conspired to produce a highly charged environment in which fighting between groups of refugees was common.

In response to the desperate situation SFCDP decided to hold a series of one day workshops which brought together community chiefs, ex-RUF soldiers, women and youths to explore the issues surrounding the war. At these workshops refugees discussed the need to acknowledge individual as well as group responsibility for the conflict as well as the challenges of reconciliation and hopes for the future. This was the first time that such work had been attempted in the camps.

While the impact of these workshops varied from camp to camp, overall they were highly successful. In Samukai camp, for example, refugees reported a change in attitude on the part of the RUF supporters and as a result tensions there decreased. Other achievements included the release of refugees held by certain factions, increased communication between government and RUF supporters, a marked decrease in the incidences of provocation and violence and a sharing of some resources by opposing factions.

When the situation in Sierra Leone began to stabilise the refugees slowly began to return to their villages. Although the return home was greeted with much jubilation, many challenges lay ahead. Aside from the damage to homes and crops and the psychological trauma of having to deal with the loss of loved ones, the collapse of civil authority in the region posed immediate and long term problems.
Each peace monitor would be put through a two day training course which covered conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation techniques as well as how to identify potential conflicts, to promote reconciliation and conduct peace advocacy work. Each peace monitor was given a small wage so that he could work for at least ten days per month and a bicycle so that he could move around and between villages.

The second innovation that arose from the workshops was the establishment of local ‘grievance committees’. The function of the grievance committees - made up of respected members of communities in the region - was to mediate, and where necessary, arbitrate, conflicts that were brought to their attention by the peace monitors. While the peace monitors would usually deal with local conflicts within a given village, the grievance committees were intended to deal with conflicts between villages.

The effectiveness of the peace monitors was illustrated in February 1999 in the Wai region of the Soro Gbeima Chiefdom, where a leadership crisis erupted, caused by the death of a local deputy chief, which threatened to escalate if left unresolved. The peace monitors were immediately brought in and after an extensive consultation process the issue was resolved without incident. Indeed since the peace monitors were established in the region they have been in great demand and as a result their work has expanded to include a variety of issues, ranging from the reintegration of ex-combatants, family tracing and reunification, to the resolution of conflicts over the registration for relief food.

As Guus Meijer, Co-Director of the UK based ‘Conciliation Resources’ which has supported SFCDP from the very beginning notes, ‘In the absence of a functioning court system, the peace monitors are providing a real community service, becoming the local guardians of law and order in a period of transition and uncertainty.’

As well as encouraging the creation of peace monitors and grievance committees, SFCDP has also embarked upon a variety of initiatives designed to revitalise the local economy such as launching income generating schemes for women.

Outcome

As Sierra Leone tentatively makes the transition from war to peace, SFCDP has made important strides in promoting a community level approach to conflict prevention and resolution which has yielded clear results. Indeed when they began SFCDP was the only organisation practising community based conflict resolution on the ground in southern Sierra Leone. While their work covers only a small area of a country that has been decimated by war, the SFCDP is an inspiring example of what local communities can do often against seemingly insurmountable odds.

Re-establishing civilian authority would be difficult since the Kamajors - local hunters who had banded together into militias or ‘Civilian Defence Forces’ in order to protect the local communities from RUF attack - were reluctant to relinquish power. Furthermore, without any organised mechanisms for conflict prevention, management or resolution - as had previously existed through the court system - disputes ran the risk of escalating into violence.

To help the community deal with these problems SFCDP ran a number of conflict resolution workshops for the returnees. During the workshops two innovative mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution were established. The first was the creation of ‘peace monitors’ who were mandated to ‘serve as early warning tools of conflict... to intervene in the conflicts before they boiled over’. The community would nominate a peace monitor, which in most cases was the local mwalimu - a respected teacher of the Koran.

For more information:
Read the paper Building mechanisms for conflict resolution in south east Sierra Leone, by John Massaquoi (see www.c-r.org/occ_papers/Sulima.html). Also see the issue of ACCORD on Sierra Leone (published by Conciliation Resources) available online at www.c-r.org for more information about the war in Sierra Leone. For a good overview of the conflict read Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, by John L. Hirsch. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 2000).

Deaths:
75,000 (Uppsala)

Cost of Involvement:
$2,700 for initial assessment of living conditions in the camps

Internally displaced:
1,600,000 in 1996 (UN) 500,000 - 1,000,000 in 2000 (USCR)

Refugees:
400,000 in 2000 (USCR)
Background
Violence and instability have plagued the north east of India since independence in 1947. There, in states such as Manipur, the call for self-determination and in some cases secession by certain groups led very quickly to armed insurrection. In Manipur the struggle began in 1949 when the Maharaja of Manipur signed the Manipur Merger Agreement ‘under duress’ thus bringing the once independent kingdom into newly independent India. For a large section of the population, the forced union with India and direct rule from Delhi was to be resisted at all costs.

Spurred on by the rise of armed movements in neighbouring Assam by Naga hill people - who were also one of the largest minorities in Manipur - a number of groups surfaced in Manipur whose demands ranged from increased parliamentary representation to autonomy and independence. As the situation spiralled beyond control, Delhi enacted the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in 1958 that not only gave the army the power to ‘shoot to kill’ but also provided immunity from prosecution to those forces acting under it. By 1999 there were 35 different insurgent groups in the state, 18 of which were active. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act had been in place for over 40 years, during which time the civilian population had been subjected to violence, harassment, intimidation and torture. In a recent report, Amnesty International noted that, ‘Abuses of human rights by government forces and by armed opposition groups are a feature of a daily life’. However they single out the state security forces for particular attention noting that civilians, including women and juveniles, have been killed as a result of the ‘systematic use of lethal force as an alternative to arrest’.4

In 1998 a 15 year old boy named Yumlembam Sanamacha was dragged out of his house with his brothers by the army. They were blindfolded, tortured and while Yumlembam Sanamacha’s brothers were eventually released, he was never again seen. His was a fate all too common in Manipur.

Involvement
In 1998 the US based non-governmental organisation ‘Witness’ in association with their local partner in Manipur, Human Rights Alert, produced a video documentary on the disappearance of Sanamacha.

Founded in 1992 by musician Peter Gabriel and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Witness uses video and internet technology to highlight human rights issues throughout the world. In particular Witness aims to (a) strengthen grassroots advocacy by making video and technology tools available to human rights defenders so they can fight for human rights, and (b) mobilise public concern and activism so that human rights issues move to the centre of political debate.

The idea came about in 1992 following the brutal beating of Rodney King by police officers in Los Angeles, which was caught on videotape by a passer-by. Broadcast around the world, this amateur footage provoked international outrage and the resulting riots in Los Angeles left 54 people dead and damage estimated at almost $800m.

Witness first began by putting as many cameras into the hands of as many local activists as possible. However, their early experience with this experiment revealed that simply having a camera was not sufficient to ensure that activists would be able to obtain the best footage. Therefore training, which aims to ‘marry a grounding in technical expertise with instruction in the substance of issue-based human rights campaigning’ became a critical component.
Once they have mastered the basics, activists are taught how to identify the human rights issue that needs to be addressed; prepare for and conduct a video shoot; use video to achieve a deeper impact than that achieved through traditional advocacy methods; and distribute video to the appropriate outlets, e.g., the media, governments, and other influential audiences.

Technology has also enabled Witness to bypass the mainstream media, which Gillian Caldwell, Director of Witness, argues is notoriously disinterested in international human rights issues. ‘There has been very little commitment to international human rights concerns on the part of the major media outlets, unless there is some sort of U.S. angle to the story. We can’t rely on mainstream media to cover these stories’.* Therefore Witness - through its web site - launched ‘Witness Rights Alert’, a fortnightly series of QuickTime video broadcasts which highlight snippets of footage from their partners from around the world. Each broadcast is accompanied by an ‘Act Now’ link which enables the viewer to help, either by writing letters, or sending faxes and emails to the relevant authorities.

In Manipur where the government has effectively prevented any outsiders from setting foot in the state to investigate the abuses, including all media, the advantage of having a trained ‘insider’ on the ground is clear. The footage documents for the first time how ordinary people live under the shadow of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, using Sanamacha’s story as a focus.

While groups such as Amnesty International had highlighted the plight of Yumlembam Sanamacha and others in Manipur the year before, actual footage - as the Rodney King beating attests - communicates a sense of immediacy and realism which makes it a powerful tool in the hands of the human rights defender.

The footage, skilfully edited and narrated back at Witness HQ, was then screened at a press conference in Manipur’s capital city and toured the entire country, being shown in community video parlours and on cable television stations as part of a local public awareness campaign.

In Northern Ireland, Witness footage of police brutality during the marching season forced a change in police policy. Witness has also provided videotaped evidence to the War Crimes Tribunal in Yugoslavia.

In the case of Manipur, the Witness footage has been instrumental in bringing local, national, and international attention to this forgotten area of the world. The film was presented to the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, who then challenged the Indian government to answer questions concerning the conduct of its military. The UN group also agreed to closely monitor developments in the case of Sanamacha and over 42 others as well as the general issue of military abuse in the region.

While it is difficult to know quite how the Witness footage has or will affect the Indian government and their approach to maintaining security in Manipur, pop star Michael Stipe of R.E.M., a supporter of Witness for years, notes, ‘Even just the threat that a potential or ongoing perpetrator is being watched might just be enough to make them back down a bit, save a few lives.’*

For more information:
See www.witness.org to learn more about the work of Witness.
For more about the human rights situation in Manipur see Amnesty International at www.amnesty.org.uk

Outcome
As co-founder of Witness, Peter Gabriel, says ‘A camera in the right hands at the right time at the right place can be more powerful than tanks and guns. Let truth do the fighting.’ This philosophy has already proved itself on many occasions.
Background
In 1964 a coup orchestrated by members of the Brazilian army ushered in a period of military rule that lasted for over 20 years. During those years the regime waged an insidious campaign of terror on its own people in an attempt to purge the country of any ‘communist infiltrators’. Anyone who voiced opposition to the regime became a target including those fighting for the rights of the poor and landless, journalists and members of left wing political parties.

A particular characteristic of the violence administered by the state was the widespread and systematic use of torture. Thousands of men and women were subjected to acts of terror in order to extract confessions of wrongdoing or sometimes just to silence any dissent.

While the violence subsided towards the end of the 1970s as the military began to rein in the excesses of its own men, the crimes that the state had committed remained a taboo issue, to be broken at one’s peril.

For the victims there was no opportunity for justice to be done, nor was there any guarantee that the accession to power of a new military leader would not bring about a fresh round of violence against ‘subversives’.

Involvement
In 1979 under the new administration of General João Baptista Figueiredo, a new law was introduced offering an amnesty for political prisoners and state security agents who were involved in the torture over the years. While the amnesty for political prisoners was warmly welcomed by human rights advocates representing the victims, the prospect of an amnesty for the agents of terror deeply troubled many people.

The cloud that hung over the 1979 amnesty law did however reveal a silver lining. In order to prepare amnesty petitions on behalf of the incarcerated political prisoners, their lawyers were given permission to view the official state records and even take away individual files as long as they were returned within 24 hours.

It was well known that the regime had kept the most detailed accounts of every person abducted, tortured, interrogated and killed by the security forces. What was remarkable about these accounts was that not only did they describe what method of terror was used on which victim by whom, but they also included the testimonies of many of the people who were tortured explaining their ordeal usually at a military court tribunal which is where many of the torture victims were charged. For the military, their record keeping was merely doing things ‘by the book’.

Whilst waiting at the airport for an exiled friend to arrive back in the country after an absence of over 15 years, The Rev. Jaime Wright, a Presbyterian Minister, and some colleagues, including an envoy from the World Council of Churches (WCC), hatched a plan. They would employ a number of lawyers to begin accessing the archive under the pretence of preparing amnesty submissions. The files would then be photocopied so that there would be at least some measure of the atrocities that took place over the years.

For Wright, the matter was deeply personal. In 1973 his brother, Paolo Wright, had been abducted by the military, tortured and killed within 48 hours. ‘Paolo was teaching [poor] people how to stick together,’ said Wright, ‘and to a military regime that’s subversion.’

Within a matter of days Wright had the personal backing of his close friend Cardinal Arns, archbishop of São Paulo, who had become an increasingly vocal critic of the junta, and Philip Potter, the head of the WCC. Within a month the WCC had started covertly to fund the project which enabled the daring experiment to begin without any delay.
It was clear from the outset that secrecy would be of paramount importance. If the plan were to be discovered by the regime it would pose serious consequences for all involved. As such everyone involved in the plan agreed to tell no-one - neither colleagues, friends or family. Anything of any importance was conveyed in person, face to face.

Starting in 1980, under the guidance of Cardinal Arns and Wright, a small team set to work. They rented a small office in the centre of Brasilia, equipped with three photocopiers. The team worked ten hours a day, seven days a week, copying the files so that they could be returned to the archive in time and without arousing any suspicions. The need for secrecy was so great that the people employed to do the photocopying did not even know what they were working on.

Once a batch of files had been photocopied they were immediately sent to São Paulo. From here, the photocopies were transferred onto microfilm and spirited out of the country to Geneva, home of the WCC.

With each trip the ‘courier’ brought back more money from the WCC - sometimes $20,000 at a time - which was stuffed into a money belt worn around his waist.

Once the microfilms had arrived in Geneva they were archived and then analysed. For three years this process continued unhindered, until one day to Wright’s surprise he discovered that the entire archive had been copied - over one million pages. During this time the workers had been busy processing all the information, which eventually was condensed into a 7,000 page report describing in minute detail the horrors committed by the state against its own people.

Without delay two journalists were employed to write a much more condensed version of the report, entitled: ‘Brasil: Nunca Mais’ (Brazil, Never Again) began surfacing in shops throughout Brazil. While the military did try to have the book banned, the news that there was an American publisher as well as copies of the archive abroad prompted them to realise the futility of their actions.

On July 15th 1985, without any advance publicity, copies of the book, entitled: ‘Brasil: Nunca Mais’ (Brazil, Never Again) began surfacing in shops throughout Brazil. While the military did try to have the book banned, the news that there was an American publisher as well as copies of the archive abroad prompted them to realise the futility of their actions.

Within two weeks the book had reached the No. 1 spot on the best-seller list - a position it kept for 25 weeks. Indeed it became the biggest selling non fiction title in Brazil ever - selling in excess of 200,000 copies.

Outcome
The aftershock was immediate. In September 1985 the recently inaugurated President Sarney, Brazil’s first civilian president since 1964, signed the United Nations Convention Against Torture - a move many people argue was prompted by the revelations laid out in the book.

Some months later, the list of the 444 torturers was released, many of whom now held high positions throughout the country. Some were promptly fired; others had their career paths blocked.

The effects are still being felt today. In 1999 Brazilian medical associations began hearings to revoke the medical licences of doctors who took part in the torture of political prisoners between 1964 and 1985. While the amnesty of 1979 still prevents criminal charges being brought by the victims of torture against their perpetrators, those implicated by the book are now publicly known for their crimes. ‘Brasil - Nunca Mais’ revealed the true horror of those crimes, for the country and the rest of the world to see. This truth was for many people as strong as any justice.

Deaths: 150 - 300 (Lawrence Weschler’s book ‘A Miracle a Universe’)  
Cost of Involvement: $350,000

For more information:
Read Lawrence Weschler’s excellent account of the Nunca Mais project in ‘A Miracle a Universe - Settling Accounts with Torturers’ (University of Chicago Press, 1998). Also see the original ‘Nunca Mais’ book, published in English as ‘Torture in Brazil’ (University of Texas Press, 1998) for a complete picture of the extent of the torture carried out by the Brazilian junta over the years. For more information about the practice of torture worldwide see www.amnesty.org and www.stoptorture.org .

War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict

Oxford Research Group
1999 - 2000
Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights
Croatia

Background
Increasingly polarising nationalist and ethnic tensions were not only a cause but also a result of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Under the rule of Tito these tensions were largely suppressed but with his death in 1980 the future of the Serb-dominated federation, whose economy was rapidly collapsing, was cast into serious doubt as the ruling communist party (LCY) struggled to maintain control of the country. When in 1990 the LCY finally disintegrated, so too did Yugoslavia. In 1991 Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence, followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in 1992.

In Croatia (which had a Serb population of 12%) the Serb dominated Yugoslav army armed Croatian Serb militias and the situation escalated into civil war.

The fighting was heaviest in Eastern Croatia (especially in a region known as Eastern Slavonia), which saw some of the worst fighting in Europe since WWII. Lasting 10 months, the fighting ended in November 1991 when Croatia surrendered the area (30% of its territory) to the Serbs.

While a peace agreement between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 kept a full-scale war at bay, the entire area was massively destabilised by the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which raged on until 1995. In 1995 Croatia won back its lost territory, partly through a military offensive and partly through negotiation. Supervised by the UN this area was to be re-integrated into Croatia over a two-year period.

In Croatia (which had a Serb population of 12%) the Serb dominated Yugoslav army armed Croatian Serb militias and the situation escalated into civil war.

While peace had ostensibly returned to the area there was still much tension between the communities in the region. As one commentator noted, ‘the distrust between the two communities (Serb and Croat) is huge. Both Croats and Serbs think exclusively of each other as guilty, as the war criminals with whom joint living is no longer possible.’

Involvement
In 1991, in the midst of the war, Katarina Kruhonja and her friend Kruno Sukic set up the Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights. Situated in Osijek, one of the main cities in Eastern Croatia and thus the scene of very heavy fighting, the Centre has had an enormous impact on the lives of many of the citizens of the area. Their work over the years has ranged from human rights advocacy, peace education and legal advice to community development, psychosocial development and post-conflict reconciliation.

In 1998, the Centre, in association with the ‘Life and Peace Institute’ of Sweden, launched a new project entitled ‘Building a Democratic Society Based on the Culture of Non-violence.’ In its first year, the Centre identified and trained local men and women, who themselves had been victims of war, for the creation of multiethnic ‘Peace Teams’. These teams were charged with the promotion and strengthening of community based and community generated activities that would cultivate non-violence and reconciliation.

On the one hand, expelled populations were not returning and on the other, Croatian Serbs who had stayed in the region feared that Croat returnees would seek revenge. In addition, many of the Peace Teams received different types of threats from community members regarding their work, which was viewed initially with great suspicion.

Of the many projects that the seven peace teams have conducted in the area, the ‘Listening Project’ has had a demonstrable impact on reducing tensions which otherwise had the potential to escalate into violence.
The interviewers worked in multiethnic pairs. Each interviewer was trained in a variety of skills such as facilitation, giving encouraging non-verbal feedback, managing difficult and emotional situations and articulating appropriate questions and responses. The method of listening and posing questions was practiced through role plays, so that Peace Team members were prepared for potentially difficult situations. Before entering a community, the Peace Team would learn as much about the particular background to the area so that they were aware of and sensitive to any particular local issues that might impact on their work.

One particularly poignant example of their work in action is that of the village of Berak, a small mixed Serb-Croat village in East Slavonia. When the war started, the Serbs in the town put one fifth of the Croat population in concentration camps, where many were tortured. Many people were killed or went missing and have never been found. When the region was handed back to Croatia in 1995 most displaced Croats returned and the majority of Serbs, who were living in Berak during Serbian control, fled to Serbia. However the Serbs that stayed faced severe recriminations (especially over the issue of ‘missing’ Croats from the town) and tensions soon escalated resulting in the murder of a Serb in 1999. Fearing that the situation may spiral out of control, the Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights was called in by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to help.

Despite some initial resistance the Peace Teams visited both Serbian and Croatian homes and began listening to the fears, needs and hopes of the people. Despite some initial resistance the Peace Teams visited both Serbian and Croatian homes and began listening to the fears, needs and hopes of the people.

Outcome
The Listening Project managed to reach 90% of the families living in Berak. Over time Serbs and Croats started communicating through Peace Team members. Villagers slowly began to participate in community activities such as workshops for women and children.

The Peace Teams have also been successful in channelling pre-existing support structures provided by their centre in Osijek, such as legal aid, as well as Government run projects, to the people in the village. According to an OSCE representative the Listening Project in Berak was a breakthrough in the communication between a divided population. Since their intervention, no further violent incidences have been reported.

A recent evaluation of the work of the Centre for Peace Non Violence and Human Rights noted that it has been ‘extremely successful in placing Peace Teams in some of the most volatile communities in the region.’ It went onto say that ‘Active Listening’ has unleashed a series of community processes that are, ‘the foundation for future peacebuilding and community development initiatives in the region.’ and that it had ‘has helped people to begin to process the trauma of war and ethnic conflict.’
Background
In 1997, following the signing of the 14th peace accord and the holding of multiparty elections, the war in Liberia formerly came to an end. For almost eight years, ever since Charles Taylor’s ‘National Patriotic Front of Liberia’ invaded the country from neighbouring Ivory Coast with the aim of toppling the repressive government of Samuel Doe, the country had been locked in an extremely brutal civil war which claimed the lives of over 200,000 people and turned over half the entire country’s population into refugees.

One prominent characteristic of the war in Liberia was the widespread use of child soldiers, many of whom had been abducted. Some were as young as six years old. Estimates vary, but as many as 30,000 children may have fought in the war, during which time they were plied with marijuana and amphetamines and forced to commit unimaginable atrocities. One child reported that he had been forced to bayonet his pregnant sister in the stomach as part of his initiation into the militia.¹

Such grotesque practices were used to alienate the child from his family and community so that he had no choice but to remain with his militia. The tactic was successful. ‘Keep him,’ said one mother to a local humanitarian charity in response to their return of her child-soldier-son after the war. ‘We don’t want this monster in our house.’²

With the signing of the peace accord, the reintegration of these child soldiers back into society was seen to be one of the country’s biggest challenges. While many of these children returned to school, they were psychologically damaged, knowing little other than how to kill. Violent incidences escalated as children and teachers alike struggled with the task of building a sustainable peace. The consequence of failing was clear. ‘Those we fail to reach will end up in the streets, robbing and killing at will. They will be pariahs.’³

Involvement
In 1995 the Christian Health Association of Liberia (CHAL), with support from UNICEF, launched an extensive programme aimed at tackling the problem of violence in schools. CHAL’s aim was to enable students to take on the responsibility of building their own ‘world of peace, reconciliation and mutual co-existence’.⁴ This vision had already been given form through CHAL’s earlier work in several schools in the capital, Monrovia. Then, it was agreed that ‘conflict management committees’ made up of trained students should be set up in each school and that a senior staff member from each school serve as a supervisor for the committee. Sadly the work was seriously disrupted as successive accords failed to bring peace to the country.

As a measure of stability returned to the country, especially after the elections in 1997, CHAL and UNICEF quickly recommitted themselves to the project. They agreed that the process be split into three phases: awareness building, capacity building and implementation.

The first phase, ‘Awareness Building’, was designed to build support for the project from school and local authorities, which they saw as an essential first step. Activities included providing key people with an overview of the programme as well as conducting a three-day workshop for ten teachers from selected schools to help them better support each conflict management committee, known as the ‘Student Palaver Management Committee’ (SPMC).

‘Capacity Building’ involved a series of training programmes for seven students from each school who, as ‘peer mediators’, would form the backbone of the SPMC. The first half of the training aimed to help the students change their attitudes towards themselves, others and the conflict. Training modules included trauma awareness and healing, managing conflict related emotions, reconstructing self-concept and self-esteem and prejudice reduction. Exercises included learning how to mourn, story telling and role playing.

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¹

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⁴
Students were introduced to a variety of tools such as the Thomas-Kilman Conflict Mode Instrument - which helps people understand their own style for handling conflict situations - as well as other classic problem solving and mediation skills.

CHAL also selected and trained a further 25 students from each school in an intensive crisis management programme which enabled each class section to have at least one person ready to intervene should a situation escalate.

Once the training was complete, a room - fully furnished, equipped and funded by UNICEF - was set aside in each school which CHAL hoped would enable students to come to the Student Palaver Management Committee with their problems, before they turned violent.

The last phase of the programme, ‘implementation’ involved CHAL staff visiting participating schools to give encouragement to the students who had been recently trained. The SPMC managers from each school were also encouraged to form an association so that they could share insights, learn from each other and above all provide a support network for each other.

Outcome
When CHAL re-launched their work in 1997 the challenges were clear. An earlier assessment of the potential problem revealed that in the largest state school in the country, around 1,000 of its 2,400 students were former fighters from eight different factions in the war.

When the causes of the violence were investigated they ranged from name calling, perceived injustice and unrestrained violent tendencies. One former child soldier admitted taking a gun to school in order to ‘kill a friend who refused to take warning when I told him to stop calling me crazy.’

In total, around 400 teachers participated in the ‘awareness building’ workshops, 400 students in 40 schools became peer mediators and almost 2,000 students were trained in conflict management.

A strong element running through CHAL’s programme is the use of biblical stories to assist in the healing process. For instance as part of their ‘reconstructing self concept and self esteem’ module, CHAL returned to the creation story. ‘From this story,’ says Sam Gbaydee Doe, member of CHAL, ‘we draw the conclusion that humankind is imbued with immutable and intrinsic value, a worth that is never determined by criteria of our societies.’ He continues, ‘We emphasized that this self esteem and worth is deep within us. It is about the Spirit of God which was breathed into the nostrils of the first human person. We also tell the young people that this worth comes with a responsibility - to care for creation. To care for the world means to love and to do it no harm.’

The second half of the training provided students with tools and techniques for conflict transformation. Modules included understanding conflict, effective communication, coping with conflict through play, mediation skills and reconciliation.

Students were encouraged to form an association so that they could share insights, learn from each other and above all provide a support network for each other.

For more information:
See www.child-soldiers.org for information on the international campaign to ban the use of child soldiers.

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Internally displaced: 1,200,000
1996 (US Dept of State)

Refugees: 750,000
(US Dept of State)

Deaths: 150,000 battle related deaths
(Uppsala)

Cost of Involvement: $121,000 for three years
Background
One of the most virulent strains of the Lebanese civil war began in 1982 around the Mount Lebanon region and in particular the district known as the Shouf. This area - the southern end of Mt Lebanon - had over recent years become dominated by an Islamic community known as the Druze while a Christian group known as the Maronites controlled the larger Kesruan and Metn regions to the north.

With the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 the Christian Lebanese Forces (then allied to the Israelis) attempted to take control of the Shouf, fuelled by an old confrontation between the Maronites and Druze over land and political control of the region. In the last major confrontation between the two groups in 1860, 12,000 Christians were slaughtered, aided by Ottoman troops. To this day, some Lebanese Christians still talk bitterly of the madhabi al-sittin, the massacres of '60 and the Druze of the long Maronite domination since Lebanon's independence.

As the war in the Shouf intensified Christian and Druze villages that had hitherto enjoyed good relations were drawn into the conflict. Two such villages were Ramleh and Majd El Maoush. During the summer of 1982 Druze fighters attacked the predominantly Christian village of Majd El Maoush. Over 100 civilians were massacred at Majd El Maoush and very soon the entire village fled in terror, their homes quickly occupied by Druze refugees from other areas. It was only in 1993 that some of the Christian population returned. Since then, however, tensions between the two groups have been high.

Involvement
In 1999 the Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network (LCRN) decided to run a workshop on reconciliation and conflict resolution for members of both villages.

LCRN was established in Beirut in 1996 in order to ‘disseminate the knowledge and practice of conflict resolution, with the aim of strengthening national reconciliation, civic peace and stability in a culture of peaceful problem solving.'

By 1999 it had grown to include a network of over 30 Lebanese NGOs and its activities had broadened in scope to include producing publications, training and hands-on mediation.

LCRN’s methodology focused on three core stages: (1) re-establish lines of communication between the two villages; (2) instigate trust building measures; and (3) launch a series of joint projects to increase cooperation amongst the parties. Three potential target groups were considered: leaders of the villages, youth activists and school children. After much deliberation and research it was decided that LCRN would focus on the youth activists. The reasons were twofold: firstly, that in such a sensitive situation the likelihood of securing cooperation with the village leadership was slim; secondly, the ‘spillover’ or ‘multiplier’ effect was thought to have the greatest potential with the youth group.

The next stage was to identify two youth activists, one from each village, who would ‘recruit’ ten participants each to join the workshop. After some searching two young influential people were chosen. One was a Scout leader, the other an environmental activist. Following lengthy discussions the two leaders agreed to become ‘Partners’ in the process. This was a major stepping stone for LCRN, for without the full support and active partnership of these two people there would have been little chance of entering the community and finding willing participants for the workshop.

Soon the two youth activists had identified ten people from each village who were felt to have significant leverage within their peer group. The LCRN team insisted on meeting each and every one of the participants in their own environment and on their own. This was especially important since several of the youths were highly sceptical that such a workshop would achieve anything.

104 Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network 1999

Beirut
Syria
Israel
Towards the end of the two-day workshop, the group began to discuss possible ways in which they could work together once they returned to their villages. The environment, which had suffered enormously during the war, was seen as an issue that equally concerned and affected everyone. In particular Lebanon’s famous cedar forests had been decimated, much to the dismay of the entire country, and so it was agreed that the group should launch a cooperative environmental project. A coordination committee was elected to supervise the project which would include a joint reforestation program, a public awareness campaign, fire fighting strategy and planning meetings.

As the workshop drew to a close members of the group were asked for their honest feedback. Said one, ‘What happened is of great importance, thanks to LCRN. The State couldn’t do anything, neither could the municipality. It’s now our challenge to develop this initiative and take it to other villages.’

Another said, ‘The notion of “you vs. us” has become obsolete. The past of displacement and war is behind us, we hope this cooperation will continue.’

As Armen Balian, Director of LCRN recalls, ‘It took a lot of courage for the youths to attend this workshop. The first few hours were very tense.’

Outcome

The joint environmental project began in January 2000 and ran for four months. During this time other sections of both communities became involved, first younger school children, then elders and finally municipal leaders.

Importantly, the municipal leaders offered to pay all the costs of the reforestation program, sending a powerful message to both youth groups and to their own communities that cooperation between the villages was possible. In May the joint committee ran a firefighting public awareness day which attracted over 80 people from both villages.

The workshop and subsequent environmental project were the first of its kind involving the youth from the two villages and marked the beginning of a new era in their relationship. Furthermore the youth group continue to work together and have even organised several social events - again another first in almost 20 years. The work has also generated considerable local and national media attention, which LCRN members hope has shown other Lebanese villagers what can be achieved.
1946 - 1950
Moral Re-Armament
France and Germany

Background
The post war relationship between France and Germany was unimaginably bad. France had fought three wars with Germany in the past century, which had left deep physical and psychological scars. Under German occupation (1940 - 1945) the French had suffered a massive and prolonged humiliation.

Germany on the other hand, its people little more than enemy civilians under military occupation, was almost universally reviled, more so as the revelations about the Holocaust became clear through the Nuremberg trials. Furthermore, large parts of their country were destroyed with around 25% of the nation’s housing damaged beyond use; the German people faced malnutrition and they were denied movement within and outside their country. Indeed, even if they had managed to leave the country, virtually all other nations refused to issue visas to them.

Involvement
In 1946 a group of Swiss members of the ‘Moral Re-Armament’ movement (MRA) (see page 14 and 84), guided by the founder, Dr Frank Buchman, set in motion the process of reconciliation between France and Germany. Ostensibly to discuss labour management relations and inter-class reconciliation MRA organised a series of conferences at their new centre, known as Caux, overlooking Lake Geneva. This marked the first time senior French and Germans had met following the war.

Through well-placed MRA members in the Swiss, American, British and French governments, entry and exit permits for all German participants were arranged. This, on the German side this included Konrad Adenauer, then Chairman of the Parliamentary council, and over 82 key government officials. The French contingent was similarly impressive and included the most influential of statesmen, Robert Schuman, who maintained close contact with MRA founder Frank Buchman throughout this period.

Three of MRA’s central principles were used with remarkable effect at Caux during these years. They were:

(a) the centrality of the individual - that in every situation there were one or two key people who held the key -
(b) peacemakers had to start the process of peace-making and reconciliation with themselves - that one’s own experience was an essential element in helping people filled with hate to become free,
(c) the centrality of the experience of forgiveness - that the process of repentance, asking for and accepting forgiveness for personal and community or national wrongs, liberates all.¹

An example of these principles in action can be seen in the case of Madame Laure, French Member of Parliament. As a member of the French resistance, she wanted nothing more than the total destruction of Germany. Her son had suffered extreme brutality at the hands of the Gestapo and yet through her experiences at Caux in 1947, through talking about her feelings of hatred and anger towards Germans and through apologising to them for this hatred at the conference, she underwent a profound change.
The barriers that were broken down and the relationships built at Caux were also a highly significant factor in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), fore-runner of the EU. The aim of the ECSC, unveiled as the ‘Schuman Plan’ in 1950, was to ‘make war impossible’ by jointly managing the building blocks of the arms industry. As Edward Luttwak comments, in Schuman’s eyes it was the ‘device which would embody both a guarantee of non-aggression and the promise of full reconciliation’.

That top level officials from the coal and steel industries from both Germany and France were present at Caux on numerous occasions, and that they had developed warm relations over these years, was a decisive factor in the success of the ECSC negotiations.

Outcome
In 1946, on a victory tour of war devastated Europe, Winston Churchill gave a speech in Zurich which shocked his audience: ‘If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, and indeed from final doom, there must be an act of faith in the European family. The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. But I must give you warning. Time may be short. The fighting has stopped; but the dangers have not stopped. We must begin now.’

So soon after the war, such thoughts of reconciliation were inconceivable. At a time when virtually no major initiatives were taken to bring together these two bitter enemies, MRA achieved something of almost incalculable significance; what Luttwak calls, ‘one of the greatest achievements in the entire record of modern statecraft’.

When Frank Buchman died, the German Government Bulletin wrote that ‘the foundations of the understanding between Germany and France were laid by the first meetings between Germans and French at Caux.’ Ultimately, MRA’s greatest achievement lies in the myriad of personal transformations and the relationships that were forged at Caux.

The profound personal transformation of Madame Laure, what Joseph Montville in ‘The Psychodynamics of International Relationships’ singles out as ‘perhaps the signature event in terms of psychological breakthroughs in the Franco-German conflict’ and ‘one of the most dramatic examples of the power of a simple appeal for forgiveness’ was by no means unique. ‘I am accustomed to international conferences’ said Robert Schuman at one Caux conference session. ‘They usually end with great disappointments. Here we find nothing but satisfaction and great hope. I will never give up.’

For more information
Read Edward Luttwak’s account of the MRA/Caux meetings in Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (Oxford University Press, 1994). See also the books of Michael Henderson published by Grosvenor Books which cover a range of issues from the activities of MRA over the years to inspiring stories of forgiveness and reconciliation. Also see www.mra.org.uk, www.caux.ch and www.afr.org.uk for more about MRA’s work.

For Madame Laure, Caux became her Damascus and she, along with her husband who died in 1960, spent the next 40 years travelling the world carrying her message of personal apology, forgiveness and reconciliation. In Germany alone they spoke at over 200 meetings, addressing 10 out of the 11 state parliaments. Her relentless bridge-building between France and Germany was praised by Konrad Adenauer who said that she and her husband ‘had done more in the past 15 years than any other two people to build unity between age old enemies.’

Speaking to six hundred people at Caux, she said ‘I have so hated Germany that I wanted to see her erased from the map of Europe. But I have seen here that my hatred is wrong. I am sorry and I wish to ask the forgiveness of all the Germans present.’

Peter Peterson, later to become a member of the German Parliament, had been ready to answer back if Madame Laure attacked the Germans. But as he said later ‘I was dumbfounded. We knew, my friends and I, that she had shown us the only way open to Germany if we wanted to join in the reconstruction of Europe.’

This marked the first time senior French and Germans had met following the war.
What leaps out from the pages is how personal are the processes which bring about peace. How slow and painstaking they are, how unglamorous and undramatic. The stories repeatedly describe people who, full of suspicion and trepidation, finally agree to get together in workshops or meetings, and talk to people whom they hate or fear. They describe the methods and techniques that worked – brainstorming sessions, training in communication, mediation techniques, role-plays, dialogue and just plain listening. Not the stuff of high drama.

Yet under conditions of war, these actions require courage of a high order. The initiatives recorded here are exactly those which, under a regime of terror, are reason enough for abduction, torture or murder. In 1993 in Colombia, for example, six key members of the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights were assassinated, simply for defending the rights of activists. In Buenos Aires three of the mothers of the disappeared were abducted and killed for attempting to place an advertisement in the national newspaper.

In the story of Brazil, Paolo had been teaching poor people how to stick together, and within 48 hours was abducted, tortured and killed. Yet it is perfectly ordinary people who do these extraordinary things, often with no training, usually making it up as they go along.

The lessons we shall draw here do not pretend to be an academic evaluation; that has been most ably carried out elsewhere (see bibliography). What follows is merely a common sense drawing out of some of the main points which emerge.

To meet and talk about peace, when others can see only violence as the solution, is no wimpish activity. To sit down with the enemy can be an act of extreme bravery, and even to carry out the preparations to enable that to happen requires the conquering of personal fear. Although not much is said explicitly in these pages about the personal struggles of individuals, the proof of those struggles is abundantly evident.

The Dinka and Nuer chiefs in the Sudan listened to each other’s stories for three full days “as though they were peeling back layer upon layer of pain and discovering afresh that at their core they are from one family” (page 52).

The women of Wajir had to overcome even the killing of a member of their own family in their commitment to keeping the peace committees going (page 62). In the Lebanon, it was youth activists from Christian and Druze villages at war who overcame their scepticism to enrol other youngsters to come to a workshop (page 104).

Key figures in the Tajikistan civil war agreed to meet, “to listen carefully, to speak from the heart and respect the sensitivities of others” (page 78).

The support of outsiders is often critical in ensuring the physical and psychological survival of those who dare to do this work. The witness of international NGOs like Peace Brigades International was essential to those in Columbia who were willing to risk their lives to defend human rights (page 54). In Nicaragua it was American citizens who volunteered their presence to deter Contra attacks (page 46).
Nearly one half of the interventions were carried out by people with some spiritual basis for their activities. This is remarkable, considering that in our selection process religious or spiritual affiliation played no part. Yet again and again, the factor named by participants as being central to their effectiveness is a sense of direction inspired by some connection with a source of strength greater than their own ego. The approach of Moral Rearmament, for example, is explicit; it is to “engender a heightened spiritual sensitivity in both parties and to thereby induce them to enter into a genuine and deep dialogue” (page 14).

A slow steady process of trust-building is often necessary before official negotiations can start, if they are to succeed. The work of the Vatican in the Beagle Channel dispute is a good example of this, as is the Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts Task Force in Tajikistan, the Lutheran World Federation in Guatemala, the Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network, and many others.

Business has a powerful role to play. In two examples from South Africa it was industrialists who provided both the incentive and the techniques to enable violent opposition groups to work towards ending the killing. Business leaders in El Salvador organised a ‘goods for guns’ scheme, which was so successful that by the end of the second weekend almost $103,000 worth of vouchers had been given out when the organisers had only $19,500 in the bank. The President intervened to provide enough money to continue and expand the programme (page 32).

Traditional processes can be of key importance in peace making. Somali people for example place a high value on poetry, which in a nomadic society is as important as radio or television, addressing all aspects of Somali life. The traditional elders therefore brought in poets as well as religious leaders to reconcile warring clans (page 36).

For this work to be extended, far more evaluation needs to be done. Even the best funded organisations don’t write up what they do. Robert Ricigliano, CEO of the Conflict Management Group, wrote to us: “Reflecting on our work is something we do too little of …we are much better at doing it than documenting what we have done.”

Women frequently offer the ingredients essential to the establishment of peace, particularly in addressing the feelings involved. This is implicit in several of the stories, and explicit in the cases of the Liberian Women’s Initiative, the Somali women, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Wajir Peace Group, where Dekha Ibrahim Abdi says: “Most of what was accomplished was done by people with a heart for peace, rather than training in conflict resolution.” (page 62).

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What can be learned from these stories?

The effectiveness of NGO work in this field has increased dramatically, but it should not become a replacement for government action. A multi-track approach can often be more effective than either a government or NGO on its own. The case of St Egidio in Mozambique, and the ‘Norwegian model’ used by FAFO in its work with Israelis and Palestinians, are good illustrations of this point. Likewise in Mali the Norwegian government funded an NGO that knew what it was doing through a long-term involvement in the area (page 90).

The interventions described in this book are extraordinarily cost-effective. The maximum cost is $4 million for a series of meetings bringing together thousands of senior figures from France and Germany after World War II, laying foundations for the unification of Europe, and the minimum is $2,700 for community level conflict resolution bringing about peace in an area of Sierra Leone.

When we compare this to the cost of military intervention, the result is stark. NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 cost approximately $4,000,000,000, in addition to the $20 - $30 billion then needed to rebuild what was destroyed, and leaving the problems of Kosovo and the dictatorship of Milosevic unsolved.

The issue however is not simply the level of funding accorded to non-violent initiatives, but the way in which it is disbursed, to make sure it reaches those who are competent, well organised and determined.

For every one of these successful interventions, many others failed for lack of funds or resources. It is for that reason that the Oxford Research Group is setting up a fund to link grassroots groups at the cutting edge of conflict with each other, and with sources of support.

This initiative is called “Give Peace a Bank”. It will enable those in strife-torn areas to learn what has been successful elsewhere, instead of reinventing the wheel. It will provide simple invaluable resources like mobile phones and photocopiers. It will enable effective initiatives, such as those described in these pages, to be multiplied.

If you would like to contribute to Give Peace a Bank, cheques should be made out to ‘Oxford Research Group’ and sent to 51 Plantation Road, Oxford, OX2 6JE, or see our website www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk for online contributions.
After extensive reading, we contacted 240 organisations world-wide requesting information on initiatives undertaken by them. Some were unable to send anything, some sent a few notes, some sent several books. The stories have been compiled making every effort to combine accuracy, balance and a sense of the immediacy of the tasks undertaken.

Wherever possible, each case was checked with the source, requested changes have been made, and references included as fully as possible. Our criteria for inclusion was that the story should be an example of an intervention in a situation of imminent or actual violence, producing a significant if not decisive impact, rather than a longer-term peace-building activity. The focus is therefore quite specific, concentrating on preventing, stopping or healing violence, rather than on transforming the conditions which produced the violence, which can take decades.

We are grateful to all those who gave precious time and advice. Organisations like International Alert, Responding to Conflict, the Forum On Early Warning and Early Response, the International Crisis Group and others all undertake remarkable work in advocacy, research, analysis or training, but stories of their work are not included here, because their main focus is not on intervention.

The people who do this work are modest. When trying to pin down a case history from the Centre for Conflict Resolution in South Africa, the manager there said to us “The image in my mind is that of a river. As it takes many streams to form a river, so with all major conflicts at national and regional level. Our inputs at many levels are streams that feed into bigger processes. For this reason it is difficult to identify events where we can claim to have managed a complete process and delivered an outcome.”

This is true of many people doing this work, who agree that to prevent or resolve a conflict, a ‘multi track’ process is needed working all the way from the grassroots to the top leadership, and sometimes the other way round.

By highlighting the work of a single organisation in each story, we do not mean to suggest that it was the only organisation involved or indeed that it was the most important. In literally all of the cases featured, a myriad of state and non-state actors were involved. Our aim was to highlight examples of those who had a significant, if not decisive, role in the conflict in question. There are many, many other stories we would like to be able to tell, and we hope that this book will be the first in a series.

In this volume we thought it useful to distinguish the stories by virtue of whether the intervention took place before any violence had actually broken out, while violence was escalating, during full-blown violence, when violence had been contained, or in a post-conflict stage. We have used different colours to indicate these distinctions. However, because conflicts tend to be cyclical, much post-conflict work is actually also preventive in nature; therefore these distinctions are certainly not rigid. In order to summarise the cases, and to show at a glance what worked at what stage in a conflict and how much it cost, we have included a poster-size matrix at the back of this volume.

Our intention throughout has been to highlight the heroic work of those who have neither the time to tell their stories themselves nor in some cases the where withal to seek funds to extend their work.
Footnotes

Before any violence
Committee for the Protection of Peoples Dignity, Nigeria, 2000 (p.10)
1. According to a recent World Bank study, 23% of countries where at least 1/4 of the economy depends on exports of primary commodities experience violent conflict. Conversely, countries with no exports of primary commodities have less than 1% chance of violent conflict. The link - that countries which depend heavily on natural resources for their income remain underdeveloped (since governments are reluctant to invest in education or industry) and more prone to corruption and conflict - can be seen most clearly in Nigeria.
2. Personal communication with Peter Claver Oparah, October 10th 2000.
3. Internal COPPDPD document.

East West Institute, Serbia / Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1999 - 2000 (p.12)
3. ICG briefing August 2000. See www.crisisweb.org
4. This echoed polls conducted by a variety of organisations, including the Center for Policy Studies in Belgrade, which showed that 80% of Serbian people cited improved relations with the West as the top policy priority for the country.
5. ICG briefing August 2000. See www.crisisweb.org

Moral Re-Armament, India, 1967 - 1972 (p.14)
4. Ibid pp.55.
5. Quoted in A Sign of Hope, op cit, p.8.


Saferwater, Europe, 1992 - 2001+ (p.18)
2. Saferwater was joined by other UK non governmental organisations such as the British American Security Information Council (BASIC).
4. Taken from Davis, Ian. 'Development of a EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports' in a forthcoming book under consideration by SIPRI/GO. The Regulation of arms and dual-use exports by EU member states: a comparative analysis of Germany, Sweden and the UK.
5. Ibid.

The Holy See, Argentina and Chile, 1978 - 84 (p.20)

Saint Xavier's Social Service Society, India, 1991, (p.22)
1. See page 24.
2. See the analysis of St Xavier's Social Service Society by Collaborative for Development Action. www.cdadinc.com
3 - 6. Ibid.

Escalating Violence
City Montessori School, India, 1992 (p.24)
1. As quoted in India's City Montessori School Educates World Citizens' in People Building People - 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Utrecht 1999, p.278.
2. Government figures submitted to the Sriksitama Commission on the riots in Bombay.
3. As quoted in India's City Montessori School Educates World Citizens', op cit.

The Mediation Network, Northern Ireland, 1995 (p.28)

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Estonia, 1993 (p.28)
2. OSCE HCNM mandate see www.osce.org/hcnm/mmandate.htm

Partners for Democratic Change, Hungary, 1996-1998 (p.30)
1 'Roma' is the collective term for 'Gypsies' - a name now considered pejorative.
4 - 6. Ibid.

1. See briefing paper on Light Weapons by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), www.basicint.org
3. Ibid.
Project on Ethnic Relations, Romania, 1991 - 2001+ (p.34)
4. From a presentation delivered by Allen Kassof to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars East European Studies Dept on Jan12th 2000 entitled Mediating inter-ethnic relations: successes and failures in the new Europe, Meeting report #190.
5. Handelman, Louise. 'Negotiating Peace - Project on Ethnic Relations teaches compromise', op cit.
6. ibid.
7. Email communication with Allen Kassof.
8. Handelman, Louise. 'Negotiating Peace - Project on Ethnic Relations teaches compromise', op cit.

Full blown violence

The Borama Process, Somalia, 1991 - 1993 (p.36)
Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, Lebanon, 1984 (p.38)
1. The Maronites belong to the Patriarchate of Antioch, one of the four Eastern Christian traditions that hold the Pope as the head of the Church.
3. ibid p.50.
4. ibid p.51.
5. ibid p.33.
6. Taken from CIDCM publicity. See www.bidso.umd.edu\ldivid\ldivThe Community of Sant Edigio, Mozambique, 1989 - 1992 (p.40)
5. ibid p.199.
6. Taken from CICDM publicity. See www.bidso.umd.edu\ldivid\ldivThe Community of Sant Edigio, Mozambique, 1989 - 1992 (p.40)
5. ibid p.199.
6. Taken from CICDM publicity. See www.bidso.umd.edu\ldivid\ldivThe Community of Sant Edigio, Mozambique, 1989 - 1992 (p.40)
Lutheran World Federation, Guatemala, 1988 - 1996 (p.48)
1. Taken from Costello, Patrick. 'Historical Background in Negotiating Rights, the Guatemalan Peace Process, ACCORD - an International Review of Peace Initiatives, Conciliation Resources (www.c-rc.org).
2. ibid.
5. Personal email communication with Leopoldo Nikus.
8. Jeffrey, Paul 'Ecumenical effort, without headlines, paved the way to peace' op cit.
9. ibid.
11. ibid.
Natal Chamber of Industries, South Africa, 1989 - 1990 (p.50)
1. Interview with Steve Simpson, 9th May 2001.
2. - 3. ibid
New Sudan Council of Churches, Sudan, 1999 - 2001+ (p.52)
2. Lowrey, William 'A Flicker of Hope in Sudan' See: http://members.tripod.com/~Sudaninfonet/Nuer-Dinka/Flicker.html
3. - 5. ibid
Peace Brigades International, Colombia, 1997 - 2001 (p.29)
1. For background information on La Violencia see page 56.
2. Lowrey, William 'A Flicker of Hope in Sudan'. See: http://members.tripod.com/~Sudaninfonet/Nuer-Dinka/Flicker.html
5. Personal email communication with Leopoldo Nikus.
8. Jeffrey, Paul 'Ecumenical effort, without headlines, paved the way to peace' op cit.
9. ibid.
11. ibid.

Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado, Colombia, 1997 (p.56)
1. Author unknown. Taken from 'Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado', May 1999. Available online at www.colombiasupport.net.
3. As quoted on Oxfam web site www.oxfam.org.uk/peace\ldiv\ldivconflict
The Quakers, Nigeria, 1967 - 1970 (p.58)
1. While there is no precise definition for the term 'political violence' it can best be described as 'violent behaviour which is intended in some way to influence the political process'. For a brief overview of the various definitions of the term 'political violence' see pp 9-10 of Peter Gastrow's book The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts - Theory and Cases, Dartmouth Publishing, Hampshire, 1990, p.21.
3. ibid p.50.
4. ibid p.51.
5. ibid p.33.
6. Taken from CIDCM publicity. See www.bidso.umd.edu\ldivid\ldivThe Community of Sant Edigio, Mozambique, 1989 - 1992 (p.40)

Wajir Peace and Development Committee, Kenya, 1992-1995 (p.52)
3. Ibid, p.46.

Witness for Peace, Nicaragua, 1983 - 1990 (p.62)
2. Ibid, p.74.

Women’s Groups, Somalia, 1991-2001+ (p.66)

**Contained violence**

**Action Aid Burundi, Burundi, 1993 - 2001+ (p.68)**
3. Ibid, section 2, Point 7.1.
5. Dood, Robert. Peace building in Burundi: An evaluation of the contribution made by ActionAid Burundi to peace and reconciliation in the province of Ruyigi, op cit, Section 1, Point 3.

3. Ibid, p.357.

**Amnesty International, Turkey, 1990 - 2000 (p.72)**

**Christian Peacemaker Teams, The Occupied Territories, 1995 - 1999 (p.74)**
5. Ibid.
7. Quoted in Miller, Joseph. ‘History of Mennonite Peacebuilding’ in Lederach, John Paul & Sampson, Cynthia From the Ground Up - Mennonite Contributions to International Peacebuilding, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p.27.

**Conflict Management Group, Peru / Ecuador, 1995 - 1998, (p.76)**
2. Ibid, p.11.


**FAFO Institute for Applied Social Sciences, Israel & the Occupied Territories, 1989 - 1993, (p.80)**
4. Ibid, p.175.

JAMAA, Burundi, 1994 - 2000, (p.82)
1. For background information on the conflict in Burundi see page 68 and 92.
5 - 6. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

**Moral Re-armament, Zimbabwe, 1974 - 1980, (p.84)**
1. Interview with Joram Kucherera, Johannesburg Sunday Times, 8 Nov 1992, p.2.
4. Kandodera later became Treasurer of the ANC, and through Alec Smith met Ian Smith many times. After meeting Kandodera for the first time, Ian Smith said to his son ‘Alec I really want to thank you for bringing Arthur (and Gladys) here. If all black nationalists were like him, I’d have no trouble handing the country over tomorrow’ (p.85 Smith, Alec. Now I Call Him Brother, Marshall, Morgan & Scott publishers, Basingstoke, Hants, 1984.) He was assassinated in 1978 just before putting the finishing touches to a peace plan that he had masterminded between Smith, Mugabe and Nkomo.
8. Kraybill, Ron. ‘Transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The role of religious actors’ op cit, p.211.
50 stories of people resolving conflict

War prevention works:

2000.

3. Participant, as featured in LCRN newsletter, Fall 2000.

Executive Director of LCRN, 16th Jan 2001.

4. Personal communication with Armen Balian, Antioch, one of the four Eastern Christian traditions that hold the Pope as the head of the Church.

Verapaz, 1982, p.100, ibid.


Witness, India, 1998, (p.96)


2. ibid p.1.


6. ‘QuickTime’ is a software programme that allows footage to be downloaded and played on a computer in a relatively short space of time.

7. Thacker, Shane. ‘Videos bear witness to human rights abuses’ op cit.

8. Transcript of interview with Michael Stipe as featured on NBC’s ‘News of the week’ April 3rd 2001.

Search For Common Ground, Burundi, 1995 - 1999, (p.92)


3. Personal correspondence with Francis Roll.

Sulima Fishing Community Development Project, Sierra Leone, 1997 - 2001+, (p.94)


Christian Health Association of Liberia, Liberia, 1997 - 1999, (p.102)


2. Quoted in Purvis, Andrew. ‘Beware the Children - Civil war has spawned a legion of young warriors who must now learn to discover their childhood’ in Time Magazine, December 4th, 1995.

3. ibid.

4. Evaluation of CHAL work.

5. ibid.


7. CHAL evaluation.

Lebanon Conflict Resolution Network, Lebanon, 1999, (p.104)

1. The Maronites belong to the Patriarchate of Antioch, one of the four Eastern Christian traditions that hold the Pope as the head of the Church.

2. LCRN Promotional literature, “THE LCRN PROFILE”.


4. Personal communication with Armen Balian, Executive Director of LCRN, 16th Jan 2001.

5. Participant, as featured in LCRN newsletter, Fall 2000.

6. ibid.
Organisations profiled

Groups from the 50 stories listed alphabetically

Academic Associates PeaceWorks
9 Esomo Close, Ikeja, Lagos, Nigeria. Contact: Judith Burdin Asuni, Director. Tel: +234 17743203. Email: aapeaceworks@yahoo.com Web: www.aapeaceworks.org

ActionAid Burundi
BP 2170, Bujumbura, Burundi. Contact: Samuel Braimah, Director Tel: +257 226393. Fax: +257 226791. Email: aab@cni.cbinf.com Web: www.actionaid.org

American Friends Service Committee (Quakers)
1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102, USA. Tel: +1 215 241 7000. Fax: +1 215 241 7275. Email: afsccinfo@afsc.org Web: www.afsc.org

Amnesty International
1 Easton Street, London WC1X 8OJ, UK. Tel: +44 (0)171 413 5500/ Fax: +44 (0)171 956 11 57/ Email: amnestysis@amnesty.org Web: www.amnesty.org

Archdiocese of São Paulo
Av. Higienópolis, 890 – Higienópolis, 01238-908 – São Paulo, SP Brazil. Tel: +55 11 3826 0133. Fax: +55 11 3825 6806. Email: vicariatocom@uol.com.br Web: www.archidiocese-sp.org.br/

Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo
Hipólito Yrigoyen 1442 (1089), Buenos Aires, Argentina. Tel: +54 11 43830377. Fax: +54 11 49540381. Email: madres@ Datatting.com Web: www.madres.org

Center for International Development and Conflict Management
University of Maryland, 0145 Tydings Hall, College Park, Maryland 20742 - 7231, USA. Contact: Ernest J Wilson, Director. Tel: +1 301 314 7703. Fax: +1 301 314 9256. Email: cismm@bsis.udm.edu Web: www.bsos.udm.edu/cidcm

Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights
Zupanijska 7, HR-31000, Osijek, Croatia. Contact: Branka Kasej, Executive Director. Tel: +385 31 206 886. Fax: +385 31 206 889. Email: czmos@zamir.net Web: http://www.zamir.net/~czmos

Christian Health Association of Liberia
P.O. Box 10-9056, 7th Street, Sinkor, 1000 Monrovia, Liberia. Contact: James Nagbe Doe, Coordinator, Healing and Reconciliation Unit. Tel: +231 226187. Fax: +231 226823. Email: chal@liberia.net

Christian Peacemaker Teams
P.O. Box 6508, Chicago, Illinois 60680, USA. Contact: Gene Stoltzfus, Director. Tel: +1 312 455 1199. Fax: +1 312 432 1213. Email: cpt@igc.org Web: www.prairienet.org/cpt/

City Montessori School, Lucknow
12 Station Road, Lucknow, UP 26001, India. Tel: +91 522 215 483. Fax: +91 522 212 888. Contact: Dr Bharti Gandhi, Director. Email: info@cmsgeducation.org Web: www.cmsgeducation.org

Coalition of Grassroots Women’s Organisations (COGWO)
P.O. Box 71135, Nairobi, Kenya. Tel: +254 212 121 5048. Email: cogwo@compuserve.com

Committee for the Protection of Peoples Dignity (COPPED)
9 Bayo Shodipo Street, Off Afsisman Drive, Anifowoshe, Ikeja, Lagos, Nigeria. Contact: Peter Cleave Opara, Director. Email: copped@usa.net Web: www.copped.org

Community of Sant’Egidio
Piazza Sant’Egidio 3/a, 00153 Rome, Italy. Contact: Fr Matteo Maria Zuppi, Tel: +39 06 585 661. Fax: +39 06 580 0197. Email: info@santegidio.org Web: www.santegidio.org/

Consejo de Iglesias Pro-Alianza Denominacional (CEPAD)
Apartado 3091, Managua, Nicaragua. Contact: Ms. Damaris Albuquerque, Executive Director. Tel: +505 266 4628. Fax: +505 266 4236. Email: cepad1@ibw.com.ni Web: www.cepad.org.ni/

Conflict Management Group
The Roger Fisher House, 9 Waterhouse Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA. Contact: Michael DeKoster, Operations Manager. Tel: +1 617 354 5444. Fax: +1 617 354 8467. Email: dekoster@cmgroup.org Web: www.cmgroup.org/

Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts Taskforce
c/o The Kettering Foundation, 200 Commons Road, Dayton, OH 45459, USA. Contact: Harold Saunders, Director of International Affairs. Tel: +1 937 434 7300. Fax: +1 937 439 9804. Email: comments@kettering.org Web: www.kettering.org/

East West Institute
Prague Centre, 78/2000 Rasímov, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic. Contact: Aleksandar Lojpur, Coordinator, Task Force on FRY. Tel: +420 22198 4222. Fax: +420 22491 7854. Email: alojpur@iews.cz Web: www.iews.cz/frfy/index2.html

FAFO Institute for Applied Social Sciences
P.O. Box 2947, Toyen, N-0608 Oslo, Norway. Tel: +47 220 88600. Fax: +47 220 88700. Email: fafo@fafo.no Web: www.fafo.no/engelsk/

JAMAA
Contact: Adrien Tuyaga Email: adrientuyaga@hotmail.com

Liberian Women’s Initiative
11 Broad Street, PO BOX 1063, Monrovia, Liberia. Contact: Etweda Cooper, Secretary General. Tel: +231 227 095

Lutheran World Federation
50, route de Ferney, Case postale 2100, CH-1211 Genève 2, Switzerland. Tel: +41 22 791 6111. Fax: +41 22 791 6630. Email: info@lutheranworld.org Web: www.lutheranworld.org/
War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict

**Mediation Network for Northern Ireland**
10 Upper Crescent, Belfast BT7 1NT, Northern Ireland, UK. Contact: Peter O’Reilly, Development Manager. Tel: +44 (0)28 9043 8614. Fax: +44 (0)28 9031 4430. Email: peteroreilly@mediation-network.org.uk Web: www.mediatonetwork.org.uk

**Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHAG)**
6a Calle 7-70, Zona 1, Guatemala 01001, Apartado Postal 723, Guatemala. Contact: Claudia Agreda. Tel: +502 232 4604. Fax: +502 232 8384. Email: remhi@odhag.org.gt Web: www.odhag.org.gt/

**OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCMN)**
P.O. Box 20062, 2500 EB, The Hague, The Netherlands. Contact: Max van der Stoel, High Commissioner on National Minorities. Tel: +31 70 312 5500. Fax: +31 70 363 5910. Email: hcnm@hcmn.org Web: www.osce.org/hcnm/

**Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHAG)**
6a Calle 7-70, Zona 1, Guatemala 01001, Apartado Postal 723, Guatemala. Contact: Claudia Agreda. Tel: +502 232 4604. Fax: +502 232 8384. Email: remhi@odhag.org.gt Web: www.odhag.org.gt/

**Peace Brigades International (PBI)**
5 Caledonian Road, London N1 9DX, UK. Contact: Helen Yuill, International Coordinator. Tel: +44 (0)20 7713 0392. Fax: +44 (0)20 7837 2290. Email: pbio@gn.apc.org Web: www.peacebrigades.org

**Project on Ethnic Relations (PER)**
15 Chambers Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08542-3718, USA. Contact: Allen Kassof, President. Tel: +1 609 683 5666. Fax: +1 609 683 5688. Email: ethnic@compuserve.com Web: www.per-usa.org/

**Search for Common Ground**
1601 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 200, Washington DC 20009, USA. Contact: Susan Collin Marks, Executive Director. Tel: +1 202 265 4300. Fax: +1 202 232 6718. Email: search@sfcg.org Web: www.sfcg.org

**South African Council of Churches**
PO Box 4921, Johannesburg 2000, South Africa. Tel: +27 11 492 1380. Fax: +27 11 492 1448. Email: info@sacc.org.za Web: www.sacc.org.za/

**St Xavier’s Social Service Society - Ahmedabad**
Post Box 4088, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad 380009, Gujarat, India. Contact: Father Cedric Prakash, Director. Tel: +91 79 7417654 or 79 495238. Fax: +91 79 6426362. Email: cprakash@ad1.vsnl.net.in

**Witness Lawyers Committee for Human Rights**
333 Seventh Avenue, 13th Floor, New York, NY 10001, USA. Contact: Gillian Caldwell, Director. Tel: +1 212 845 5243. Fax: +1 212 845 5299. Email: witness@lchr.org Web: www.witness.org

**Witness for Peace**
1229 15th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005, USA. Contact: Steve Bennett, Executive Director. Tel: +1 202 588 1471. Fax: +1 202 588 1472. Email: witness@witnessforpeace.org Web: www.witnessforpeace.org
Organisations contacted

Other useful organisations listed alphabetically

Abraham Fund, 477 Madison Avenue, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10022, USA.

AC Génocide Cirimoso (Burundi), B.P. 600 Bujumbura, Burundi.

ACCORD, c/o University of Durban-Westville, Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000, South Africa.

ACORD, Dean Bradley House, 52 Horseferry Road, London SW1P 2AF, United Kingdom.

African Dialogue Center for Conflict Management and Development, Arusha International Conference Centre, Serengeti Wing, Room 628/629, Arusha, Tanzania.

African National Congress (ANC), PO Box 922, Peshawar, Pakistan.

African Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Network, P.O.Box 61884, Marshalltown 2107, South Africa.

African Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Network, P.O.Box 63560, Nairobi, Kenya.

Albert Einstein Institution, 427 Newbury Street, Boston, MA 02115-1801, USA.

All Africa Conference of Churches, P.O. Box 14205, Nairobi, Kenya.

American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102, USA.

Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, Apartado 8-6410-1000, San José, Costa Rica.

ASEAN, 70A Jl. Sisingamangaraja, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia.

Balkans Initiative, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC20036-3011, USA.

Balkans Peace Teams International (BPT), Ringstr. 9a, D-32427 Minden, Germany.

Bangladesh Interreligious Council for Peace & Justice (BICPAJ), 14/20, Iqbal Road, Mohammadpur, Dhaka-1207, Bangladesh.

Berghof Centre for the Constructive Management of Conflict, Altensteinstrasse 48a, 14195 Berlin, Germany.

Bonn International Centre for Conversation, An der Elisabethkirche 25, 53113 Bonn, Germany.

British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Lafone House, 11-13 Leathermarket Street, London SE1 3HN, UK.

Cambodian Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cambodia Development Resource Institute, P.O. Box 622, Phnom Penh 1, Cambodia.

Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation, Cambodia Development Resource Institute, P.O. Box 622, Phnom Penh 1, Cambodia.

Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Ashmun Street (near corner Mechlins Street), P.O. Box 10-3569, 1000 Monrovia 10, Liberia.

Catholic Relief Services, GPO Box 1657, Islamabad 46000, Pakistan.

CDR Associates, 100 Arapahoe Avenue, Suite 12, Boulder, Colorado 80302, USA.

Center for Civil Society International (CCSI), 2929 NE Blakeley Street, Seattle, WA 98105, USA.

Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), National Insurance Building, Pilkington Road, P.O. Box 5211, Kampala, Uganda.

Center for Nonviolent Action, P.O. Box 31603, Jerusalem 91163, Israel.

Center for Nonviolent Communication (CNVC), P.O. Box 2662, Sherman, Texas 75091-2662, USA.

Center for Preventive Action (CPA), Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021, USA.

Center for Preventive Diplomacy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1800 K Street NW, Washington D.C. 20006, USA.

Centre for Conflict Analysis, Department of Politics and International Relations c/o Rutherford College, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury CT2 7NX, United Kingdom.

Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, 7700 Rondebosch, South Africa.

Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR-Kenya), PO Box 16389, Nakuru, Kenya.

Centre for Conflict Resolution (CENCOR), P.O. Box 33, Legon, Accra, Ghana.

Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK.

Centre for Development Research, Gammel Kongevej 5, DK - 1610 Copenhagen V, Denmark.

Centre for the Study and Management of Conflict, Leninsky Prospekt 32a, Moscow 117 334, Russia.

Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), P O Box 30778, Braamfontein, Johannesburg, 2017, South Africa.

Centre for World Indigenous Studies, 1001 Cooper Pt. Rd. S.W. Suite 214, Olympia, WA. 98502, USA.

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Fantofftvegen 38, 5036 Fantoff, Norway.

Church of the Brethren, 500 Main St, PO Box 188, New Windsor, MD 21776-0188, USA.

Clonard Monastery, Clonard Gardens, Belfast BT13 2RL, Northern Ireland.

Coalition of Grassroots Women’s Organizations (COGWO), P.O. Box 71135, Nairobi, Kenya.
War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict
Organisations contacted

Other useful organisations listed alphabetically

Heritiers de la Justice, B.P. 109
Bukavu, Sud-Kivu, R.D.Congo, B.P. 234
Cyangugu, Rwanda.

Human Rights Alert, PO BOX 183,
Imphal 795001, Manipur, , India.

Human Rights Watch, 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor, New York City, New York 10018-3299, USA.

Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS), Policy and Analysis Division, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, DC 1-15th Floor, New York, NY 10017, USA.

IGAD, P.O.Box 2653, Djibouti, Republic of Dijbouti Independent Projects Trust (IPT), 1802 Old Mutual Centre 303 West Street, 4001 Durban, South Africa.

Initiative on Conflict Resolution & Ethnicity (INCORE), Aberfoyle House, Northland Road, Londonderry BT48 7JA, Northern Ireland, UK.

Institute for Disarmament and Development studies, 675 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.

Institute for Multi Track Diplomacy, 1819 H Street, NWSuite 1200, Washington, DC 20006, USA.

Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales y de Investigaciones Para la Paz (IRIPAZ), 1a Calle 9-52, Zona 1, Ciudad de Guatemala, Guatemala.

Inter Agency Consortium c/o OXFAM Ghana, P.O. Box 432, Tamale, Ghana.

International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Box 422, 37 Store St., London, WC1E 7BS, UK.

International Alert, 1 Glyn Street, London SE11 5HT, UK.

International Center for Ethnic Studies, 2 Kynesey Terrace, Colombo - 08, Sri Lanka.

International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN), 16 Chavchavadze Ave., entry 3, 1st floor, Tbilisi 380079, Georgia.

International Committee of the Red Cross, Public Information Centre, 19 avenue de la Paix, CH 1202 Genève, Switzerland.

International Conflict Resolution Centre, Uni of Melbourne, School of Behavioural Science, University of Melbourne, Parkville Victoria 3052, Australia.

International Crisis Group (ICG), 149 Avenue Louise - Level 16, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium.

International Fellowship for Reconciliation (IFOR), Spoorstraat 38, 1815 BK Alkmaar, The Netherlands.


International Peace Academy, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York City, New York 10017-3521, USA.

International Peace Research Association (IPRA), c/o COPRI, Fredericigade 18, DK-1310 Copenhagen K., Denmark.

John Templeton Foundation, PO BOX 8322, Radnor, PA, 19087-8322, USA.

JUSTAZPAZ, Calle 32 No. 14-42, 1er. Piso, Apartado Aereo 209B, Bogota D.C., Colombia.

Kazakhstan Centre for Conflict Management (CCM), 57’V’ Timiryazev Street, Apt. 23, Almaty 480 070, Kazakhstan.

Letsema, P.O. Box 81, Roodepoort 1725, South Africa.

Life and Peace Institute - Horn of Africa programme, P.O. Box 21123, Nairobi, Kenya.

Life and Peace Institute (LPI), P.O. Box 1520, 751 45 Uppsala, Sweden.

Mediation and Change, La Trade Fair, P.O. Box C 1433, , Cantonnements, Accra, Ghana.

Mennonite Conciliation Services (international div), Menonite Central Committee, 21 South 12th Street, PO Box 500, Akron, USA.

Mendolo Ecumenical Foundation, Box 21493, Kitwe, Zambia.

National Business Initiative, P O Box 294, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, 2006, South Africa.

National Peace Council (NPC), 291/50 Havelock Gardens, Colombo 6, Sri Lanka.

National Peace Foundation (NPF), 1835 K Street NW, Suite 620, Washington DC 20006, USA.

Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation (NOVIB), P.O. Box 30919, 2500 GX The Hague, The Netherlands.

Nonviolence International / Middle East office, Nuzha Building, PO Box 20999, Jerusalem 91202, Israel.

Nonviolence International / South East Asia, 495/44 Soi Yu-omsin, Jaransanitwong 40, , Bangkok 10700, Thailand.

Nordic Africa Institute, P O Box 1703, SE-751 47 Uppsala, Sweden.

OAS, 17th Street and Constitution Ave, Washington, DC 20006, USA.

OAU, P.O. Box 3243, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Organization for Security and Cooperaion in Europe (OSCE), OSCE. Secretariat, Kämtner Ring 5-71010 Vienna, Austria.
War prevention works: 50 stories of people resolving conflict
Annotated bibliography

For good case studies

**Words over War**
(John Barton, Melanie Greenburg, Margaret McGuinness, Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland, 2000). 12 case histories where mediation has been used with varying success.

**Herding Cats - Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World**
(Crocker, Hampson, Aall (eds), USIP Press, Washington, 1999). Good series of case histories (official and non official) including some very interesting personal accounts of efforts to prevent or resolve violent conflicts from people such as Richard Holbrooke and Max Van der Stoel.

**Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized**
(Bruce Jentleson (ed), Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland, 2000). Interesting and widely acclaimed book commissioned by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (www.ccpdc.org). All examples of successful (and failed) interventions are track one (i.e. official).

**Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft**
(Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995). Possibly the best book written to date on the role of religious actors in conflict prevention and resolution. The book is the result of a 7 year research project headed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (www.csis.org) and features case studies from around the world.

**Watching the Wind**
(Susan Collin Marks, USIP Press, Washington, 2000). A personal account of the local peace efforts launched after the signing of the National Peace Accord in South Africa. Some good case histories.

**People Building Peace**
(European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Utrecht, Netherlands, 1999). Aimed at the non specialist, this engaging and inspiring book features 35 conflict prevention/resolution stories from around the world. Also features contributions from some of the world’s leading conflict specialists.

**Intermediaries in International Conflict**

**Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action**
(Barnett Rubin (ed), Century Foundation Press, New York, 1998). Good examination of several ‘hotspots’ around the world and the efforts taken by official and non official actors to prevent or resolve conflict.

**Searching for Peace in Africa**
(European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Utrecht, Netherlands, 1999). An overview of the violent conflicts taking place in Africa as of 1999 as well as a look at all official and non-official attempts at resolving and preventing the conflicts in each country. Part of a series currently being written by the ECCP.

**The Politics of Non Violent Action**
(Gene Sharp, Porter Sargeant, Boston 1973). A must-have three volume work on the theory and practice of non violent action including 198 cases of successful non violent action.

For theory / analysis

**Do No Harm - How Aid Can Support Peace - or War**

The Promise of Mediation (Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger, Jossey Bass Wiley, 1999). One of the most interesting books on the different theories of mediation.


Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (JP Lederach, USIP Press, Washington, 1999). Excellent and easy to read book by one of the key experts in the field.

Preventing Violent Conflict (Michael Lund, USIP Press, Washington, 1997). Brilliant, accessible book which analyses the range of actors involved in preventive diplomacy, what methods work and why and how governments can overcome the challenges to effective preventive action.

Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Polity Press (eds), Cambridge, 1999). One of the best general theory books available. Charts the history and development of the study and practice of conflict resolution.


Websites

www.refugees.org
Superb website from the US Committee for Refugees giving in-depth information on the number of refugees in each country.

www.euconflict.org
One of the most comprehensive sources of information on NGOs working in conflict on the web.

www.colorado.edu/conflict/
An extensive site run by the Conflict Research Consortium of Colorado University. Masses of information on the theory and practice of conflict resolution.

www.usip.org
The web site of the United States Institute of Peace. USIP publish several good newsletters (available online) and many of their reports are available online too.

www.crisisweb.org
Official site of the International Crisis Group. All reports available online. Excellent analysis of various current conflicts.

www.crinfo.org
Another mammoth site run by the people from the Conflict Research Consortium at Colorado University.
Contribute

We are keen to learn of more examples of effective intervention.

Name of Organisation:
___________________________________________________________________________

Contact Details:
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ...
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Website(s):
___________________________________________________________________________

Time and Place of involvement:
___________________________________________________________________________

Nature of involvement:
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ...
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_____________________________________

Your contact details / comments:
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☐ Please inform me of other work in this area.

☐ Tell me more about the Oxford Research Group.

☐ Please send me details of a covenant with ORG.

Thank you

Oxford Research Group
Acknowledgments

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About the author

Dylan Mathews has worked for the Oxford Research Group (ORG) since 1999.

Before working on ‘War Prevention Works’ Dylan was Co-ordinator of Oxford Research Group’s ‘C21’ young leaders initiative. The aim of C21 was to engage 500 of the world’s emerging leaders in the challenges and possibilities of developing a cooperative and integrated approach to global security. By sensitising young leaders to cutting edge thinking and practice on the most important current and future global security issues, Oxford Research Group aimed to help develop a new generation of leaders better able to manage the challenges that lie ahead. The project awaits sufficient funding to proceed. Dylan is also the Founder and Director of the Rwenzori Development Foundation (www.rwenzori.org), a UK registered charity that supports the needs of local communities in Uganda.

The producer

Scilla Elworthy is director of the Oxford Research Group since its foundation in 1982. She trained as a social scientist and after working for 10 years in Africa became consultant on women's issues to UNESCO, and research director for the Minority Rights Group in France. She is author of studies on the role of women in international relations and on many aspects of international security. Her best-known book, ‘Power and Sex’, was published in 1996 by Element Books, and her PhD from Bradford University was on the subject of British nuclear weapons policy.

The designer

Paul V Vernon has worked as a freelance illustrator and designer for 5 years. He has worked on many issues including peace, human rights, roads, ecology, genetics, refugees rights, climate change, globalisation etc. Since graduating as a psychologist he has also worked as a teacher, a lollipopman, a pavement artist, and a tree-surgeon. For over a year he has painted an ultra-violet ‘trompe l’oeil’ mural. Today he works for a wide range of small NGOs and grass roots campaign groups, which partially explains why he lives in a shed.
“A wonderful collection of stories about how local communities participate in transforming conflicts that have been destroying the lifeways of their society.”

Elise Boulding
Professor Emerita of Sociology, Dartmouth College, USA.

“Peace builders need moral support and financial support from around the world to encourage them and give them confidence to go on. I welcome this initiative.”

Rt. Hon. Mo Mowlam
Former Minister for the Cabinet Office, UK.

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The book also shows how readers can support this work. This is a valuable resource for practitioners, decision makers, students and activists alike.

Cover painting “Lightness in Dark” by Gabrielle Rifkind

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