



**AN EVALUATION OF PEACE DIRECT'S
'RAPID RESPONSE FUND' IN KENYA**

Evaluation conducted between March and May 2009

By Sophie Gordon

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METHODOLOGY

The consultant hired for the evaluation first met with Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, the founder of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, to get a brief on the current conflict situation in Kenya, current responses and main actors to meet with for the evaluation and locations to travel to where rapid response money had been used.

The evaluation process began with a desk review of Peace Direct's reports pertaining to RRF in Kenya as well as research on peacebuilding efforts in the region by other actors. Following this, the consultant arranged meetings and interviews with various stakeholders involved in peacebuilding generally, and particularly involved in rapid response, with or without funding from the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund. Due to insecurity in Elwak (hostage takings) and Mandera, the consultant was unable to travel to those areas and interviews that would have taken place there took place in Nairobi or via the telephone. The consultant also travelled to Garissa to interview a Sheikh involved in the Mandera peace process and took the opportunity to gain information on an area not provided with rapid response funding by the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund.

Due to the very disparate nature of the conflicts and responses throughout Kenya between 2006 and 2009 that fall within the parameters of this evaluation, it was not conducive to successful evaluation to formulate an evaluation tool applicable to all interviews. Instead, each interview was guided by information already at hand and additional questions were asked during interviews as and when necessary.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ALRMP – Arid Lands Resource Management Project
APF – Africa Peace Forum
CBO – Community-Based Organisation
CP – Concerned Citizens for Peace
CEWARN – Conflict Early Warning and Responsive Mechanism
CRR – Centre for Conflict Resolution
CSO – Civil Society Organisation
DC – District Commissioner
DfID – UK Department for International Development
DPC – District Peace Committee
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
GOK – Government of Kenya
IDP – Internally Displaced Person
IGAD – Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(I)NGO – (International) Non-Governmental Organisation
KSH – Kenyan Shilling
M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation
NCCK – National Council of Churches in Kenya
NFI – Non-Food Item
NRR – National Rapid Response
NSC – National Steering Committee
RR – Rapid response
RRF – Rapid response fund
TOT – Training of Trainers
UN – United Nations
USAID – United States Agency for International Development

INTRODUCTION

Rapid response initiatives have been taking place in Kenya for hundreds of years. They involve controlling conflicts in the early stages, before they escalate out of hand. There are tribal mechanisms that cater for this; dialogue and, if necessary, compensation (generally in the form of cattle or food), have been the most common methods used. Dialogue is often conducted by tribal elders who hold a representative role in the community and who have the influence to sway community actions. However, despite these deeply-rooted traditional methods to quell conflict, sometimes tensions are so high between two or more communities that even dialogue is impossible and compensation unachievable. This is when external mediation is needed, and this has been provided by local religious leaders as well as NGOs and UN agencies, bringing elders on board who, in turn, are able to approach the community. Getting elders involved in rapid response initiatives as well as longer-term peacebuilding is paramount to success.

Since 2006 Peace Direct has been supporting rapid response initiatives in Kenya, funding initiatives that are already being implemented by local people, encouraging them to work with the available resources at hand. As a result, responses differ enormously in type and dimension, as they respond to different types and magnitudes of conflict with different resources available. When the Peace Direct rapid response fund was initiated, conflicts in Kenya were mainly on a local scale, sometimes cross-border in north-eastern and western parts of the country, and tackled very much as local problems that could have a wider impact if not dealt with immediately. Since December 2007, conflict in Kenya took a different dimension and it was clear that it had the potential to escalate very quickly into national conflict, with the power to become a regional conflict if not dealt with immediately.

Since early 2008 when the post-election violence took the country by surprise, it has become apparent just how fragile and susceptible Kenya is to conflict; it has also become apparent that the need for rapid response has expanded to national-level initiatives which can build upon local initiatives. The levels of violence experienced in the first two months of 2008 highlighted more than ever the need to support the capacity and resilience of a peacebuilding structure within Kenya. Support should be targeting both rapid response – focusing on flexibility of approach and speed, achievable through solid foundations of trust with partners – and longer-term initiatives to maintain peace, which are currently being implemented by NGOs and the Government of Kenya (GOK). There is need for the rapid response system to be more involved with the aforementioned bodies and have a coordinated relationship with these peace-building actors. Grassroots peacebuilding initiatives, which lead to national-level initiatives, can have a far-reaching impact on regional peace – national turmoil has a far-reaching impact on regional stability, which was evident in the regional stagnation of markets following the post-election period in Kenya.

Rapid response to conflict and simmering tensions is an approach that has been taken up by NGOs such as Pact Kenya and Oxfam GB, both of whom have much larger funds than the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund. In that respect, what the Lt. Gen. Adan

Peace Fund committee is able to do in comparison to the larger outfits is of a smaller scale, but the impact it has on the community is still very important. The nature of a smaller fund is that it is more flexible and in theory can be applied much faster due to fewer bureaucratic requirements.

What is Rapid Response?

Opinion on what rapid response actually is or should be is varied according to people interviewed during the evaluation period. This in itself highlights the need for flexibility of approach in RR funding, but also highlights the need for caution as RR money could easily qualify for responses which are not strictly rapid response to conflict (c.f. Nakuru section of report)¹. Rapid response also need not necessarily be financial and often in-kind support is as important as the funded response. Generally speaking, the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund has been used to support already-existing peace initiatives that require urgent additional funds to quell a conflict that is escalating to dangerous levels; acting quickly in this way can go far to calm a heated situation. This can otherwise be classified as reactive rapid response or fire-fighting as many practitioners have called it in Kenya. The Fund's committee has also given a lot of time and support in-kind. Where tension is simmering, RR should be used to break a potential cycle of violence through community dialogues and initiatives that bring conflicting parties together. In the more elaborately-funded initiatives, RR can also mean longer-term initiatives to break the cycle of violence such as trauma healing, where deep-rooted grievances can be the causes of underlying tensions that have the power to erupt suddenly. This system could be classified as strategic rapid response, a system that has not been employed by the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, but is currently under way in Mandera via Pact Kenya, and has also been adopted by Oxfam GB in Eldoret following the post-election violence. This type of response includes the capacity building of strategic positions within the community as well as local government.

What is the value of Rapid Response?

One of the enormous benefits to RR is that it has the ability to keep up with the ever-changing dynamics within the complex communities found in Kenya. The country is in a very fluid and changing situation which many peacebuilding projects simply cannot keep up with due to stringent regulations on budget lines. One of the virtues of RR is that it is creative and flexible in its approach of building upon initiatives begun by local people who may know the situation and people involved best of all, in areas where resources may be few, but where initiative and will is plenty. By building on already-existing endeavours, rapid response focuses on resources and capacities that people have rather than focusing negatively on what is lacking. In terms of local-level peacebuilding, RR is successful in bringing to the fore local actors who are in tune

¹ One area where rapid response money is allegedly used on a regular basis is during the months of May-September when the government closes its books and has no money available for responding to emergencies. When this has happened, NGOs have stepped in to uphold the government structure. This is known in Kenya as 'stop-gap funding' and is a common practice. Although nobody interviewed agrees with it, nor agrees that this is an area for rapid response funding, failing to provide this money when the need arises could potentially lead to increased crises.

with their people and thus creates a system of trust which is pivotal to the success of most peacebuilding ventures.

Limitations of the Evaluation

The following evaluation aims to chart the work of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund over the last 3 years and is divided into case study locations, with a description of what initiatives took place under the auspices of rapid response. In some sections this may be a repetition of information already present in Peace Direct reports – this information has been included to confirm what is known. In other sections, information will most likely be new to the reader as there has been considerable disparity between what Peace Direct reports say and the information collected on the ground. Some of this might be to do with the discrete nature of RR and recipients of the money not being aware of its source; in some cases, the need for conflict resolution has been so urgent that it simply has not mattered where the money has come from. Rapid response money from the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund appears to have often been used in conjunction with other rapid response funds as part of a larger collective venture between several bodies responding to a conflict. As such, it has been very hard to isolate Peace Direct's money within the rapid response system and determine exactly the impact its donations have had at both the local and national level. The case study for Nakuru is the only clear example of Peace Direct's money being used as a solo venture to support a grassroots initiative.

In addition to the difficulties in attributing merit to one funding channel, it was difficult for the evaluator to determine an exact timeline of events. Triangulation of information was conducted where possible, but often this led to several dates and series of events. For some, time is seasonal and does not follow the western calendar. For other, conflicts are so many and so frequent in the same areas that they all seem to blend. For others, one even cannot be disassociated from another and there are causal linkages between conflicts. Due to a combination of these factors, there is not clear linear timeline of events leading from conflict to peace and this is especially true of the Mandera case study.

SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED

- Rapid response provides the **flexibility in approach and speed in assistance** that most other agencies receiving prescribed funding cannot meet. Due to the ever-changing nature and unpredictability of conflicts in Kenya, there will still be a need for rapid response mechanisms for several years to come. Timeliness is a pivotal factor in the system's success/effectiveness and the larger organisations are often constrained by time.
- Rapid response has helped to **secure livelihoods and reinforce trust** in progressive leadership in communities, enabling community leaders and elders to maintain dignity and respect for their institution by diffusing tensions through the traditional systems with the help of rapid response money.
- One of the less successful elements of the rapid response system in Kenya has been the **disjuncture between putting out flames (rapid response) and making sure they are out for good (development)**. It is crucial that rapid response initiatives work alongside NGO development initiatives that have longer and more secure funding in order to maintain peace and not need to repeat the response.
- While it remains undisputed that rapid response, in some situations, is the best course of action, the nature of rapid response – building upon responses already begun – makes it **almost impossible to evaluate** as the rapid response element cannot be separated from the whole.²
- Despite the need for urgent action during times of tension, **calm periods should also be exploited and action should not only be limited to tense times**. Initiatives to build trust and improve lines of communication between communities with history of violence and conflict has not taken place under this RRF and it could be argued that a lot of money could have been better spent building resilience to conflict rather than being spent on RR.³ Grassroots peace workers interviewed for this evaluation showed signs of resignation due to rapid response being only about fire-fighting which ended immediately once conflict had been cooled, rather than then building upon peace and aiming to maintain it.
- There is **need for information sharing on rapid response** to avoid duplicated efforts and funds being used for the same purposes. The NRR system should allow for this kind of information and best practice sharing to take place and the committee should certainly be involved in these forums.

² An example of this is given above in the Nakuru case study. In 2006 NCKK organised a conference that required the use of Dekha's facilitation skills. Rapid response money was to get Dekha to the conference. As such, it is impossible to gauge how important the rapid response was to this process as NCKK could simply have invited a few less people to the conference had there been no money readily available to pay for Dekha's transport.

³ This point has already been mentioned in an Interim Report for Peace Direct but it appears that no action was taken to resolve this.

- The committee's **monitoring capacity is non-existent** as there is no money in the Nomadic Healthcare account ear-marked for this. Consequently, expensive initiatives like the Isiolo VSAT are left to ruin as there is no follow-up.
- Decision-making at Fund's committee level has been very monopolistic. As there are **no guidelines or criteria on decision-making**, one person has generally been responsible for pursuing response to a conflict and authorising dispatch of funds to the ground. There needs to be a restructuring of the decision process and distribution of authority among committee members. When the money has already been transferred to the bank account of an implementing partner, it appears the committee has not always known what it was spent on.
- Key people working on the Fund's committee are well-know peacebuilders and hold paid positions with other organisations. Therefore their **priority will inevitably be with the paid position**. As such, response by the committee and its ability to raise additional funds has been hampered.
- **Lack of accountability** for spending Peace Direct's money has led to ambiguous use of the money. Very sparse reporting to Peace Direct outlining what money was spent on makes it very hard to find a causal link between the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Committee's work and the attainment of peace following a rise in conflict.
- Since the post-election violence, the situation in Kenya has completely changed. While the country may appear calm, tensions are simmering and people are preparing themselves for more violence in the run-up to the next presidential elections in 2012. Rapid responses to localised conflicts are now by default integrated into a much wider national, if not, global framework of conflict. The **concept of rapid response needs to be redefined** according to the new context within which it is now applied and the possibility for larger preventative interventions may need to be considered.
- Community-level organisations that have received rapid response assistant through the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund have not necessarily been able to progress and gain additional funding. However, by receiving a little assistance they have often **gained respect and a wider network** (with women-led peacebuilding ventures, this is especially critical), which can often be as, if not more, important than being successful in finding further funding.
- **Short-term work (rapid response) can have a huge impact on long-term change**, but only if the correct coordination and linkages are made between immediate response and long-term development. To date, this has not happened as the committee has no-one disposable to carry this out.
- If done properly, **rapid response in Kenya can have an impact on neighbouring countries** – Sudan, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia – and methods and best practices can be replicated. Since the 2007 elections, it has become clear that conflict in Kenya has not only regional, but global, implications. It is in everyone's best interest therefore to help maintain peace in Kenya.

- There is a **lack of female representation** in DPCs visited throughout this evaluation. It is paramount to get women on board in conflict mitigation ventures. As it was highlighted by many informants, women are raising families and instilling deep-rooted hatred built up over generations to their children. If these women can be approached and provided with guidance, then there is hope for the next generation. Women also have the capacity to incite violence by spurring on men, but ironically, women and their children are usually the ones to suffer most during conflict. Women are both the instigators and the victims and this must be tackled. Women to women peacebuilding ventures are important and effective as many women in Kenya have dual identities – they are from their father’s clan and marry into their husband’s clan. This makes women the ideal connector to bridge the gap.

MANDERA

Mandera has been a conflict hot spot for many years; the number of NGOs working in peace building there alone indicates that there are deep-rooted grievances between the communities at the crossroads of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia.⁴ While the conflict itself is local, it has national and international dimensions as conflict impacts on Kenya’s neighbouring countries. Rapid response money sent via the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund has been used on several occasions in this vast district.

In 2005, conflict broke out over grazing land between the Garre and Murale tribes within the Kenyan border. In response to this outbreak, Sheikhs and prominent peacebuilders from all over Kenya joined together and set about mediating between the two tribes and preaching peace in public barazas (gatherings). The process took 28 days and culminated in the two warring communities drawing up the Umal Accord – a locally-produced peace accord stating the compensation dues by both tribes, plans for repatriation of displaced, plans for discussions on sharing pasture lands, release of captives arrested during conflict, which was signed by elders from both sides.

Once the accord had been signed and both parties agreed to follow through with the terms, the visiting Sheikhs left. Interviews suggest that the Mandera District Peace Committee is structurally weak and lacked the capacity to carry out the implementation of such accords, hence the violation of the Umal Accord (of all the resolutions, only some compensation was made). People are still displaced due to the violence, land has not been evenly distributed and many grievances have not been resolved. Consequently, fighting has since broken out in Mandera.

Use of Rapid Response in Mandera

In 2005, Peace Direct’s support in Kenya of rapid response initiatives had not begun, but money to fund the mediation and peace process was provided by Arid Lands,

⁴ Pact Kenya, Peace Net, Safer World, Oxfam GB to name but a few, in addition to the World Bank-funded Arid Lands project which falls under the Office of the President.

other NGOs working in the area,⁵ and small contributions were provided by the warring communities. The root causes of the conflict, which date back many generations (land rights, water points etc), were identified and addressed in the Umal Accord, but instead of providing a remedy to the situation, it appears to have provided fuel for renewed conflict.

Local government structures are weak in Mandera, and conflict resolution initiatives were hampered by the decision of the central government to send in additional armed forces to the area to break up the fighting and keep the peace. There were allegedly some objections from the district administration to the Sheikhs' involvement in the 2005 peace process and threats to forcefully remove them were made.

While many parts of Kenya entered 2008 in turmoil, north-eastern Kenya remained calm. However, in October 2008 fighting broke out again in Mandera between the Murale and the Garre over the drilling of a borehole by the Murale in a Garre area, to which the Garre responded by blocking access to the well. Two people were initially killed in the clashes and many more injured. Fighting was so great that many NGOs working in the area had to stop their work due to the insecurity. By this time, the Peace Direct RRF was fully fledged and funds were used in response to this crisis.

Intervention

Using religious leaders in conflict mediation in Mandera had worked well in 2005 and appears to have had the support of the local communities, despite the DC's alleged pressure to remove them forcefully. A local peacebuilding initiative began with Sheikhs and members of the Degodia and Corner tribes (all considered non-partisan third parties to the violence) to travel around the district and preach peaceful coexistence. The kick-off meeting was attended by members of NGOs working in the area and of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund and all agreed to finding a peaceful way of bringing the warring communities together. While it is unclear exactly how much RRF money was used and to what purposes, the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund RRF money, along with funds from Pact Kenya and Arid Lands, was used to facilitate the movement of the Sheikhs from various corners of the country to converge in Mandera and to facilitate their movement to the conflict hotspots whilst on the ground. Some money was also used to provide food, accommodation and transport for the mediation teams as they travelled around the district.

Impact

One of the Sheikhs involved in both the 2005 and 2008 peace processes noted the difference in speed with which the mediation team was able to travel to the conflict zones, and drew attention to the efficacy of the team in 2008 compared with 2005 – helping the communities reach agreement in a shorter time. Following the initial mediation process in Mandera, a meeting was held in Nairobi bringing on board strategic government personnel, including the former Provincial Commissioner, the Office of the President (Arid Lands), as well as the Minister of Internal Security and

⁵ The evaluator was unable to clarify who exactly these actors were, but it is highly likely that Pact Kenya figured predominantly.

Minister of Defence. During this meeting it was agreed that urgent action was needed and that these people should travel to Mandera to assess the situation themselves. To enable this delegation to travel, Pact Kenya provided rapid response money to charter a plane from Nairobi to Mandera. The delegation met with religious leaders who had been holding peace meetings as well as representatives from both warring clans to hear grievances from both sides. The Nairobi meeting and the publicity it gained also served the important role in getting the District Commissioner on board and providing security to move with the mediation team, rather than against them. This had huge impact on the effectiveness, strength and legitimacy of team on the ground.

A closed-door meeting between the delegation and Garre and Murale elders paved the way for a ceasefire accepted by both clans, agreement over the removal of road blocks, dissemination of peace talk resolutions to residents of Mandera district (including non-directly implicated clans), meeting with the Provincial Administration to relay resolutions, and above all, that the Umal Accord of 2005 would be followed and implemented. Since the mediation process, damages have been paid and land demarcated for grazing as per the Umal Accord.

Limitations

Although this mediation process has been hailed a success by many, there have been shortfalls and weaknesses for various reasons and the peace process was not as clear and smooth-sailing as reports to Peace Direct make it sound. When peace was achieved, the mediation team members returned to their respective locations rather than venturing further into the interiors of the district to translate the message of brokered peace to the people. This was largely due to armed forces present in locations where the Umal Accord should have been disseminated and the inability to preach peace with forces present. While peace has largely held in the region, following up to ensure that the peace messages have been correctly transmitted and applied is of paramount importance but has not been possible due to security forces. In addition, throughout interviews conducted regarding Mandera conflicts and resolutions, the weakness of the District Peace Committee has been highlighted. It has also been noted that there are rifts between the various peacebuilding bodies in the district, with allegations of corruption preventing certain organisations working with the DPC. It appears that the mediation team did the same and bypassed the DPC, depriving it of a capacity-building exercise and a good set of lessons learnt to apply in future. Pact Kenya has gone on to continue its Peace II project in Mandera, albeit in a different manner than initially planned. Pact was due to support the dissemination of the Umal Accord, yet due to high tensions prevailing and the need for armed forces, Pact has started its next phase of the project, training of trainers for trauma healing, which is proving a success according to meetings with Pact staff.

Evaluator's Observations

Rushing to 'douse the flames' appears to not always be the most viable and sustainable option – in Mandera it may have been wiser to identify what gaps needed filling, and thereby work at supporting the capacity and resilience of the structure already in existence to work within the new context formed by a renewed bout of conflict. Improved coordination between stakeholders, and clearer reporting on what

exactly money has been spent on, would have avoided duplicated efforts and the most applicable actor could have done the mediating while others concentrated on something else. In the case of Mandera, rapid response was clearly necessary to quell the violence. However, lack of follow-up money meant that the peace message was not disseminated where it mattered most – in the interiors of Mandera District – and no assurance of the maintenance of peace was provided following the rush to stop the spread of the flames.

It is extremely hard to attribute a specific section and success of the Mandera peace process to the financial backing of Peace Direct as it was a collaborative process including Pact Kenya and the ALRMP rather than a series of individual events, and money from the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, once pooled with the other funds, was used in multiple ways. In addition, much of the organisational capacity of the delegation and subsequent field visit had as much to do with the personalities involved in the process as it did the funds available. However, without the flexibility to use the funds in a way that the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund committee saw appropriate and useful at the time, the peace process could have been hampered due to searching for additional funds for items as small as transport to hotspots and meals for the peace delegates.

Recommendations:

- Improved coordination with other NGOs to avoid duplication of efforts, identify gaps in response and avoid rushing to only ‘put out the flames’;
- Continued and improved coordination with government structures (DC and DPC) to maintain trust and sustainable development;
- Clearer accountability allowing for transparency in expenditure and the ability to qualify and quantify response;
- Improved follow-up and M&E to ensure expected results are achieved;
- Clearer and more regular reporting to Peace Direct to fully establish the context, the analysis and rationale behind response.

NAKURU

Conflict background

Since early independence in Kenya, there has been conflict and tension in the Rift Valley, especially in areas like Nakuru where farm and pasture land is fertile and highly contested between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. Violence broke out again towards the end of 2006 in Likia, Nakuru District, over land ownership. This conflict became known as the Likia-Mau conflict and gained national attention due to its magnitude – homes were burnt, people killed, and subsequently schools and health facilities were closed. Hundreds of people were displaced due to the persistent violence. The direct and immediate benefit of the violence was land seizure. The less immediate benefit was that of changing voting patterns ahead of the 2007 elections. Traditional leaders and politicians were the main instigators of the violence while the idle youth were the main perpetrators. Nakuru District has been structurally politically weak and subsequently unstable for many years.⁶ It has hence become increasingly difficult for CSO and NGOs working on peacebuilding in the area to form good working relationships with the DPC. This has had a detrimental impact of long-term institutional peacebuilding efforts in Nakuru.

Intervention

In a bid to end the vicious cycle of violence, NCKK organised and funded a peacebuilding conference in 2006, in conjunction with the National Steering Committee for Peace in Kenya, inviting over 2200 people to participate from the conflicting groups. While the number of participants was high, it seems from the evaluation process that funds were not as far-reaching and there was no money remaining for a decent facilitator. Dekha was asked to step in as facilitator. Her transport was paid for using RR money from the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund and she volunteered her time (4 days). The conference was a success, momentarily at least, and led to a cease-fire within the community and the creation of 3 new peace structures⁷ through which to monitor the situation. This conference led to a momentary cessation of hostilities, but this started again in December 2007 when there area became a hotbed for post-election violence.

In addition to providing funds for Dekha's transport to Nakuru in 2006, the RRF provided approximately 90,000KSH (roughly 700 GBP at today's exchange rate) to the Nakuru Emergency Support Group – a network of five members committed to fighting conflict in their district. The group has been spearheaded by Batula Abukar since 2005. Throughout 2006, Batula and her group were involved in creating an early warning system throughout the district's hotspots (a system that mirrored the early warning system initiated by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Nakuru). This was facilitated by money from RRF, ensuring money for members' transport, food and accommodation where necessary. In addition, some money was spent as mobile phone airtime for focal points in the community – elders and selected community

⁶ It was reported during one interview that there has been a high turn-over of District Officers since 1998 which affects the progression of the District Offices.

⁷ In Keringet, Molo and Kuresoi.

members – tasked with reporting any rumours or suspicions of conflict as soon as they heard of it. Due to the nature of the system there are no clear records to prove exact figures. In areas where violence had been particularly high, RR money was given as small cash handouts/compensation to elders and orphans affected by the conflict. Some women's groups in Molo who were working on income-generating activities and peace messaging were provided with small incentives through the Nakuru Emergency Support Group. This aimed to give women more of a voice and in addition, some RRF money was spent on transport to move women from one community to another in a bid to create good relations. In the region of 20,000KSH was spent in 2006 on visits by the team to Likia and Mauche, to promote peace and reconciliation among the communities through meetings with elders and community representatives.

Since 1979, elections in Kenya have been marked by violence. 2007 was an election year and the Lt. Gen Adan Peace Fund committee had already briefed Peace Direct that they anticipated escalating violence towards the end of the year. Despite a history of Kikuyu/Kalenjin conflicts and anticipation of a renewal in conflict, the Nakuru Emergency Support Group received only 30,000KSH (c. 230 GBP) from the Lt. General Adan Peace Fund in 2007, compared with 90,000KSH in 2006. About two thirds of that sum was used on peace messaging by team members to areas such as Molo, Kuresoi, Kamwawa and Mwaragamia. In December 2007, the government realised the potential severity of simmering tensions in the area and a large two-day seminar for over 500 people from all over the Rift Valley was held in Nakuru, with the GOK Minister of Security as guest speaker. This conference aimed primarily to educate the masses on the election system, but also to calm potential tension. It was mentioned during the evaluation that in the run-up to the 2002 elections, there had been a lot of civic education in traditionally-hotspot areas, such as Nakuru, which led to relatively peaceful elections. The same process did not take place in 2007 and it could be argued that this was a contributing factor to the eruption of violence in Nakuru District on 29th December 2007.

Following the elections, the early warning networks built up by the Nakuru Emergency Support Group broke down as people were killed, others fled, and some lost their documents in the confrontations. Hundreds of people were displaced during the months of December 2007 and January 2008. With money in the bank and hundreds of IDPs on their doorstep, the Nakuru Emergency Support Group went to the camps in Nakuru town to see what the needs of the people were. Many NGOs were providing food, water and NFIs, but none had considered sanitary wear for the women who had run from their homes with only the few clothes on their backs. Lack of sanitary protection was disabling many women from queuing to receive the food and NFIs being distributed, through shame of having blood-stained clothes. Sanitary pads and new underwear enabled the women to have as much chance as the others to receive help, and to end the stigmatisation. Out of the 40,000KSH that the group received in 2008, in the region of 30,000KSH was spent for this purpose.

Evaluator's Observations and Suggested Way Forward

In March 2009, the evaluator visited residents of Mauche village⁸ – an area where community dialogues and peace messaging have taken place by the Nakuru Emergency Support Group as well as other organisations such as CCR. Despite these efforts, tensions remain high in this village inhabited by Kikuyus on one side of the road, and Kalenjins on the other. Trade between the two communities is rare and the communities live completely segregated lives on different sides of the road. In addition, the local administration is of the majority Kikuyu tribe, and claims were made that this is currently disadvantaging the Kalenjin community and preventing them access to vital resources.⁹ This persistent stigmatisation of one community could have been prevented had the district administration remained constant throughout the process and enabled CSOs, CBOs and NGOs to work closely with them.

Batula noted that having money at hand in a local bank account meant that the group was able to act fast and travel to the conflict hotspot to hold much-needed discussions with community leaders as well as inter-community dialogues to calm tensions before they escalated into violence. It was also noted how difficult it is doing peacebuilding as per the 'African method' of dialogue, without following up with the African method of compensation. For this reason, some of the money was used as compensation to victims of conflict from within the visited communities. While one cannot doubt the need for humanitarian response in the face of conflict such as those that took place sporadically throughout Nakuru District in 2006, an evaluation of RR spending suggests that some of the funds spent in Nakuru were not spent in line with what RRF should be used for and therefore expected results in terms of conflict resolution were not attained (c.f. above point on Mauche village).

In addition, the provision of sanitary wear for women at the Nakuru showground when it was used as an IDP camp in early 2008 cannot be considered rapid response. It was most certainly a humanitarian response, but did not directly relate to quelling the conflict in Nakuru at the time. The money spent on this (amounting to about 30,000KSH) was already in the bank account of the Nakuru Emergency Support Group, therefore the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund committee was not kept abreast of how money was spent by the group. This, coupled with point raised above on the group's expenditures of a compensatory nature, suggests a clear need for guidelines on rapid response – what it is exactly and what the money should be spent on once entrusted to a local committee.

Providing money to the Nakuru Emergency Support Group did not enable the group to go on and find further funding and develop as a more prominent peacebuilding outfit. However, movement and freedom of work did enable Batula to work alongside the Centre for Conflict Resolution and gain prominence as a local peacebuilder.

⁸ The evaluator visited Nakuru town also but was unable to meet with any direct beneficiaries of Peace Direct's rapid response funding as IDPs have since been forcefully moved by the government. No one knows exactly where these forcefully repatriated IDPs have gone to.

⁹ One informant alleged that the sinking of a much-needed borehole on the Kalenjin side had been postponed for at least a year as materials to finish the job had been deliberately withheld from that side of the village by the local administration. Regardless of the factual evidence to uphold this statement, the fact that rumours such as these are still prevalent in Mauche, despite dialogues within the community, serves to indicate the height of tension between the two communities.

Batula still enjoys a good working relationship with the Centre, and when they travel to areas where Batula is well-known, they take her along as a portal into the community. As a result, future RR and development efforts could be channelled through Batula due to her local status built upon trust gained whilst using Peace Direct's money. She is seen as impartial (a woman and Muslim from Eastern Kenya) by the community. As a result of her status now in the District, the evaluator suggests that using people such as Batula is a good idea. However, there is a dire need for training (it is also desired by recipients of RR money such as Batula) on rapid response methods and more general grassroots peacebuilding techniques.

Since January 2008 when the Nakuru Emergency Support Group received 40,000KSH from the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, Batula has not asked for money as the money received was too little to do anything except for 'put out flames' – sums in the region of former 90,000KSH donations by the Fund enabled her to do more. In an area such as Nakuru where conflict is deep-rooted and risks becoming a culturally-engrained phenomenon, efforts should be more sustainable and geared towards peacebuilding – trauma therapy, lengthy community dialogue and forgiveness. It was sad to hear from Batula that she would not ask for more money until the conflict (inevitably) flairs up again. Efforts should be made now, while there is room to manoeuvre due to political calm, to address the root causes of the conflict, and avoid the anticipated renewal of conflict. "We should not only be fire fighters – we need to be able to respond and help, but then we leave them" said Batula, 2nd March 2009.

One of the current root causes of conflict in the area is high youth unemployment and this had a major bearing on the conflict after the 2007 elections. It would be far more beneficial and indeed recommendable to send a little more money than that which the group has been able to access through the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, thereby enabling youth to have some business training or business start-up packages, giving them something worth losing if/when violence erupts again. As is currently happening in other parts of Kenya, youth business initiatives would make them less available to join in the violence or to accept money to attack the opposing community as was witnessed during the 2008 post-election violence crisis. Many people lost their businesses during the post-election violence, and many have not been able to resume their business. This idleness risks impacting upon future conflict in the area and should be tackled while communities are calm.

From interviews held in Nakuru District, it appears that many conflicts require external mediation (conflicts emerging from theft, bar quarrels, rape, arson, to name but a few). When this occurs, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), based in Nakuru town, is often called in. However, one of the complaints aired during interviews was that people require feeding during these mediations, and the length of the mediation process is undeterminable at the onset. Failure to have flexible funds available for expenditures, such as refreshments during mediation, can have a detrimental impact on peace processes as important parties may not attend. It was interesting to note that CCR had not heard of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, although they had worked with Batula in the past, and was therefore not aware that money could be made available for refreshments if the success of the mediation process was dependent upon it. There is clearly a need for the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund to

publicise itself within the Kenyan peacebuilding circle so that work funded through other channels can be upheld and bettered through the support of this RR fund.¹⁰

Recommendations:

- Creation of guidelines outlining what qualifies as rapid response to enable implementing partners to know what money can be spent on;
- Work with NGOs and other peace actors on the ground to link rapid response with longer-term initiatives – taking advantage of peace time;
- Link up with and maintain relationship with DPC and DC in order to contribute to sustainable peace – even if positions in local government have a high turn-over;
- Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund committee to improve M&E and ensure correct spending of money by partners entrusted with an advance sum of money.

¹⁰ Due to the make up of the Fund, with all members having other, paid commitments besides the Fund, there is the possibility that the Fund was not able to publicise itself due to these other commitments. Certainly members interviewed alluded to the limited time they had in which to do voluntary work for the Fund.

ISIOLO

Conflict Background

Isiolo District is located in North Eastern Kenya, an area inhabited by pastoralist tribes and an area prone to severe drought. The main tribe in the area is the Burana. During the long dry spells, it is not uncommon for fighting to take place over scarce resources such as water and pasture for the cattle. However, in this District, cattle-rustling is also a common phenomenon and forms part of the cultural identity of the Burana tribe. Both resource-based and cattle-fuelled conflicts have the potential to escalate and lead to severe conflict and death.

Isiolo remained relatively calm during the post-election period, when widespread violence prevailed in many other parts of Kenya. Instead of people fleeing the area, Isiolo District has become a haven for many IDPs from Central and Rift Valley Provinces. The influx of people, predominantly Kikuyu, has been relatively peaceful and somewhat welcome by the local population, who now has access to new goods (especially fruit and vegetables) on the markets as a result of new trade links due to new people.

However, the people of Isiolo have felt, and still feel, isolated from the rest of Kenya (when people go towards Nairobi, they talk of going to Kenya). For many years, the administrative structure has had to deal with one of the largest areas of land in the country and many of the toughest cases of drought and consequent conflict. The capacity at local government level has not met requirements to deal with these perennial problems and the funding from the central government has been severely lacking. Communication to the rest of Kenya has been extremely limited, and Isiolo now has only four places from which the public has access to internet.

Intervention

Due to the need for communication lines to Nairobi and other parts of the country, from where help could be sought as/when needed and to which early warning of conflict could be transmitted, the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund decided to start up a resource centre where people could gain access to the internet and essential communication. Lack of effective communication channels (physical, telephone and internet) has been raised in most interviews during the evaluation as an impediment to local peacebuilding efforts in Kenya, especially in physically and mentally secluded areas such as Isiolo. Good communication channels have proven pivotal in the rapid response to early warning signs as well as creating means through which to contact the local and central governments.

From interviews held in Isiolo it appears that the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund committee worked through someone from the District Peace Committee, who helped liaise and negotiate between the committee based in Nairobi and the district level administration. However, rather than opening a resource centre for the general public,

as mentioned above and in internal reports to Peace Direct, the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund committee opened an internet access space with a VSAT and three computers housed in the compound of the District Commissioner. Explanations for this relate to the unforeseen cost of renting a space for the 'resource centre' and the DC offering to provide a space free of charge.

The implications of opening a public service in the DC's compound were not thought out properly by the committee. The result is that very few people, save the district office workers, ever used the internet that was installed in their midst, for fear of the armed guards in the compound and their generally intimidating nature. In addition, the district offices are located towards the end of town, fairly secluded from the town centre. Browsing until the evening hours was therefore impossible as the district offices close at 5pm. Lastly, it was discovered that the VSAT had broken down in 2007 just a few months after installation and, after the district office tried to repair it without success, it was left idle. It is uncertain whether the VSAT is in a complete state of disrepair. An interview with the DPC in Isiolo suggests that the local government still uses the computers, when the custodian of the keys to the room comes to work, but relies now on the Arid Lands department for internet access to the central government.

Impact

While the idea of creating an early warning system by installing a VSAT in an area of frequent conflict, and where people feel marginalised and ostracised from the rest of the country, was initially a good one, it could be argued that a computer system was not the most effective early warning system – providing airtime to focal people throughout the district could have been as, if not more, effective a method to transmit messages pertaining to tensions and conflicts. In addition, the VSAT system in Isiolo highlights that some of the committee's weaknesses have prevented the rapid response system they had originally envisaged from working fully. The main factor is the committee's organisational capacity which prevented it from fully establishing at the onset how exactly the resource centre would work, who was the targeted beneficiary group, and who would be in charge of its day to day running on the ground. The group entrusted start-up responsibility to an individual who since left the DPC, leaving no information on the VSAT system for his followers. Therefore, when the VSAT broke down, the DPC did not even know who was responsible for installing it in Isiolo. This should not be entirely attributed to the Lt. Gen. Adan Committee however, as there is extremely high turn-over of position in the DPC and very poor information transfer. With no-one in the DPC knowing who installed the VSAT, there was no-one in Isiolo to report to the committee that the equipment was not working. There appear to have been no plans made for how the resource centre would be funded, whether externally or self-sustaining.

Attributable to the fact that no money was allocated for this in the beginning, the committee did not conduct a follow-up or evaluation of their activities in Isiolo and hence was unaware of the breakdown of the early warning system/resource centre. As mentioned later on in the report (c.f. How the RRF Committee Worked), internal rifts within the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund committee have led to one member being based



in Isiolo since late 2007 and none of the other committee members knowing about the dysfunctional VSAT.

Recommendations:

- Improved links/relations between the Fund and the DPCs and other NGOs, in order for the Fund to be known as an active peace actor and source of support;
- Improved reporting within the committee and to Peace Direct to avoid news being reported one and a half years later;
- Improved monitoring and evaluation, including follow-up on projects funded by the Fund.

IMPACT OF PEACE DIRECT ON NOMADIC HEALTHCARE TO FIND ITS OWN FUNDS

Nomadic Health Care is the official channel through which Peace Direct is able to send money to the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund. Although the committee members are recognised by other peace-builders in the region, the group does not have registered status (CBO/NGO) as this requires a lengthy process and administrative costs that do not always benefit the organisational capacity of the committee. As Dekha Ibrahim already had this account with Nomadic health Care, it was decided to channel funds through this.

Prior to receiving funding from Peace Direct, Nomadic Health Care had raised money via Comic Relief, DfID, the Quakers UK and the Urgent Action Fund. Receiving funds from Peace Direct has not led directly to additional funding, although a large private donation was made to the Nomadic Health Care account in 2008 following the post-election violence. The money received came as a result of widely-publicised Concerned Citizens for Peace activities (see below) and built upon them by helping to cover the costs of documentation and supporting CCP activities in the provinces.

Rapid response funding has the predisposition of being very sensitive by nature – it is not uncommon for practitioners to be involved with militia groups for example. This makes publicity of rapid response contentious when it could impact upon good ties with groups hard to build relationships with. However, it is important for donors to know about these linkages and the importance and impact that their funds are having in terms of negotiating with such forces. Leaning more towards the former, the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund has not advertised its work in order to receive more funding. In addition, committee members work on a voluntary basis and all have other (remunerated) commitments. According to Fund members interviewed, finding time as a committee to raise additional funds to those provided by Peace Direct has not been possible.

Recommendations:

- The committee to bring on board a trainee/intern to assist with fundraising

IMPACT OF RAPID RESPONSE ON CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR PEACE

Widespread violence broke out in Kenya towards the end of 2007, following the disputed presidential elections, which led to the political and ethnic killings of over 1500 people. The speed with which the violence spread took everyone by surprise. On 31st December, four prominent and internationally-renowned peace workers came together to respond rapidly to the growing problem in their country. The group formed Concerned Citizens for Peace, created to give a voice to Kenyan citizens and allow them the opportunity to contribute to the creation of a peaceful nation. However, it was recognised that the group could not be seen as impartial being comprised of only men, each of which from communities heavily implicated in the fighting, so Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, founder of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, was asked to join the group. Dekha has a long history of peacebuilding in Kenya and her community (Somali Kenyan) was a peripheral actor in the post-election period. Her impartiality, coupled with her expertise as peace practitioner and theoriser of peace building, led to the group electing her as the convenor of CCP, for strategic reasons. Dekha flew to Nairobi immediately following the request from the group, using money made available to her by Peace Direct, through the Nomadic Health Care account. The rapidity of movement on the part of the group was key to the success of its activities and overarching goal of calming conflict in Kenya.

On 31st December 2007, the group, based at the Serena Hotel in Nairobi, went to the press, appealing to all Kenyans to end the violence. By 2nd January 2008, the room that the group had hired at the Serena was filled with NGO and civil society representatives, people from the private sector, politicians, media representatives, women, youth and men from the general public, victims and perpetrators of violence....These people had heard of the group's appeal and came to show their support in transmitting messages of peace and to provide the group with information about the violence happening in their areas. These open meetings encouraging dialogue were initially held on a daily basis and became known as the Morning Forums. People came from all over Kenya to contribute to a situation analysis and information gathering exercise that the technical/core team then used to inform their strategising on ways to increase tolerance throughout the country. During the month and a half that the Morning Forums took place on a daily basis in Nairobi, more than 200 people came to offer support and information, some from as far as Laikipia (c.290km from Nairobi). As violence calmed and the peace process led by Kofi Annan strengthened, the open meetings reduced to three a week and gradually petered out towards the end of February 2008.

At the time of the group's inception, all banks were closed in Kenya. In order to afford even mobile airtime, the group had to use whatever cash they had. Some of the money collected at this point was from the rapid response fund paid into by Peace Direct. A further cash injection was needed to uphold the process, which was sent by Peace Direct using Dahabshiil.¹¹ This money was used to support the Morning

¹¹A Somali money transfer system which worked despite other banks being shut in Kenya at the time.



Forums by contributing to room hire, refreshments, photocopying, airtime, and occasionally food for the technical team when they worked late into the evening. Access to money at the beginning was important to the subsequent success of the CCP's activities. Additional funding for the group came from the US Institute for Peace, from the Nairobi Peace Institute and from the American Quakers Association (funding from the latter was spent only on burials). Room hire at the Serena was provided free of charge for the first two weeks.

In addition to the Morning Forums, the CCP used both traditional and new media to send peace messages to the Kenyan people. Due to the group's good connections, messages were sent out over vernacular radio stations (some of these stations had had the finger of blame pointed at them for airing messages inciting tribal violence in the run-up to the election), non-political messages were also aired on national television. Through CELTEL, SMS messages were sent to mobile subscribers throughout the country. With funding from the Global Coalition Against Poverty, the group organised a large meeting for 50 people from Kenyan radio stations to lobby against airing of political propaganda and hate messages. In one of the worst-affected places in Kenya, Eldoret, DJs from Kass fm were able to mobilise people to stay indoors for a day and take the time to reflect on peace in their country.

Some of the funds provided by Peace Direct were also channelled into small community initiatives that came out of the Morning Forums, such as facilitating the transport of people from one ethnic group to a different area in a bid to build confidence in both communities. The Morning Forums received a visit by a group of ex-police and military wanting to help their country. Some had likely been involved in the violence themselves and this was therefore an indication of remorse and forgiveness. A separate room was facilitated for this group, which later became known as 'Veterans for Peace', and following the Serena talks, the group was linked up by CCP with the National Steering Committee and the Nairobi Peace Committee.

The Morning Forums and subsequent strategising led to a cross-fertilisation of ideas, and from the discussions emerged several groups (including the above-mentioned). The CCP forums led to Nairobi Peace Committee, the initiation of which was facilitated by people from as far apart as Mombasa and Mandera; to the Concerned Youth for Peace, a direct off-shoot of CCP, which deals mainly with youth issues and peace messaging in the slums of Nairobi; and to Concerned Kenyan Writers, a group still in existence today. It is unlikely that these initiatives would have taken place had it not been for the physical and political space allocated to individuals to air their concerns, testimonies, suggestions and messages of hope provided by the CCP Morning Forums.

As important as the formation of CCP was to the national peace process in Kenya, the role of Peace Direct's RR money in the formation of the group is not as evident. As mentioned above in all other case studies, the exact role of the RR money provided via Dekha is unknown as it was drawn in as part of a central pool working towards a common goal. An interview with one of the founding group members suggested that, even if group members had not had access to additional money, the cause was so great that they would have found a way to raise enough money to host the meetings,



through their networks in Kenya, and even from their own pockets if necessary. Incidentally, this same group member was unaware of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund and the financial contribution paid out at the start of the CCP process. It can therefore be concluded that the CCP was initiated on the good will of its founding members and some small external resources, but would have been initiated in the same way even without the small funding received from Peace Direct. While it may not have been essential in the setting up of CCP, additional funding, such as Peace Direct's and that of the Quakers, certainly enabled the group to further their work and build firmly upon the ground covered in the Morning Forums.

HOW THE RRF COMMITTEE WORKED

The Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Committee has received funding from Peace Direct from January 2006 to June 2008. During this period, the committee's dynamics have changed somewhat since inception, and internal tension has, on occasion, been quite high. For various reasons outlined below, the committee has not met as a whole since 2007 (where they met in Isiolo at the inauguration of the VSAT) although since then, a few members at a time have met to discuss peace initiatives.

All members of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Committee have provided their time and expertise on a voluntary basis. Money received from Peace Direct has been channelled only into peace initiatives; money spent on refreshments and accommodation should be considered part of these initiatives. With money being used only for rapid response, no money has been allocated for remunerating committee members for their time, much of which has been donated on an *ad hoc* and uneven basis. As all work has been voluntary, and because active participation has largely depended upon committee members' other responsibilities, it appears that there have been some tensions between committee members over how much time and effort each person has contributed.¹² There is general consensus among those interviewed that remuneration would increase effectiveness of the committee.

In 2007, the secretary of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, Khamis Kabeu, left Mombasa for Isiolo. Since arriving in Isiolo, Khamis has not been working on the committee because, *inter alia*, his position was not paid and he could not afford to continue. When contribution to the committee's efforts is voluntary, quality of performance can be an issue which seems to have also created some animosity between members. It is apparent that this is having implication on the committee's functioning, as Khamis is based in Isiolo, where the mal-functioning VSAT is located, and other committee members have been, until now, unaware of the broken VSAT. Communication between committee members has been, and is, a problem which is contributed to by the above.

Decision-making within the committee appears to have been rather top-heavy and not as egalitarian as reports to Peace Direct suggest it is. The committee's success in terms of its peacebuilding work has been largely due to the extensive network of people affiliated to Dekha Ibrahim Abdi. When there is a conflict, or rumour of one, that needs responding to rapidly, committee members are either made aware through their contacts on the ground (and in this case it usually goes via Dekha), or the committee receives a proposal from local organisations requesting financial assistance. In order to decide collectively on a response, it was explained that Dekha holds a central position in deciding whether it is worth pursuing. Committee members are then contacted by the secretary and a telephone vote is held. As many of the

¹² This is particularly evident in discussions on the committee's ability to raise additional funds – in early meetings it was decided that certain committee members would take charge of organising gala dinners to raise funds. But due to time constraints this was never achieved and other committee members have felt let down by these people.

committee members are extensive travellers in the region, they cannot always be contacted – there is no quorum for voting – and they are bypassed when out of range. Other times, committee members may be in remote places with little mobile access – when these situations have arisen, a short SMS describing the suggested response has been sent and an SMS response sent back giving the member’s verdict. Much of the weight behind decisions to go for a response or not appears to come from Dekha and she is the person to do a lot of the logistics involved in response. A more evenly-distributed system for responding to requests for help from the committee would be highly beneficial to the functioning of the committee and enable Dekha to be freed up for more peacebuilding work.

If Dekha was not on the committee, it is doubtful that rapid response would be a possibility at all. Dekha is a well-known personality in Kenyan peacebuilding and has pioneered the rapid response method in many parts of the country. Due to her extensive network of fellow peacebuilders, she is able to manoeuvre people and money efficiently. She is also in a perfect position to generate additional help – from her contacts in the Kenyan government, through to her contacts overseas – she has been able to gain support for areas affected by conflict that often appear off the funding map. However, the flipside of this is that Dekha is not able to do it all and there well may have been occasions over the past 3 years when her resources and capacity have been stretched to their limit and rapid response has not been provided in an area due to this.

The lack of shared responsibility among committee members and subsequent lack of coordination appears to be largely due to lack of funding for such. All committee members are heavily-committed elsewhere and their voluntary work for the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace fund naturally comes second to any paid work they do. This could easily be resolved if strategic positions within the committee were remunerated. To professionalize the committee in this way would require additional money either from Peace Direct or from another partner. Such strategic positions should certainly include a fundraiser and a secretary, enabling the committee to have the human resources needed to raise its own funds, become more accountable to the donor, increase communication in-house and with donors and work more effectively as a team by meeting regularly. The effectiveness of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund committee cannot always rely on the goodwill of its members.

One of the biggest problems during this evaluation was following the flow of cash and justifying expenditures. The committee has been extremely lax on accountability and reports back to Peace Direct. As mentioned above, this could be due to the huge time constraints on the committee members, but some of the blame should fall on Peace Direct for not enforcing more stringent record keeping and regular feedback. In addition, accountability on the part of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund committee requires both time and additional money for proper follow-up of activities; neither of which are abundant. Accountability for funds should not be just a sheet of paper saying what funds were spent on (as appears to have been the case up until present), but should include a physical visit to the site and a thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of the initiative. As funding to the committee has been *ad hoc* and used almost entirely for the rapid response, there has been no financial scope for follow-up,



post-activity visits or good M&E of activities. There has been no continuum between the committee and the local people carrying out the initiatives. If funds remain unavailable for this, the committee should consider hiring an intern from one of the many peace institutes in Kenya to deal with fund raising and M&E.

When dealing with rapid response the issue of reporting to the donor can be a sensitive one. There is the sense in which this kind of response to conflict is highly confidential and part of the benefit of this system of rapid response is that it creates trust, not only between the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund and the local community, but also between Peace Direct and the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund. Some of the money will inevitably be spent in a discrete way. If the Fund's committee members are able to gain the space to discuss with militias for example, such discussions must be considered sensitive and be allowed off-record. While it is recommended that the committee increases its capacity to account for money spent and submit regular reports to Peace Direct, there will be need for some of the money to be unaccountable.

During interviews in field locations and in Nairobi, the evaluator noted that many people, even those receiving assistance from the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, had not heard of the Fund – they had heard of Dekha. Help has been given based upon a network rather than based upon knowledge of a system. As became apparent in one interview, there are areas which regularly have conflicts and which have not been assisted by the Fund, due, perhaps, to the fact that committee members did not have close connections with people in that area. This dependence on individuals of the current system is unsustainable. As highlighted above, the system rests upon one person; Dekha. In order for there to be longevity in the committee and its success, the system needs to be institutionalised, rather than personalised as it currently is. People in conflict-prone areas need to know that the Fund exists and they need to know how to access help, beyond those people who know Dekha only. The committee's structure needs to be strengthened to accommodate for this and responsibility spread across its members. The Fund currently works well to responding quickly to conflicts because Dekha knows people in government, in the mosques and within many of the NGOs on the ground, but, without Dekha the system would most certainly fall apart. Once institutionalised, the system (and grassroots implementers) will most certainly be legitimised and respected by communities, local governments, and security forces. This will allow for the system to be stronger than the personalities within it, which will create greater effectiveness.

REPLICATION OF RRF BY OTHER ORGANISATIONS

As mentioned in the introduction, rapid response is something that has been happening in Kenya for generations. However, over the last few years in Kenya and in the wider East Africa region where reoccurring conflict takes place, development and donor agencies have capitalised on the merits of supporting these systems and have been providing funds to maintain local, small-scale, peace initiatives.

One of the pioneers of rapid response initiatives in Kenya is Oxfam GB, who worked towards setting up District Peace Committees throughout north-eastern Kenya and supporting the work of local peace initiatives in these areas, thereby providing the necessary transport etc. to facilitate necessary dialogues. However, over the past few years Oxfam GB has shifted towards more sustainable development-type activities which aim to tackle the root causes of conflict in these areas where conflict persists on an annual basis. In Garissa for instance, Oxfam GB is now involved in livestock replenishing activities, especially tackling areas where compensation is needed (e.g. GBV cases or cattle raiding cases where compensation is due) but where the assailant is unable to pay, thus leading to further conflict.

For various reasons, including abuse of the rapid response system by provincial and district authorities, Oxfam is collaborating with other NGOs and CBOs and central government in a mainstreamed national rapid response fund, which will help, inter alia, to build the capacity of provincial and district government to work with rapid response in a responsible manner.

This centralised rapid response fund falls under the Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) branch of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). With the aim of initiating a regional rapid response system, a pilot version is being rolled out in Kenya by the National Steering Committee for Peace Building and Conflict Management (NSC), the Africa Peace Forum (APF) and Pact Kenya (providing funding from USAID). Funding for the first six months of this pilot is in the region of \$30,000 and is expected to begin within the next few months. The system will partner with the government and help to establish transparent guidelines for rapid response from the central government through to the community level. The system will be manned by a steering committee comprising of the government (NSC), Pact Kenya, National Research Institute (APF is the fund holder for this), INGOs (represented by Oxfam) and national NGOs (represented by Peacenet). This level will hold the 'basket' of money which will trickle down to the next level which is the District Peace Committees, who will be given responsibility to manage funds at the district level. If more funds are needed for the district-level basket, the DPC can ask the steering committee to consider injecting more funds. From this level, money will be channelled to the divisional level, to CBOs and community groups. At this level, implementers can seek additional funding from the DPCs.

The system has strict guidelines qualifying rapid response¹³ and therefore guidelines on disbursement of funds at the various levels. The national rapid response system will also incorporate a monitoring and evaluation section, done both in-house and by external consultants. This pilot system will inevitably be more bureaucratic than the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund's system although administrative costs have been so far budgeted to a maximum of \$3,000 for the duration of the six months. While the long-term aim is for all rapid response initiatives in Kenya to come on board with this centralised system, there are bound to be initial teething problems that will prevent the easy access to money that the Lt. Gen. Adan Fund is able to do. It is recommendable that the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund maintains its position at present and works parallel to the NRR, addressing gaps that may arise and maintaining trust with communities. However, the Fund's committee must ensure regular communication with the NRR to chart the best course of action for the coming years and to share and capitalise upon lessons learned – it may be the case that the NRR overshadows the need for the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, or it may transpire that the NRR is premature for Kenya and in which case the need for much smaller rapid response funds like the one supported by Peace Direct may still be needed for a few years. However, it is advisable to wait and see what happens with the NRR before a decision on this is taken.

Since 2007 the Arid Lands Department of the Government of Kenya has been implementing a World Bank-funded project on Natural Resource Management which will expire June 2010. Within Natural Resource Management, and under the Drought Management component of the project, falls a key component on conflict management in which Arid Lands is building the capacity of Peace and Development Committees throughout the drought-prone areas of Kenya, enabling them to manage and respond to conflicts. Arid Lands are heavily relied upon in drought and conflict-prone areas in Kenya and have been key players in rapid response to conflict. There is a chance that the project will be extended, but if not, there will certainly be a gap in response on the ground. This highlights the need for an institutionalised system of rapid response at the local level, be it through the NRR system of a more structures Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund system.

In one interview it was mentioned that USAID has in the past built a rapid response component/budget line into their projects. This has been dependent upon personality though as great trust is required with this type of spending. Reporting has been necessary and all per diems etc. paid out using the rapid response money have been signed for in a log book as proof of expenditure.

¹³ Dialogue and Reconciliation Meetings, Strategic Planning Meetings, Capacity Building, Peace Messaging, Rapid Assessments, Documentation and Research, Administrative and Logistical facilitation, Trauma Healing, and Reconstruction of infrastructure crucial for the survival of those affected such as water points, cattle dips etc

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PEACE DIRECT AND RRF IN KENYA

It is most likely that rapid response to conflict will be needed for some years to come in Kenya. Despite well-funded and larger scale endeavours such as creating a nationalised rapid response system, there appears to still be a need for smaller response initiatives to be supported by well-connected groups like the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund. While the impact of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund *per se* has been difficult to identify, money provided to the Fund from Peace Direct has had an impact on local communities and has helped to strengthen both local conflict resolution institutions as well as strengthening a concept (rapid response) that has a pivotal role in the larger process of conflict resolution. However, for the success of the Fund to continue parallel to the larger funding streams, it is necessary for the system to become more sophisticated and work in a complimentary fashion with longer-term peacebuilding development initiatives. The following are recommendations for the Fund and Peace Direct to take on board in order to professionalize and improve on the current system.

- The Lt. Gen. Adan Peace fund needs to receive **more regular and/or predictable strategic funding from Peace Direct**, in order to know what budget is available for small staff incentives/salaries, airtime, office help, M&E, logistical support etc. This would help to professionalize/institutionalise the system. In order for this to happen, the amount transferred from Peace Direct to the Nomadic Healthcare account will have to be increased to take into account expenditures for staff remuneration as well as response initiatives that may take longer and therefore cost more but that link up with long-term peacebuilding efforts. Remunerating staff will increase work output and help to create a system that outlives staff changes.
- If the above is achieved, **institutionalisation of the rapid response process** can take place at the local level where capacity building of local partners (DPCs and other) on peacebuilding approaches can be held. This would in turn lead to greater opportunities for local-level fund raising. Once systems and procedures work properly at the local level, Peace Direct could perhaps think about matching locally-raised grants in a bid to support local peace initiatives.
- In order for rapid response peacebuilding efforts to lead to a more sustainable peace, a **longer-term structure needs to be supported that can respond to conflict in a more strategic manner**. Peace Direct could consider a two-pronged funding system in which 'reactive rapid response' is used to create an entry point into the community to calm tensions in the run up to/during conflict and gaining trust, and in which a parallel funding stream corresponds to 'strategic rapid response' which creates and upholds structures that have a more sustainable impact on conflict resolution. The latter would enable the committee to support local efforts to work with the DPC and DCs, bringing pivotal government bodies on board in a more synchronised and harmonised response to long-term peace.

- **Guidelines outlining what qualifies for rapid response funding** need to be drawn up by the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund and Peace Direct collectively. These should include enough time before response for a thorough analysis of the situation, context and work of others on the ground. This should enable conflict-sensitive rapid response and integration of rapid response initiatives with others on the ground where applicable.
- The Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund committee needs to **improve its coordination with other NGOs and, where appropriate, DPCs**, to extend the impact of its rapid response initiatives beyond simply dousing flames during a conflict. Coordination with other actors on the ground would facilitate the move from in-out action to feeding rapid response into projects that are addressing the root causes of conflict. Currently this cannot happen as all committee members are tied up working for other peacebuilding bodies who they must represent at meetings. It comes as no surprise therefore that most NGOs and peacebuilding bodies met with for this evaluation had heard neither of the committee, nor of Peace Direct. Improved coordination would also lead to better targeting and less duplication among agencies working in rapid response. It is recommended that a representative role could be filled by an intern if funding is limited.
- **Regular accountability checks** by Peace Direct should be mandatory criteria for the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund to receive money. Due to the discretionary nature of rapid response (noted above), the Fund's committee should be held accountable for only 90% (negotiable) of funds coming in, with a 10% margin to be spent in a discrete way.
- In addition, Peace Direct should be receiving **regular reports and analysis** (quarterly if not monthly) from the field, outlining the conflict, the response, monitoring and evaluation, new links that have been made between the committee and other peace actors and any regional news that should be known at the London-level.
- As the committee has no-one at their disposal for monitoring and evaluation and report-writing purposes, it is recommended that a **Peace Studies intern** join the team and act as reporter and M&E person, using some of the funds which are recommended to be sent from Peace Direct to the committee for incentive and logistics/admin costs.
- The Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund, in conjunction with Peace Direct, needs to **restructure the decision-making process** to distribute authority among committee members and create a transparent process.
- There is a clear need for **documentation of best practices** within the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund and this should be shared with other Peace Direct rapid response funds.
- Peace Direct could consider hosting a **cross-border workshop** promoting horizontal learning, bringing together all those working on rapid response under Peace Direct, to feel part of a larger initiative than those at country-level.
- In the interim period during which the national rapid response system is rolled out, the **Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund's committee should ensure good liaison with the NSC and other members of the steering groups** to assess what space and need there is for a smaller outfit. It is certainly



recommendable that the present system of the Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund is maintained in Kenya (albeit with the recommendations outlined above), but this should be re-evaluated once the NRR pilot period has come to a close.

ANNEX 1: LIST OF INFORMANTS

Name	Organisation	Location
Dekha Ibrahim Abdi	Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund	Nairobi
Halima Shuria	Camel Bell Ltd.	Nairobi
Ali Ahmed	Camel Bell Ltd.	Nairobi
Fatuma Abdikadir	Arid Lands, Office of the President	Nairobi
Nuria Abdullahi Abdi	Interpeace	Nairobi
Barasa Edwin Mang'eni	Africa Peace Forum	Nairobi
Mohamed Ali	Pact Kenya	Nairobi/Garissa
Michael Karanja	Pact Kenya	Nairobi
Angela Yoder-Maina	Pact Kenya	Nairobi
Khalif Sheikh Mohamed	SUPKEM (based in Mandera)	Nairobi
George Wachira	Nairobi Peace Institute	Nairobi
Daniel Kiptugen	Oxfam GB	Nairobi
Khamis Kabeu	Lt. Gen. Adan Peace Fund	Isiolo
Lotte Lund	MS Kenya	Isiolo
Jarso Halkano	District Peace Committee	Isiolo
Frederick Maina	District Peace Committee	Isiolo
Batula Abukar	Nakuru Emergency Support Group	Nakuru
Mariana Muia	Centre for Conflict Resolution	Nakuru
Apollos Francis	Centre for Conflict Resolution	Nakuru
James Gitone	District Peace Committee	Nakuru
Josephine Rono	Community member	Mauche
James Kones	Pastor	Mauche
Steven Chepkwany	Pastor	Mauche
Peter Kirui	Director of primary school	Mauche
Zeinab Ali	Garissa Women for Peace	Garissa
Halima Mohamed Haji	Women Concern Kenya	Garissa
Sheikh Ali Gure	Sheikh	Garissa
Saadi Noor	Arid Lands	Garissa
Osman Ibrahim Abdi	Garissa Peace and Development Committee	Garissa
Gabow Abdi Bare	Garissa Peace and Development Committee	Garissa
Sheikh Hassan Amey	Sheikh	Garissa
Sheikh Ismail Bashir	Sheikh	Garissa
Amina Hassan	Women for Peace and Development	Mandera
Mama Rahma	Women Care and Concern	Mandera (Elwak)