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East West Institute, Serbia/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Background


During his years in power, Slobodan Milosevic oversaw the gradual disintegration of the political, economic and social infrastructure of Serbia, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, warfare on a scale not seen in Europe since WWII and increasingly suffocating international isolation and sanctions. The NATO bombing of Serbia between March and June 1999 in response to the Serb violence in Kosovo only deepened the crisis. While the figures speak for themselves - such as damage to Serbia's infrastructure estimated at over $4bn - the psychological costs were similarly high.

One source describes the prevailing mood amongst the Serbian population as being one of deep uncertainty, victimisation and isolation.1 It is no wonder, then, that the International Crisis Group called Milosevic ‘the single greatest cause of instability and conflict in South-eastern Europe’.2 The removal of Milosevic, however, seemed a monumental task.

With increasing control of all forms of media within Serbia, he used the NATO bombings to strengthen his hand by arguing that the West was intent on destroying the Serb people. His indictment for war crimes made many pro-democracy leaders increasingly nervous, seeing that if Milosevic had no-where to run he would most likely fight harder than ever to maintain his power and authority within Serbia. Elections, therefore, would be a sham and in all probability would end in violence and further repression. Meanwhile the opposition forces were viewed as weak, fragmented and indecisive, lacking the credibility to mount a serious threat to the regime.3 This view was particularly prevalent among western governments who largely ignored them.

Involvement


In July 1999, just after the devastating NATO bombing campaign, the East West Institute and the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised a conference in Bratislava, Slovakia, entitled ‘The Future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the context of post war reconstruction’.

The conference brought together representatives of pro-democracy forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) including the major opposition parties, trade unions, NGOs and independent media along with key figures from the international community (EU, Council of Europe, OSCE etc). This was the first time that anti Milosevic groups from all sectors of Serbian society had been brought together. The US-based East West Institute, founded in 1981 as a think tank on traditional security issues had, since the collapse of Communism, focused on research, networking and low-key conferences to help support the development of democracy and free enterprise in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. Its early work - acting as a bridge between East and West, building confidence in order to reduce the risk of armed conflict, had been praised by key Cold War politicians over the years and was widely respected. At the Bratislava meeting, Serbian pro-democracy participants voiced their concerns that the economic and political situation in the FRY would deteriorate even further and that Milosevic would tighten his grip on power.

Worryingly, some participants predicted an impending civil war or a ‘fascist coup’ by forces close to the Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj. Amid continuing international isolation and a crippling embargo the participants felt that Serbia desperately needed to re-engage with the rest of the international community so that it could begin to work towards an open society.4

When discussing the obstacles that lay in their path towards the goal of a free and democratic society, it was felt that the removal from office of Serbia's current leadership was not enough: pro-democracy forces were too fragmented to mount a credible alternative to the current system. As a result, two important initiatives were launched. The first was the creation of a ‘Community for Change’ - a consortium of pro-democracy forces which would engage the Serbian population and the international community in a common vision for the country. The second key outcome was the setting up of a Task Force to assist in the formation of the Community for Change and to develop a comprehensive action plan for the future of the FRY.

EWI, which was serving as the Secretariat for the Task Force, immediately set to work, organising a series of meetings between September 1999 and February 2000 which brought the Community for Change into close contact with international actors such as the Council of Europe. Here they were able to discuss some of the most vital issues that faced the country. At the same time, the Task Force organised meetings in Belgrade which soon became an important forum for the representatives of the opposition parties to meet each other and with NGOs, trade unions and the media.

This gradual process of coalition building played a significant role in the decision by all the main opposition groups to call for early general elections, followed by street protests if the demand was not met. Such a move had been proposed at the first meeting in Bratislava in July 1999 and was followed by intense discussions at the Task Force Belgrade meetings.

When, on July 6th, Milosevic changed the constitution so that the President of the FRY would be elected by a popular vote and early presidential elections would be held, the pro-democracy forces were given an opportunity to prove to themselves and to their many sceptics (both inside and outside the country) that they were able to unite and win at the polls. This was a decisive moment. Up until this point many experts especially in the west, argued that the opposition, united or not, would not win the elections. The International Crisis Group recommended that the international community not support these flawed elections lest they hand Milosevic a sham victory, further commenting that ‘serious doubts remain about the capacity of the opposition to mount a credible campaign...nor is there a consensus behind any one figure as an agent of change and an alternative to Milosevic.’5

A Bratislava II conference scheduled for July 7th - the day after the constitutional changes - was devoted entirely to the task of working towards a common vision for the elections. The meeting covered every major issue from nominating a presidential candidate and preparing the election campaign to strengthening horizontal networking.

Soon after, nearly all of the opposition parties grouped together to form the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), nominating Vojislav Kostunica as their presidential candidate. A massive ‘Go to vote’ campaign was launched and preparations were made to field trained observers in each of the 160 municipalities in Serbia. As the Serbian newspaper Danas noted ‘The analysts of the Left probably could not have predicted such a degree of unity even in their worst nightmares.’6

Outcome


After a comprehensive and exhaustive campaign mounted by the united opposition, the election results yielded a clear victory for Kostunica’s DOS coalition. When Milosevic attempted to have the results annulled, a wave of non-violent protests spread throughout the country and he was forced to concede defeat. The DOS went on to win the Serbian elections in December and many members of the Bratislava Process Task Force became members of parliament, some even joining the Cabinet.

It is difficult to know to what extent the Bratislava Process contributed to the successful overthrow of the Milosevic regime. However, members of the Task Force, some of whom are now members of the government, privately attest to the importance of the initiative, pointing out that it did provide the first real opportunity for the pro-democracy forces to meet and coalesce around a common strategy.

Internally displaced:
Unavailable

Refugees:
Unavailable

Deaths:
Unavailable

Cost of Involvement:
$240,000 to December 2000

Footnotes


1. Demes, Pavol. Civil Society Development in Post War Serbia - key findings and observations, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, September 1999, p.3.
2. International Crisis Group, Serbia's Embattled Opposition, Report No. 94, May 2000, p.3.
3. ICG briefing August 2000. See www.crisisweb.org
4. This echoed polls conducted by a variety of organisations, including the Center for Policy Studies in Belgrade, which showed that 60% of Serbian people cited improved relations with the West as the top policy priority for the country.
5. ICG briefing August 2000. See www.crisisweb.org
6. Spasic, Jasmina 'Victory without Gloating' in Danas, September 30th -1st October 2000.

For more information


See www.iews.cz/frytf/index2.html for a complete overview of the Bratislava process. For an interesting look at the dissolution of Yugoslavia read 'The Death of Yugoslavia' by Laura Silber and Alan Little (Penguin Books, London, 1996). For a look at the rise and fall of Milosevic read 'Milosevic and Markovic: The End of the Serbian Fairytale' by Slavoljub Djukic (McGill-Queen's University Press, Canada, 2001).
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